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Page 1 Case 1:01-cv-02643-JFM Document 30 ~ Filed 06/04/2002 Page1of6
FILED
WS. OS Out
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Pia 7BiCT De Meee eyo
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
2002 JUN -4 A 8 YQ
DENNIS ARTHUR TALBOT, JR. *
* LENK’S OF. fay
Vv. * Civil No. JFM-01-2643 AT BALTIMORE
* nn DEPUTY
U.S. FOODSERVICE, INC.. et al. *
2K ok ok
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Dennis Arthur Talbot, Jr., a former warehouse employee of Defendant U.S.
Foodservice ("Foodservice"), has brought an action for employment discrimination under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000¢e et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA," or "the Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Plaintiff has
sued both Foodservice and the union to which he belongs, Local Umon No. 570 ("Local 570"),
an affiliate of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO. Previously, I granted
Foodservice’s motion for summary judgment as to the ADA claim Talbot made against it. See
Talbot v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc., 191 F, Supp. 2d 637, 641-42 (D. Md. 2002).' I now grant Local
570's motion for summary judgment as to the Title VII and ADA claims that Talbot asserts
against it.
I.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that, when a court considers matters outside
the pleadings, a motion to dismiss "shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed
of as provided in Rule 56... ."_ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). In order to decide this motion, which
'The facts of this case are set forth in the earlier opinion, see Talbot, 191 F. Supp. 2d at
638-39, and are incorporated here by reference.Page 2 Case 1:01-cv-02643-JFM Document 30 ~ Filed 06/04/2002 Page2of6
deals exclusively with administrative exhaustion of plaintiffs ADA and Title VII claims against
Local 570, I must consider two items of evidence extrinsic to the pleadings: plaintiff's Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charge of discrimination, which is part of the
record in this case, and an EEOC discharge questionnaire that plaintiff submitted in opposition to
defendant’s motion. Thus, | will treat defendant’s motion, which was styled as a motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, as a motion for summary judgment. See
Talbot, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 639 (converting motion to dismiss to motion for summary judgment in
order to consider same two documents).
Il.
Local 570 asserts that plaintiff may not maintain Title VII or ADA claims against it
because he did not refer to Local 570 in his EEOC charge of discrimination, which he filed in
October 2000. When asked on the charge form to "name[] . . . the employer, labor organization,
employment agency apprenticeship committee, state or local government agency who
discriminated against" him, plaintiff responded "U.S. Foodservice." Plaintiff contends that his
claims against Local 570 are not barred because he identified the union as an organization that
discriminated against him on a "Discharge, Job Elimination, or Layoff" questionnaire he
provided to the EEOC in April 2001.
An action under Title VII "may be brought only ‘against the respondent named in the
charge." Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1)) (emphasis added). Similarly, because the ADA incorporates by reference the
administrative exhaustion procedures that apply to claims asserted under Title VII, sec 42 U.S.C.
§ 12117(a); Talbot, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 639, defendants who are not named in a charge of
2Page 3 Case 1:01-cv-02643-JFM Document 30 Filed 06/04/2002 Page 3of6
discrimination also would not be liable under the ADA. As the Fourth Circuit explained in
Causey, "The purposes of this requirement include putting the charged party on notice of the
complaint and allowing the EEOC to attempt reconciliation." 162 F.3d at 800.
In this case, plaintiff failed to mention Local 570 anywhere in his charge of
discrimination, and named only his employer, Foodservice, as the entity that discriminated
against him. Further, he did not specify nor even allude to any discrimination by the union in his
charge narrative. As a result, Local 570 did not receive notice of plaintiff's allegations until
October 9, 2001, when it was provided with the charge as an attachment to plaintiff's complaint
in this case. (See Valentine Aff. J] 4-6.) This was more than one year after Talbot had been
fired by Foodservice and nearly a year after the union exhausted its pursuit of a grievance on
Talbot’s behalf.’ Evidence submitted by the union establishes that the EEOC has no record of
having investigated whether the union discriminated against Talbot. (See Def.’s Reply Exs. 1a,
lb.) Because plaintiff failed to hst Local 570 in his charge of discrimination, and failed to refer
to discrimination by the union in the charge. he has not filed a timely charge of discrimination
against the union. Therefore, he has not exhausted his administrative remedies as to Title VII or
ADA claims against the union. See, e.g., Bratton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 649 F.2d 658, 666
(9th Cir. 1980) (affirming dismissal of Title VII claims against union by plaintiffs whose
?Koodservice fired Talbot on October 4, 2000, allegedly for charging the company for
time he had not worked. See Talbot, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 639. The union pursued a grievance on
Talbot’s behalf, protesting his firing through the procedure outlined in its collective bargaining
agreement, but was denied at each step of the grievance procedure by Foodservice. (See
Valentine Aff. § 3.) On October 20, 2000, the union’s executive board voted against arbitrating
Talbot’s grievance. (See id.) It notified him of that decision by a letter dated October 30, 2000.
(See id.)Page 4 Case 1:01-cv-02643-JFM Document 30 Filed 06/04/2002 Page4of6
"charges neither named the Union nor alleged facts from which it could be inferred that the
Union .. . violated Title VII"); Gilmore v. Local 295, Int’] Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of America, 798 F. Supp. 1030, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (dismissing
claims against union where it was not named in the charge, did not share a "substantial identity"
with the employer named in the charge, and was not alleged to have participated in a "common
discriminatory scheme" with the employer); cf. Sanders v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 1995 WL
418585, at *4 (D. Md. 1995) (limiting litigant to those charges against her union that she
discussed in an EEOC charge).
Plaintiff, who opposed this motion pro se, argues that he did identify the union on a
questionnaire that he claims he provided to the EEOC on April 19, 2001, six months after he
filed his charge of discrimination. In the questionnaire, he identifies the union when asked to
name "the employer, employment agency, or organization that discriminated against you." He
also lists the union president as a contact for the organization. Although information on an
EEOC questionnaire may be considered in determining the scope of an investigation that would
stem from a charge of discrimination, see Lane v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d
749, 756 (D. Md. 1999), plaintiff points to no cases in which such questionnaires have been used
by courts to supplement the charge on the critical issue of the identity of the discriminating party.
Indeed, allowing the questionnaire to serve this function would undermine the rationale set forth
in Causey for the requirement that parties sued under Title VII be named in the charge: namely,
providing notice to the party accused of discrimination and an opportunity to conciliate.
Even if I were to consider the questionnaire in this case, plaintiff's argument still would
be unavailing. The questionnaire is devoid of any indication of the manner in which the union
4Page 5 Case 1:01-cv-02643-JFM Document30 Filed 06/04/2002 Page 5of6
allegedly discriminated against plaintiff. Rather, it asserts that the person responsible for
plaintiff's firing was a vice president of operations at Foodservice who was plaintiff's immediate
supervisor, and that plaintiff was fired for allegedly "charging the Co. for time not worked.”
Plaintiff also complains that he was not made aware of any "Co. policy for discharge for
admitting to falling asleep on the job." Plaintiffs repeated, shorthand references to the company
support his naming of Foodservice on the charge of discrimination. Meanwhile, his bare
reference to the union would not indicate to an investigator that he or she should investigate
discrimination in the union’s handling of plaintiffs grievance, since plaintiff does not refer in his
answers on the questionnaire either to the grievance procedure or the failure of the union to
arbitrate the grievance.*
Plaintiff also appears to argue for an equitable exception to the administrative exhaustion
requirement, indicating in a letter to the court that he filed in opposition to this motion that he
“was told by the EEOC’s intake clerk that since I already had [a] charge presently on file that
they would forward this complaint to .. . the investigator handling the case I filed against U.S.
Foodservice. [The investigator] apparently didn’t notify Local 570 of the charge and she had
adequate time to do so." He requests that he not "be held accountable for [the] EEOC’s negligent
mishandling of my case." Even assuming such an equitable exception exists, plaintiff is
mistaken in his belief that it would apply to him. The EEOC did not, as he asserts, fail to notify
Local 570 of a charge of discrimination filed against it, for what plaintiff had filed was not a
second charge, but merely a questionnaire that the EEOC apparently believed was meant to
*In his Amended Complaint, plaintiff contends that the union refused to pursue his
grievance through arbitration because of his race, color, and disability. (Am. Compl. § 12.)
5Page 6 Case 1:01-cv-02643-JFM Document 30 Filed 06/04/2002 Page 6of6
supplement plaintiff's earlier charge against Foodservice.
To the extent plaintiff is claiming that he is entitled to an equitable exemption because he
informed the EEOC that he intended the questionnaire to represent a charge against Local 570, or
was led by an EEOC employee to believe the questionnaire represented a charge against the
union, I agree with the court in Horne v. Cub Foods, 1995 WL 319629, at *3 (N.D. IIL. 1995). It
explained that a plaintiff's claims as to conversations with EEOC employees cannot relieve a
plaintiff from administrative exhaustion requirements. Unlike written documentation, the court
explained, "[o]ral representations have a different character in that they are not verifiable and do
not offer a lasting representation of the claimant’s case." Id. Otherwise, the court stated, "a Title
VII plaintiff [could] press any claim in a lawsuit as long as she represents that she ‘discussed’
that claim with an EEOC employee. Such an exception to the scope-of-the-charge requirement
would swallow the rule." Id. Allowing plaintiff here to add claims against a party not named in
his charge of discrimination would similarly swallow the rule enunciated by the Fourth Circuit in
Causey, that Title VII claims may only be brought against those named in a charge of
discrimination. Accordingly, defendant’s motion will be granted.
Date: ¥ nvr SL. met by
rederick Motz
Gnited States District hud
PDF Page 1
PlainSite Cover Page
PDF Page 2
Case 1:01-cv-02643-JFM Document 30 ~ Filed 06/04/2002 Page1of6
FILED
WS. OS Out
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Pia 7BiCT De Meee eyo
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
2002 JUN -4 A 8 YQ
DENNIS ARTHUR TALBOT, JR. *
* LENK’S OF. fay
Vv. * Civil No. JFM-01-2643 AT BALTIMORE
* nn DEPUTY
U.S. FOODSERVICE, INC.. et al. *
2K ok ok
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Dennis Arthur Talbot, Jr., a former warehouse employee of Defendant U.S.
Foodservice ("Foodservice"), has brought an action for employment discrimination under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000¢e et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA," or "the Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Plaintiff has
sued both Foodservice and the union to which he belongs, Local Umon No. 570 ("Local 570"),
an affiliate of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO. Previously, I granted
Foodservice’s motion for summary judgment as to the ADA claim Talbot made against it. See
Talbot v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc., 191 F, Supp. 2d 637, 641-42 (D. Md. 2002).' I now grant Local
570's motion for summary judgment as to the Title VII and ADA claims that Talbot asserts
against it.
I.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that, when a court considers matters outside
the pleadings, a motion to dismiss "shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed
of as provided in Rule 56... ."_ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). In order to decide this motion, which
'The facts of this case are set forth in the earlier opinion, see Talbot, 191 F. Supp. 2d at
638-39, and are incorporated here by reference.
PDF Page 3
Case 1:01-cv-02643-JFM Document 30 ~ Filed 06/04/2002 Page2of6
deals exclusively with administrative exhaustion of plaintiffs ADA and Title VII claims against
Local 570, I must consider two items of evidence extrinsic to the pleadings: plaintiff's Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charge of discrimination, which is part of the
record in this case, and an EEOC discharge questionnaire that plaintiff submitted in opposition to
defendant’s motion. Thus, | will treat defendant’s motion, which was styled as a motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, as a motion for summary judgment. See
Talbot, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 639 (converting motion to dismiss to motion for summary judgment in
order to consider same two documents).
Il.
Local 570 asserts that plaintiff may not maintain Title VII or ADA claims against it
because he did not refer to Local 570 in his EEOC charge of discrimination, which he filed in
October 2000. When asked on the charge form to "name[] . . . the employer, labor organization,
employment agency apprenticeship committee, state or local government agency who
discriminated against" him, plaintiff responded "U.S. Foodservice." Plaintiff contends that his
claims against Local 570 are not barred because he identified the union as an organization that
discriminated against him on a "Discharge, Job Elimination, or Layoff" questionnaire he
provided to the EEOC in April 2001.
An action under Title VII "may be brought only ‘against the respondent named in the
charge." Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1)) (emphasis added). Similarly, because the ADA incorporates by reference the
administrative exhaustion procedures that apply to claims asserted under Title VII, sec 42 U.S.C.
§ 12117(a); Talbot, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 639, defendants who are not named in a charge of
2
PDF Page 4
Case 1:01-cv-02643-JFM Document 30 Filed 06/04/2002 Page 3of6
discrimination also would not be liable under the ADA. As the Fourth Circuit explained in
Causey, "The purposes of this requirement include putting the charged party on notice of the
complaint and allowing the EEOC to attempt reconciliation." 162 F.3d at 800.
In this case, plaintiff failed to mention Local 570 anywhere in his charge of
discrimination, and named only his employer, Foodservice, as the entity that discriminated
against him. Further, he did not specify nor even allude to any discrimination by the union in his
charge narrative. As a result, Local 570 did not receive notice of plaintiff's allegations until
October 9, 2001, when it was provided with the charge as an attachment to plaintiff's complaint
in this case. (See Valentine Aff. J] 4-6.) This was more than one year after Talbot had been
fired by Foodservice and nearly a year after the union exhausted its pursuit of a grievance on
Talbot’s behalf.’ Evidence submitted by the union establishes that the EEOC has no record of
having investigated whether the union discriminated against Talbot. (See Def.’s Reply Exs. 1a,
lb.) Because plaintiff failed to hst Local 570 in his charge of discrimination, and failed to refer
to discrimination by the union in the charge. he has not filed a timely charge of discrimination
against the union. Therefore, he has not exhausted his administrative remedies as to Title VII or
ADA claims against the union. See, e.g., Bratton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 649 F.2d 658, 666
(9th Cir. 1980) (affirming dismissal of Title VII claims against union by plaintiffs whose
?Koodservice fired Talbot on October 4, 2000, allegedly for charging the company for
time he had not worked. See Talbot, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 639. The union pursued a grievance on
Talbot’s behalf, protesting his firing through the procedure outlined in its collective bargaining
agreement, but was denied at each step of the grievance procedure by Foodservice. (See
Valentine Aff. § 3.) On October 20, 2000, the union’s executive board voted against arbitrating
Talbot’s grievance. (See id.) It notified him of that decision by a letter dated October 30, 2000.
(See id.)
PDF Page 5
Case 1:01-cv-02643-JFM Document 30 Filed 06/04/2002 Page4of6
"charges neither named the Union nor alleged facts from which it could be inferred that the
Union .. . violated Title VII"); Gilmore v. Local 295, Int’] Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of America, 798 F. Supp. 1030, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (dismissing
claims against union where it was not named in the charge, did not share a "substantial identity"
with the employer named in the charge, and was not alleged to have participated in a "common
discriminatory scheme" with the employer); cf. Sanders v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 1995 WL
418585, at *4 (D. Md. 1995) (limiting litigant to those charges against her union that she
discussed in an EEOC charge).
Plaintiff, who opposed this motion pro se, argues that he did identify the union on a
questionnaire that he claims he provided to the EEOC on April 19, 2001, six months after he
filed his charge of discrimination. In the questionnaire, he identifies the union when asked to
name "the employer, employment agency, or organization that discriminated against you." He
also lists the union president as a contact for the organization. Although information on an
EEOC questionnaire may be considered in determining the scope of an investigation that would
stem from a charge of discrimination, see Lane v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d
749, 756 (D. Md. 1999), plaintiff points to no cases in which such questionnaires have been used
by courts to supplement the charge on the critical issue of the identity of the discriminating party.
Indeed, allowing the questionnaire to serve this function would undermine the rationale set forth
in Causey for the requirement that parties sued under Title VII be named in the charge: namely,
providing notice to the party accused of discrimination and an opportunity to conciliate.
Even if I were to consider the questionnaire in this case, plaintiff's argument still would
be unavailing. The questionnaire is devoid of any indication of the manner in which the union
4
PDF Page 6
Case 1:01-cv-02643-JFM Document30 Filed 06/04/2002 Page 5of6
allegedly discriminated against plaintiff. Rather, it asserts that the person responsible for
plaintiff's firing was a vice president of operations at Foodservice who was plaintiff's immediate
supervisor, and that plaintiff was fired for allegedly "charging the Co. for time not worked.”
Plaintiff also complains that he was not made aware of any "Co. policy for discharge for
admitting to falling asleep on the job." Plaintiffs repeated, shorthand references to the company
support his naming of Foodservice on the charge of discrimination. Meanwhile, his bare
reference to the union would not indicate to an investigator that he or she should investigate
discrimination in the union’s handling of plaintiffs grievance, since plaintiff does not refer in his
answers on the questionnaire either to the grievance procedure or the failure of the union to
arbitrate the grievance.*
Plaintiff also appears to argue for an equitable exception to the administrative exhaustion
requirement, indicating in a letter to the court that he filed in opposition to this motion that he
“was told by the EEOC’s intake clerk that since I already had [a] charge presently on file that
they would forward this complaint to .. . the investigator handling the case I filed against U.S.
Foodservice. [The investigator] apparently didn’t notify Local 570 of the charge and she had
adequate time to do so." He requests that he not "be held accountable for [the] EEOC’s negligent
mishandling of my case." Even assuming such an equitable exception exists, plaintiff is
mistaken in his belief that it would apply to him. The EEOC did not, as he asserts, fail to notify
Local 570 of a charge of discrimination filed against it, for what plaintiff had filed was not a
second charge, but merely a questionnaire that the EEOC apparently believed was meant to
*In his Amended Complaint, plaintiff contends that the union refused to pursue his
grievance through arbitration because of his race, color, and disability. (Am. Compl. § 12.)
5
PDF Page 7
Case 1:01-cv-02643-JFM Document 30 Filed 06/04/2002 Page 6of6
supplement plaintiff's earlier charge against Foodservice.
To the extent plaintiff is claiming that he is entitled to an equitable exemption because he
informed the EEOC that he intended the questionnaire to represent a charge against Local 570, or
was led by an EEOC employee to believe the questionnaire represented a charge against the
union, I agree with the court in Horne v. Cub Foods, 1995 WL 319629, at *3 (N.D. IIL. 1995). It
explained that a plaintiff's claims as to conversations with EEOC employees cannot relieve a
plaintiff from administrative exhaustion requirements. Unlike written documentation, the court
explained, "[o]ral representations have a different character in that they are not verifiable and do
not offer a lasting representation of the claimant’s case." Id. Otherwise, the court stated, "a Title
VII plaintiff [could] press any claim in a lawsuit as long as she represents that she ‘discussed’
that claim with an EEOC employee. Such an exception to the scope-of-the-charge requirement
would swallow the rule." Id. Allowing plaintiff here to add claims against a party not named in
his charge of discrimination would similarly swallow the rule enunciated by the Fourth Circuit in
Causey, that Title VII claims may only be brought against those named in a charge of
discrimination. Accordingly, defendant’s motion will be granted.
Date: ¥ nvr SL. met by
rederick Motz
Gnited States District hud
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