PlainSite :: Caleb Mendoza v. Tesla, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa Case No. C24-02690 Document 1: Complaint

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Electroni callyFi led Superi or Court of CA Countyof Contra Costa 10/9/2024 4:25 PM By:C. Jacala, Deputy

Brett J. Schreiber, Esq. (SBN 239707) Srinivas Hanumadass, Esq. (SBN 228547) Carmela Birnbaum, Esq. (SBN 190495) Per local Rule, Thi s case i s assi gned to Singleton Schreiber, LLP Judge Treat, Charles S, for all purposes.

591 Camino de la Reina, Ste. 1025 San Diego, California 92108 Tel: (619) 771-3473 Fax: (619) 255-1515 bschreiber@singletonschreiber.com vas@singletonschreiber.com cbirnbaum@singletonschreiber.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs Caleb Mendoza, Eduardo Mendoza and Maria Mendoza, and Estate of Genesis Giovanni Mendoza Martinez, by and through its personal representatives Eduardo and Maria Elena Mendoza

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA

Caleb Mendoza; Eduardo Mendoza and Maria Mendoza; and Estate of Genesis Giovanni Mendoza Martinez, by and through its personal representatives, Eduardo and Maria Elena Mendoza,

Strict Products Liability Negligent Products Liability Negligent Misrepresentation Fraudulent Misrepresentation Concealment Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

7. Wrongful Death

Tesla, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants.

C24-02690

Complaint for Damages

Plaintiffs,

Case No.:

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiffs CALEB MENDOZA, EDUARDO and MARIA MENDOZA, and ESTATE OF

GENESIS GIOVANNI MENDOZA MARTINEZ, by and through its personal representatives

Eduardo and Maria Elena Mendoza allege on information and belief as follows:

PARTIES

Plaintiff CALEB MENDOZA (“Plaintiff” or “Mendoza”) is an adult, and at all times

was, an adult citizen of California who resides on Bethal Island, County of Contra Costa in California. 2.

Plaintiffs EDUARDO and MARIA MENDOZA are, and at all times were, adult

citizens of California who reside on Bethal Island, County of Contra Costa in California. Plaintiffs

are the mother and father of Decedent GENESIS GIOVANNI MENDOZA MARTINEZ

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(“Giovanni”).

GENESIS GIOVANNI MENDOZA MARTINEZ (“Giovanni”) was born June 21,

1991. He died at the age of 33 years old as a direct and proximate result of the misconduct of the

Defendants as alleged herein. Prior to his death, Giovanni suffered damages as a direct and proximate

result of the misconduct of the Defendants as alleged herein.

Plaintiffs Eduardo and Maria Elena Mendoza in their capacity as personal

representatives of the ESTATE OF GENESIS GIOVANNI MENDOZA MARTINEZ, brings a

survival action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 337.30 to recover the damages Giovanni

suffered prior to his death.

Defendant TESLA, INC. (“Tesla”) is a Delaware corporation that had its principal

place of business in Palo Alto, California, from approximately 2003 until December 1, 2021, at which

point it moved its principal place of business to Austin, Texas. Tesla designs, develops, manufactures,

tests, markets, distributes, sells, and leases electric vehicles under the brand name “Tesla.” It also

offers services related to those vehicles, including designing, developing, and periodically sending

over-the-air updates for advanced driver assistance systems (“ADAS”) software in Tesla vehicles.

Tesla was the manufacturer of a Tesla Model S with license number 7HSJ063 and VIN

5YJSA1H10EFP44876, referenced throughout this complaint as the “Subject Vehicle.” DOE PARTIES

The true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise

of Defendants Does 1 to 100, inclusive and/or the factual bases of liability of Defendants Does 1

through 100 are unknown and Plaintiffs therefore sue said defendants by such fictitious names

pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure section 474. Plaintiffs will seek to amend this Complaint to

allege the true names and capacities when the same have been ascertained.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe that each defendant named herein as a DOE is

responsible in some manner for the events, occurrences, and circumstances that form the basis of

this suit, in that each defendant designated herein as a DOE is responsible, negligently or in some

other actionable manner, for the events and happenings hereinafter referred to and caused injuries

and damages proximately thereby to Plaintiffs either through said Defendants’ own negligent conduct

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or through the conduct of their agents, servants, or employees. As used herein the term “Defendants”

means all Defendants, including DOES 1 to 100, both jointly and severally, and references by name

to any named Defendant shall include all Defendants, both jointly and severally.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that, at all times mentioned

herein, Defendants and each of them, were the agents, servants, employees, joint venturers, or

contractors of their co-defendants, and in doing the fats herein alleged they were acting within the

scope, course and authority of said agency, employment, contract, or joint venture. Each and every

defendant, as aforesaid, when acting as a principal, actively participated in, controlled, authorized,

aided and abetted, incited, compelled, coerced, directed, or subsequently ratified and/or adopted,

each and all of the acts or conduct alleged herein, with full knowledge of all the facts and

circumstances, including, but not limited to, full knowledge of each and all of the violations of

Plaintiffs’ rights and the damages to Plaintiff proximately caused thereby.

JURISDICTION & VENUE

Constitution Article VI, Section 10 which grants the Superior Court “original jurisdiction in

all causes except those given by statute to other trial courts.”

10.

11.

12.

The amount in controversy is well in excess of the Court’s jurisdictional threshold of

$35,000.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section

395 in that the injury to Plaintiffs occurred within the County of Contra Costa.

Tesla is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of the State of California as

this lawsuit arises out of, and is directly related to, Tesla’s business activities in the State of California.

The California Superior Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to California

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Tesla continuously misrepresented its cars’ ability to provide safe, autonomous driving despite an awareness of the deadly consequences.

13.

For the past decade, the auto industry has been developing autonomous vehicle

technology.

14.

SAE International (“SAE”), is a U.S.-based professional association and standards

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development organization. In 2014, SAE took a leading role in the development of autonomous

vehicle technology standards by publishing the initial version of SAE J3016 Recommended Practice:

Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles,

commonly referred to as the SAE Levels of Driving Automation (“SAE Levels”).

15.

The SAE Levels provide a taxonomy of vehicle driving automation systems with

detailed definitions for six levels for driving automation, ranging from no driving automation (SAE

Level 0) to full driving automation (SAE Level 5). 1 The SAE Levels can be summarized as follows:

•

Level 0—No Driving Automation: The human driver performs all driving tasks (steering, acceleration, braking, etc.), although vehicles may have safety features like automatic emergency braking and forward collision warning.

•

Level 1—Driver Assistance: The vehicle has features that provide a small degree of automation over the vehicle’s acceleration, braking, or steering (e.g., adaptive cruise control, lane-keeping assistance).

•

Level 2—Partial Driving Automation: The vehicle can perform multiple driving tasks (e.g., acceleration, steering) but remains under the human driver’s constant supervision, responsibility, and control.

•

Level 3—Conditional Driving Automation: The vehicle can take full control of certain driving tasks such that the human driver need not remain constantly alert but must be ready to intervene upon request from the vehicle.

•

Level 4—High Driving Automation: The vehicle can perform all driving tasks in specific locations or environments, but human override is still an option.

•

Level 5—Full Driving Automation: The vehicle can perform all driving tasks under all conditions, with zero human attention or interaction required.

16.

SAE refers to Level 1 and 2 technologies as systems or features that provide “driver

support,” but reserves the term “automated driving” for Levels 3, 4, and 5. 17.

The SAE levels are a widely accepted international standard and have been adopted

by regulatory agencies such as the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”), National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”), and U.S. Department of Transportation.

18.

Tesla began equipping its vehicles with ADAS technology in 2014. Specifically, Tesla

began equipping vehicles hardware that was intended to allow vehicles to automate some steering, SAE International, Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for OnRoad Motor Vehicles (revised Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.sae.org/standards/content/j3016_202104

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braking, and acceleration functions, although the software to control those functions was not yet

available.

19.

At all times relevant to this complaint, Tesla’s ADAS technology has only ever been

capable of SAE Level 2 autonomy. Tesla’s ADAS technology relies primarily on cameras and image-

recognition software with limited assistance from a single forward-facing radar unit. By contrast,

Level 3 and 4 systems rely on a more robust and expensive combination of cameras, multiple radar

units, and one or more light-detection-and-ranging (“LIDAR”) units. The general consensus among

autonomous vehicle experts is that truly autonomous, self-driving cars cannot be achieved without

some reliance on lidar technology. But Tesla has refused to use this technology because of expense

and aesthetics.

20.

Consistent with the Level 2 limitations of its system, Tesla originally called its ADAS

features “advanced driver assistance.” 21.

But in or about 2014 or 2015, a group of Tesla officers and directors—including

Tesla’s CEO, Elon Musk—decided to change the name to “Autopilot.” Tesla engineers expressed

concerns that the name was misleading and suggested less misleading options such as “Copilot.”

Musk and other Tesla officers and directors rejected those concerns and suggestions. 2 Musk and

other Tesla officers and directors favored “Autopilot” specifically because they believed the public

would associate it with truly self-driving cars, and that the perception Tesla was making self-driving

cars would increase sales, attract investments, and drive up Tesla’s stock price.

22.

As a result, at all times relevant to this complaint, Tesla has marketed its ADAS

technology under various names, including “Autopilot,” “Enhanced Autopilot,” and/or “Full Self-

Driving Capability,” all of which falsely—and intentionally—imply that the vehicles equipped with

such software can operate at SAE Levels 3, 4, and 5, when in reality they are SAE Level 2 at best.

Tesla compounded the public misperception that its cars are self-driving by distributing promotional

materials and videos that depict Tesla’s vehicles driving themselves with no need for a human driver.

Cade Metz & Neal E. Boudette, “Inside Tesla as Elon Musk Pushed an Unflinching Vision for Self-Driving Cars,” The New York Times (Dec. 6, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/06/technology/tesla-autopilot-elon-musk.html

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In June 2014, Tesla’s CEO and co-founder, Elon Musk stated during a Shareholder Meeting that

"I’m confident that—in less than a year—you’ll be able to go from highway onramp to highway exit

without touching any controls.”

23.

In October 2015, Tesla released its version 7.0 software, which enabled Autopilot on

Model S vehicles. Robert Rose, the head of the Autopilot project, left Tesla shortly before the release.

Evan Nakano, a Tesla Autopilot engineer who had worked on safety features, objected that Autopilot

was not ready for release. When Tesla ignored his concerns, Nakano resigned in protest and wrote a

resignation letter, circulated widely among Tesla employees, that called Autopilot’s development

“reckless decision making that has potentially put customer lives at risk.” 3

24.

By December 2015, Musk was publicly stating Tesla vehicles would drive themselves

within about two years. He told Fortune magazine, “I think we have all the pieces, and it’s just about

refining those pieces, putting them in place, and making sure they work across a huge number of

environments—and then we’re done. It’s a much easier problem than people think it is.” 4 Musk also

stated, “We’re going to end up with complete autonomy, and I think we will have complete autonomy

in approximately two years.”

25.

In January 2016, Musk announced on a conference call with reporters that Autopilot

was “probably better” than a human driver. He stated Tesla vehicles would be able to drive

significantly better than humans within two to three years, and that within approximately two years

drivers would be able to use Tesla’s “Summon” feature, which allows drivers to remotely instruct

their vehicle to drive to a specified location, to summon a vehicle from the other side of the country. 5

Ianthe Jeanne Dugan & Mike Spector, “Tesla’s Push to Build a Self-Driving Car Sparked Dissent Among Its Engineers,” The Wall Street Journal (Aug. 24, 2017), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/teslas-push-to-build-a-self-driving-car-sparks-dissent-among-itsengineers-1503593742

Kristen Korosec, “Elon Musk Says Tesla Vehicles Will Drive Themselves in Two Years,” Fortune (Dec. 21, 2015), available at https://fortune.com/2015/12/21/elon-muskinterview/

Elon Musk, https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/686279251293777920 (Jan. 10, 2016, 12:11 PM).

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26.

As a result of the above, thousands of Tesla drivers relied—and continue to rely—

on Tesla’s ADAS technology as though it were capable of Level 3, 4, or 5 self-driving, when in fact

it is incapable of safely handling a variety of routine roadway scenarios without driver input.

Predictably, this has led—and will continue to lead—to multiple collisions between Teslas and other

vehicles or pedestrians, resulting in death or serious bodily injury.

27.

On January 20, 2016, 23-year-old Gao Yaning, who had a history of relying on

Autopilot to drive, was killed in China on the way home from a family wedding when his Tesla Model

S crashed at full speed on a highway into the back of a large street sweeper. The facts of the accident

strongly indicate that Autopilot was engaged at the time of the crash. 6

28.

On May 7, 2016, Joshua Brown was killed in Florida when the Autopilot on his Tesla

Model S failed to recognize a tractor-trailer crossing in front of his car, which resulted in Brown’s car

striking and passing under the trailer at 74 mph. 7 The top third of Brown’s car was sheared off.

Brown was a Tesla enthusiast who had previously made videos of himself using Autopilot, one of

which was retweeted by Elon Musk just a few weeks earlier. 8

29.

Despite these incidents, Tesla officers and directors—including, most notably, Elon

Musk—repeatedly doubled-down on the premise that Teslas were, or would soon be, capable of safe,

fully autonomous driving with minor software updates.

30.

For example, on June 2, 2016—less than a month after Brown’s death—Musk

confidently announced that “autonomous driving” was “basically a solved problem,” and that Tesla’s

Autopilot software was already safer than a human driver on highways. “I think we’re basically less

Neal Boudette, “Autopilot cited in Death of Chinese Tesla Driver,” The New York Times (Sept. 14, 2016), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/15/business/fatal-teslacrash-in-china-involved-autopilot-government-tv-says.html

NTSB, No. HWY16FH018, Dkt. No. 2, “Crash Summary Report” (June 19, 2017), available at https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40453253&FileExtension=.PDF&File Name=Crash%20Summary-Master.PDF

Rachel Abrams & Annalyn Kurtz, “Joshua Brown, Who Died in Self-Driving Accident, Tested Limits of His Tesla,” The New York Times (July 1, 2016), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/02/business/joshua-brown-technology-enthusiast-tested-thelimits-of-histesla.html#:~:text=Brown%20became%20a%20victim%20of,in%20a%20self%2Ddriving%20car.

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than two years away from complete autonomy—complete,” Musk said. 9 31.

On July 14, 2016, Consumer Reports urged Tesla to “change the name of the Autopilot

feature because it promotes a potentially dangerous assumption that the Model S is capable of driving

on its own.” Instead of using the “misleading” name Autopilot, Consumer Reports urged Tesla to “name

automated features with descriptive, not exaggerated, titles.” 10

32.

On July 20, 2016, Tesla’s official blog quoted a post by Musk, in which he

misleadingly suggests that lack of regulatory approval was a major challenge Tesla was facing in

bringing to market fully self-driving vehicles:

When true self-driving is approved by regulators, it will mean that you will be able to summon your Tesla from pretty much anywhere. Once it picks you up, you will be able to sleep, read or do anything else enroute to your destination. You will also be able to add your car to the Tesla shared fleet just by tapping a button on the Tesla phone app and have it generate income for you while you’re at work or on vacation. 11

33.

In August 2016, a Tesla with Autopilot engaged crashed into a parked vehicle on a

Beijing highway. After the owner stated publicly that Tesla had misrepresented Autopilot’s

capabilities and misled buyers, Tesla removed from its China website a term that translates as “self-

driving” and replaced it with a term that translates as “self-assisted driving.” 12 Tesla did not make any

similar changes to its U.S. website.

34.

In September 2016, Musk—referencing Brown’s fatal crash—publicly announced

that Tesla had fixed the issue that caused that crash in the latest version of its “Autopilot” software

by increasing the system’s reliance on radar so that it “would see a large metal object across the

road.” 13

Recode, “Elon Mush | Full Interview | Code Conference 2016,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wsixsRISz4&t=4675s at 1:17:55–1:21:20 (June 2, 2016).

Consumer Reports, “Consumer Reports Calls on Tesla to Disable and Update Auto Steering Function, Remove ‘Autopilot’ Name” (July 14, 2016), available at https://www.consumerreports.org/media-room/press-releases/2016/07/consumer-reports-callson-tesla-to-disable-and-update-auto-steering-function-remove-autopilot-name/

Elon Musk, “Master Plan, Part Deux,” https://www.tesla.com/blog/master-planpart-deux (July 20, 2016).

Jake Spring & Alexandria Sage, “Tesla removes ‘self-driving’ from China website after Beijing crash,” Reuters (Aug. 15, 2016), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-teslachina-crash-idUSKCN10Q0L4

Neal Boudette, “Elon Musk Says Pending Tesla Updates Could Have Prevented

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35.

On October 16, 2016, German regulators sent Tesla a formal letter reading, “In order

to prevent misunderstanding and incorrect customers’ expectations, we demand that the misleading

term Autopilot is no longer used in advertising the system.” The German government also reminded

Tesla vehicle owners that Tesla’s ADAS technology required, and could only be safely operated with,

constant driver attention and supervision. 14

36.

On October 19, 2016, Tesla released its Autopilot 2.0 software and announced that

all new Tesla cars would come with a new suite of hardware (called Autopilot Hardware 2) consisting

of eight cameras, twelve ultrasonic sensors, and a forward-facing radar unit, which Tesla claimed

would allow the cars to soon become capable of SAE Level 5 autonomy. 15 To access the hardware,

owners would have to pay $5,000 for an “Enhanced Autopilot” feature and another $3,000 for the

right to activate Tesla’s promised “Full Self-Driving Capability.” The Enhanced Autopilot package

provided drivers most or all of the features in the FSD package, except for the right to unlimited

access to Tesla’s soon-to-arrive full self-driving technology, and potential early access to FSD Beta

updates Tesla might release on its way perfecting that technology.

37.

As part of the announcement, Tesla published a post on its official company blog

titled “All Tesla Cars Being Produced Now Have Full Self-Driving Hardware,” stating “[w]e are

excited to announce that, as of today, all Tesla vehicles produced in our factory – including Model 3

– will have the hardware needed for full self-driving capability at a safety level substantially greater

than that of a human driver.” In the same post, Tesla stated that “[s]elf-driving vehicles will play a

crucial role in improving transportation safety and accelerating the world’s transition to a sustainable

future,” and that “[f]ull autonomy will enable a Tesla to be substantially safer than a human driver.” 16

Fatal Crash,” The New York Times (Sept. 11, 2016), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/12/business/elon-musk-says-pending-tesla-updates-couldhave-prevented-fatal-crash.html

Reuters Staff, “Germany says Tesla should not use ‘Autopilot’ in advertising,” Reuters (Oct 16, 2016), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN12G0KS

Alex Nishimoto, “All New Tesla Models Will Feature Level 5-Capable Autopilot Hardware,” Motor Trend (Oct. 20, 2016), available at https://www.motortrend.com/news/new-teslamodels-will-feature-level-5-capable-autopilot-hardware/

The Tesla Team, “All Tesla Cars Being Produced Now Have Full Self-Driving Hardware,” https://www.tesla.com/blog/all-tesla-cars-being-produced-now-have-full-selfdrivinghardware (Oct. 19, 2016).

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38.

The blog post included a video made by Tesla’s Autopilot team in the weeks before

the release, which purported to show a Tesla driving itself without any human intervention from the

person in the driver’s seat, whose hands remain off the steering wheel throughout the video. The

video begins with a note saying, “The person in the driver’s seat is only there for legal reasons. He is

not doing anything. The car is driving itself.” However, multiple Tesla Autopilot employees who

worked on the video would later report that the route taken by the car had been charted ahead of

time by software that created a three-dimensional digital map (a feature unavailable to drivers using

the commercial version of Autopilot), and that the video did not accurately show how the car

operated during filming. For example, in portions of the video Tesla did not show, the car executed

driving tasks poorly, and even crashed into a fence at one point. 17 Tesla engineers had to run the

pre-programmed route multiple times to get a clean video clip that made it appear the car was capable

of driving itself. None of these facts were referenced in the video or otherwise disclosed by Tesla.

The deceptive and misleading video was later used to promote Autopilot’s purported abilities, and

indeed is still featured on the company’s website as of this writing. 18

39.

Also on October 19, 2016, the company held a conference call with reporters, during

which Musk stated that all new Tesla cars would now include all the cameras, computing power, and

other hardware necessary for “full self driving.” Musk further stated that Tesla would “be able to

demonstrate a demonstration drive of our full autonomy all the way from LA to New York. So

basically from home in LA to let’s say dropping you off in Times Square, NY and then having the

car parking itself by the end of next year without the need for a single touch.” 19 Musk repeatedly

represented that autonomous vehicles were safer than human-driven ones, and even warned

journalists that they would be “killing people” if they wrote negative articles about self-driving

See Metz & Boudette, supra note 2.

See Tesla, https://www.tesla.com/autopilot ; Tesla, “Tesla Self-Driving Demonstration,” https://www.tesla.com/videos/autopilot-self-driving-hardware-neighborhoodlong (Nov. 18, 2016).

Xautoworld, “Transcript: Elon Musk’s Autopilot 2.0 Conference Call,” https://www.xautoworld.com/tesla/transcript-elon-musk-autopilot-2-conference-call/ (Oct. 19, 2016).

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technology that dissuaded people from using it. 20 40.

According to reporting by multiple outlets, including the Wall Street Journal and The

New York Times, Tesla’s decision to promise the technology would be able to provide “Full Self

Driving” and Musk’s statements at the news conference “took the Tesla engineering team by surprise,

and some felt that Musk was promising something that was not possible.” Sterling Anderson, who

was the head of Tesla’s Autopilot program at the time, “told Tesla’s sales and marketing teams that

they should not refer to the company’s technology as ‘autonomous’ or ‘self-driving’ because this

would mislead the public.” 21 In a meeting after the October announcement, someone asked Mr.

Anderson how Tesla could brand the product “Full Self-Driving,” to which he responded, “This was

Elon’s decision.” Two months later, in December 2016, Mr. Anderson resigned. 22

41.

In March 2018, Apple engineer Walter Huang was killed when the Autopilot on his

Tesla Model X became confused at a fork in the highway and caused the car to veer sharply to the

left and crash into a concrete barrier in Mountain View, California. 23 In the aftermath of that fatal

crash, Tesla publicly released crash data and blamed Huang for the accident, violating its agreement

with NTSB not to comment on crashes during the course of an investigation and causing NTSB to

remove Tesla as a party to its investigation.

42.

In April 2018, a Tesla with Autopilot engaged struck and killed a pedestrian in Japan.

43.

On May 11, 2018, a Tesla Model S with Autopilot engaged crashed into a stopped

firetruck in South Jordan, Utah, prompting a NHTSA investigation into the collision. 24 Maya Kosoff, “Elon Musk: Self-Driving Car Doubters Are Literally ‘Killing People,’” Vanity Fair (Oct. 20, 2016), available at https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/10/elonmusk-self-driving-car-doubters-are-literally-killing-people ; Andrew Batiuk, “Tesla October 19th 2016 Autopilot 2.0 Conference Call With Visuals Added,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjGEEF_p5E (Oct. 20, 2016).

Metz & Boudette, supra note 2.

Dugan & Spector, supra note 4.

Hyunjoo Jin, “Factbox: Tesla’s Autopilot faces unprecedented scrutiny,” Reuters (Nov. 1, 2022), available at https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/teslasautopilot-faces-unprecedented-scrutiny-2022-11-01/

Levin, Sam, “Tesla Confirms Autopilot Involved in Utah Crash but Seeks to Blame Driver,” The Guardian (May 17, 2018), available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/may/16/tesla-autopilot-utah-crash-confirms 24

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44.

In March 2019, Jeremy Banner was killed when his 2018 Tesla Model 3 with

Autopilot engaged drove under a tractor-trailer in Florida. 25 Banner’s accident was eerily similar to

the 2016 accident that killed Joshua Brown when his car drove under a tractor-trailer. The Banner

accident indicated that, contrary to its claims in September 2016, Tesla had not fixed this significant

flaw in its ADAS technology in the roughly three years after Brown was killed.

45.

In May 2019, Tesla released an update to its ADAS “Navigate” feature, which is

designed to automate some lane-change functions. When Consumer Reports tested the feature, it found

that it cut off other cars without leaving enough space, failed to pass in the correct lane, and

sometimes struggled to merge into traffic.

46.

In April 2019, at an event in Palo Alto, California, that Tesla dubbed “Autonomy

Day,” Musk took to the stage and announced that Tesla vehicles would be capable of full self-driving

and autonomously navigating dense urban areas like San Francisco and New York by the end of

2019, and that in two years the company would be making cars without steering wheels or pedals. 26

Musk also stated, “If you fast forward a year, maybe a year and three months, but next year for sure,

we will have over a million robo-taxis on the road,” and “I feel very confident predicting autonomous

robo-taxis for Tesla next year. … I’m confident we’ll have at least regulatory approval somewhere,

literally next year.” Musk stated the robo-taxis would be a way for Tesla owners to make money when

they aren’t using their vehicles, with Tesla taking 25 or 30 percent of the revenue and allowing the

company to compete with popular ride-hailing services like Uber and Lyft. 27 A few months later,

Musk doubled-down on the robo-taxi prediction, tweeting that Tesla would “have a million robotaxis

by end of 2020.” 28

investigation/

Jin, supra note 25.

R. Baldwin, “Tesla promises ‘one million robo-taxis’ in 2020,” https://www.engadget.com/2019-04-22-tesla-elon-musk-self-driving-robo-taxi.html (Apr. 22, 2019).

Tech Insider, “Watch Elon Musk Unveil Plans For A Tesla Ride-Hailing App,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YiWbdZ8ItRs (Apr. 22, 2019); Matt McFarland, “Elon Musk says Tesla will have robo-taxis operating next year,” CNN Business, https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/22/tech/tesla-robotaxis (Apr. 22, 2019).

Elon Musk, https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1148070210412265473 (July 7,

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47.

In December 2020, at the Axel Springer award ceremony in Berlin, Musk again

touted the capability of Tesla vehicles stating that, “I’m extremely confident of achieving full

autonomy and releasing it to the Tesla customer base next year.” 29 He also vouched for the safety

of Tesla’s Autopilot by stating, “Now, there’s an uncertain period of time for when regulatory

approval will take, how long it will take, but I think if you are able to accumulate billions of kilometers

of autonomous driving, then it’s difficult to argue and, look at the accident rate when the car is

autonomous versus non-autonomous and in fact, our statistics already show a massive difference

when the car is on Autopilot or not on Autopilot. That the safety is much greater even with the

current Autopilot software.”

48.

Tesla’s effort to misrepresent the self-driving capabilities of its cars was not limited

to affirmative misrepresentations. In addition, Tesla undertook a widespread campaign to conceal

thousands of consumer reports about problems with Tesla’s “Autopilot” feature, including crashes,

unintended braking, and unintended acceleration. 30 To that end, Tesla officers, directors, and

managing agents trained employees to refrain from memorializing customer reports in writing. When

Tesla employees did respond to customer reports in writing, it was only to reassure customers that

the “Autopilot” feature was working as intended. In addition, Tesla—in violation of Civil Code

section 1670.8—forced consumers to sign nondisclosure agreements to receive repairs under

warranty.

Giovanni died and Caleb was seriously injured when Giovanni bought a Tesla Model S with Autopilot from its prior owner and trusted it to drive—in reliance on Tesla’s misrepresentations.

49.

Giovanni was one of many members of the public exposed to Tesla’s long-term

advertising campaign designed to persuade the public that its vehicles were capable of driving

themselves. Not only was he aware that the technology itself was called “Autopilot,” he saw, heard,

and/or read many of Tesla or Musk’s deceptive claims on Twitter, Tesla’s official blog, or in the news

2019, 8:24 PM).

Alex Springer SE, “Axel Springer Award 2020” (December 1, 2020) available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AF2HXId2Xhg

Russ Mitchell, Huge Tesla data leak reportedly reveals thousands of safety complaint. 4 things to know (May 26, 2023), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2023-05-26/tesla-autopilotalleged-data-breach-leak

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media, some samples of which are alleged above. Giovanni believed those claims were true, and thus

believed the “Autopilot” feature with the “full self driving” upgrade was safer than a human driver,

and could be trusted to safely navigate public highways autonomously.

50.

Relying on this belief-- which was the direct result of the product name itself and

Tesla’s long-term advertising campaign--Giovanni purchased a Tesla Model S from its prior owner,

Jorge Ventura, on March 4, 2021. And in further reliance on this belief, Giovanni trusted the

“Autopilot” feature to drive the vehicle autonomously on the freeway regularly.

51.

When Giovanni purchased the Tesla Model S, he understood that the vehicle would

drive itself and he no longer needed to drive it. Based on representations Giovanni heard made by

Musk, Giovanni believed the vehicle was a safer driver than a human and relied on it to perceive and

react to traffic in front of him.

52.

Indeed, on or around February 18, 2023, at approximately 3:54 a.m. Giovanni was

traveling in the Subject Vehicle with “Autopilot” engaged in the number two lane on Interstate 680

northbound when the Subject Vehicle collided with a fire truck, a 2016 Pierce Aerial, that was parked

diagonally, blocking the number one and number two lanes for traffic control due to an unrelated

traffic emergency. A second firetruck was on the scene as well as two CHP vehicles. Both firetrucks

and both CHP vehicles had their emergency lights flashing. Giovanni’s brother, Plaintiff Caleb

Mendoza, was the front seat passenger in the Subject Vehicle. At the time of the collision, Giovanni

was not controlling the Subject Vehicle, but he was instead passively sitting in the driver’s seat with

the “Autopilot” feature engaged. In fact, data from the Tesla itself showed that the Subject Vehicle

was in “Autopilot” for approximately 12 minutes prior to the crash, with no accelerator pedal or

brake pedal inputs from Giovanni during that time. The approximate speed of the Subject Vehicle

was 71 mph during the 12-minute period. Data also showed that Giovanni generally maintained

contact with the steering wheel until the time of the crash.

53.

As a result of the collision, the Subject Vehicle sustained major frontal damage,

crushing Giovanni’s body. Giovanni survived, at least momentarily, but subsequently died from the

injuries he sustained in the collision.

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Tesla continues to misrepresent the self-driving capabilities of its cars, motorists continue to die, and regulators have ongoing investigations into Tesla for fraud. 54.

Despite the numerous accidents, news reports, and investigations exposing the danger of Tesla’s ADAS technology—including the incident that forms the basis of this case—Tesla continues its deceptive and misleading marketing practices concerning its ADAS technology in conscious disregard for the public’s safety.

55.

In October 2019, Consumer Reports tested Tesla’s “Smart Summon” feature, which Tesla claimed would allow owners to use a smartphone app to “summon” their Tesla vehicle to drive itself across a parking lot without any occupants inside the vehicle. Consumer Reports’ testing revealed that the feature had difficulty navigating a parking lot, with the summoned car crossing lane lines and wandering erratically “like a drunken or distracted driver.” 31 This was nearly four years after Musk’s January 2016 tweet that Tesla was two years away from its customers being able to use Summon to have their car come to them even if it was thousands of miles away. 56.

Tesla’s deceptive marketing is so egregious that it has drawn scrutiny from governmental regulators at the state, federal, and international level.

57.

In February 2020, the NTSB called on NHTSA to set stricter standards on Autopilot, citing the high number of Autopilot-related collisions and deaths.

58.

In August 2020, a couple was killed in Saratoga, California, after their Tesla veered off a highway while Autopilot was active.

59.

In September 2020, Consumer Reports published the first in a series of evaluations of Tesla’s “Full Self-Driving Capability” technology, finding that the technology caused vehicles to engage in unusual and unsafe behavior, such as stopping at green lights, driving through stop signs, slamming on the brakes for yield signs when the merge was clear, and stopping at every exit while going around a traffic circle. 32 Jeff Plungis, “Tesla’s Smart Summon Performance Doesn’t Match Marketing Hype,” Consumer Reports (Oct. 8, 2019), available at https://www.consumerreports.org/automotivetechnology/teslas-smart-summon-performance-doesnt-match-marketing-hype/ Mike Monticello & Keith Barry, “Tesla’s ‘Full Self-Driving Capability’ Falls Short of Its Name,” Consumer Reports (Sept. 4, 2020) (last updated May 19, 2021), available at https://www.consumerreports.org/autonomous-driving/tesla-full-self-driving-capability-reviewfalls-short-of-its-name-a1224795690/

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60.

In a January 2021 earnings call during which Tesla reported $721 million in profit for

2020, 33 Musk stated that the company had made “massive progress on Full Self-Driving,” and that it

“will become obvious later this year” that “Tesla Autopilot is capable of full self-driving.” Musk also

stated, “I’m highly confident the car will drive itself for the reliability in excess of a human this year.

This is a very big deal.” When a financial analyst asked Musk why he was confident Tesla would

achieve SAE Level 5 autonomy in 2021, Musk responded, “I’m confident based on my understanding

of the technical roadmap and the progress that we’re making between each beta iteration.” 34

61.

Six weeks later, on a March 9, 2021, phone call with California DMV regulators,

Tesla’s director of Autopilot software, CJ Moore, contradicted Musk. According to an internal DMV

memo memorializing the call, “DMV asked CJ to address, from an engineering perspective, Elon’s

messaging about L5 [Level 5] capability by the end of the year. Elon’s tweet does not match

engineering reality per CJ.” In response to a question from DMV regulators about “how Tesla

evaluates the potential advancement of levels of autonomy,” Tesla representatives “indicated they

are still firmly in L2 [Level 2].” Tesla further told DMV that “[t]he ratio of driver interaction would

need to be in the magnitude of 1 or 2 million miles per driver interaction to move into higher levels

of automation [i.e., Level 3 and higher].” 35 In other words, drivers would need to intervene only

once per 1 to 2 million miles before Tesla would proceed to Level 3 software. Tesla’s ADAS software,

which routinely makes mistakes, is not even remotely close to this level of reliability.

62.

In May 2021, under pressure from the Transportation Committee of the California

Senate, the California Department of Motor Vehicles launched an investigation into whether Tesla

is deceptively marketing its ADAS technology as making its cars capable of autonomous driving. 36

Chris Isidore, “Tesla just proved all its haters wrong. Here’s how,” CNN Business, https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/31/investing/tesla-cash-crunch/index.html (Jan. 31, 2020).

Tesla (TSLA) Q4 2020 Earnings Call Transcript (Jan. 27, 2021), available at https://www.fool.com/earnings/call-transcripts/2021/01/27/tesla-tsla-q4-2020-earnings-calltranscript/

Memorandum to File by Miguel Acosta (DMV) Re: Tesla AP City Streets Update (Mar. 9, 2021), available at https://www.plainsite.org/documents/28jcs0/california-dmv-tesla-robotaxi-ADAS-notes/ Russ Mitchell, “DMV probing whether Tesla violates state regulations with selfdriving claims,” Los Angeles Times (May 17, 2021), available at

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63.

In June 2021, in what was widely seen as a response to motor vehicle collisions

involving Tesla’s ADAS technology, NHTSA issued an unprecedented order requiring automobile

manufacturers to report any crash involving an injury, fatality, or property damage that happens while

or immediately after a vehicle is automating some driving tasks.

64.

In early July 2021, Tesla released the Beta 9 version of its “Full Self-Driving” (or

“FSD”) software to certain Tesla vehicle owners. Following the release, Tesla owners took videos of

the software in action that show vehicles missing turns, scraping against bushes, and veering toward

parked cars.

65.

In August 2021, NHTSA opened a preliminary safety defect investigation (PE21-020)

into Autopilot, based on eleven incidents involving Tesla vehicles, operating with Autopilot engaged,

striking stationary first responder vehicles that were tending to prior collision scenes.

66.

Also in August of 2021, U.S. Senators called for the Federal Trade Commission to

investigate what they referred to as Tesla’s potentially deceptive marketing practices surrounding its

FSD technology, including Tesla’s use of the phrase “full self-driving” to describe and market a

feature that does not make the vehicle fully self-driving.

67.

On August 31, 2021, NHTSA ordered Tesla to produce documents and information

regarding the design of its FSD technology, crashes involving that technology, and marketing

materials that make representations about that technology. On the date that was the deadline for

compliance, Tesla submitted only a partial response to NHTSA, claiming that the documents and

information it had requested was confidential business information.

68.

Tesla has long been aware of limitations in Autopilot’s ability to use the current vision

system, and the fact that these limitations may lead to missed detections of first responder/law

enforcement vehicles. Specifically, in the Subject Vehicle, Telsa knew that its vision system did not

differentiate emergency vehicles with activated caution lights from other vehicles on the road during

the day or night. Tesla’s vision system in the Subject Vehicle was based on single frames, which

means that it sees each moment of time individually, and using each single frame, tries to detect a

vehicle in only that frame. When flashing lights exist at a scene, the frames alternate between

https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2021-05-17/dmv-tesla-california-fsd-autopilot-safety

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extremely saturated frames and extremely dark frames. The Autopilot system sees the frames as either

very bright or very dark, rather than interpreting the changing light intensity as a caution signal as a

human would. This limitation based on the single frame interpretation leads to missed detections in

the system.

69.

In September of 2021, approximately eighteen months before the crash involving

Messrs. Mendoza Tesla made a software update to enhance system detectability for caution lights

associated with emergency vehicles. Despite this update, Teslas continued to crash into first

responder/law enforcement vehicles, causing injury and death.

70.

Following Tesla’s software update, NHTSA made two additional requests to Tesla,

one of which was an information request letter “to obtain information on the company’s chances to

subject vehicles’ functionality through software updates intended to improve the detection of

emergency vehicle lights in low light conditions.”

71.

Regarding its updates, Tesla has acknowledged that while its updates may improve

the system’s detection and response capabilities for caution lights, they would not work for all Tesla

vehicles. In fact, for nearly a year and a half before the subject crash Tesla knew that it’s over-the-

air software fix to improve detection of caution lights would not work on the Subject Vehicle. The

software fix was simply not compatible with Tesla’s operating on its earlier operating system known

as Hardware 1.

72.

By way of analogy with another ubiquitous consumer device, Apple routinely updates

its IOS software such earlier versions of the iPhone are no longer capable of running the latest

software. In other words the software for an iPhone 16 doesn’t work on iPhone 3. However, while

that planned obsolescence is an inconvenience for phone users, here Tesla decided that hundreds of

thousands of vehicles operating on Hardware 1 would continue to pose a threat to emergency

responders because of the vehicles’ inability to perceive and react to caution lights.

73.

Autopilot system in the Subject Vehicle did not differentiate the emergency vehicles

with activated caution lights from other vehicles on the road on the night of February 18, 2023. The

Autopilot system saw single frames in the vision system that were either very dark or very bright,

leading to the missed detection of the emergency vehicles with activated caution lights, causing the

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Tesla Model S to crash into the emergency vehicles, killing Giovanni, severely injuring Caleb and

injuring several first responders on-scene.

74.

Tesla’s updates have a history causing problems. An update to the FSD Beta software

in October 2021 caused a major increase in “phantom braking” incidents, in which the software

identifies a non-existent threat that triggers the vehicle’s emergency braking system. The result is that

Tesla vehicles, traveling at various speeds, were suddenly slamming on the brakes for no apparent

reason. Tesla initially claimed it had identified the source of the problem and fixed it with a software

update released on October 25, 2021, but subsequently issued a formal recall over the issue for the

more than 11,000 vehicles using the FSD Beta software in an effort to head off adverse action by

U.S. regulators. 37

75.

Tesla’s claims of having fixed the problem turned out to be false, as there were 107

NHTSA driver complaints in the three-month period of November 2021 through January 2022 about

“phantom braking” issues (compared with only 34 such complaints in the preceding 22 months). The

NHTSA complaints included everything from phantom braking incidents that were “happening with

NOTHING present in front of my vehicle, and sometimes with nothing around me at all,” to an

incident where Tesla software slammed on the brakes in response to a plastic bag. 38

76.

On November 18, 2021, CNN Business reported that it spent a morning testing

Tesla’s FSD technology on the streets of New York City and “watched the software nearly crash into

a construction site, try to turn into a stopped truck and attempt to drive down the wrong side of the

road.” The FSD software reportedly “needed plenty of human interventions to protect us and

everyone else on the road,” including a driver intervention “every couple of blocks or so” and

multiple instances in which the driver “quickly jerked the wheel to avoid a crash.” 39

Tom Krisher, “Tesla software recall may head off fight with US regulators,” Associated Press (Nov. 2, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/technology-businesssoftware-d3e2107435f432fd9b36ba14898166a0

Faiz Siddiqui & Jeremy B. Merrill, “Tesla drivers report a surge in ‘phantom braking,’” The Washington Post (Feb. 2, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/02/02/tesla-phantom-braking/

Matt McFarland, “We tried Tesla’s ‘full self-driving.’ Here’s what happened,” CNN Business, https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/18/cars/tesla-full-self-driving-brooklyn/index.html (Nov. 18, 2021); CNN, “CNN tests a ‘full self-driving’ Tesla,”

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77.

On December 6, 2021, The New York Times published an article about its investigation

into the failures of Tesla’s ADAS technology based on interviews with 19 Tesla employees who had

worked on design, developing, and testing that technology at Tesla over the prior decade. The article

reported that interviews with the employees indicated that Musk “repeatedly misled” the public about

the abilities of Tesla’s ADAS technology. 40

78.

As of May 15, 2022, nearly a year after the NHTSA issued its unprecedented order

requiring automobile manufacturers to report any crash that happens while or immediately after a

vehicle is automating some driving tasks, auto manufacturers reported 392 accidents in total. Tesla

accounted for 70 percent of those reports, reporting 273 accidents from June of 2021 to May 15,

2022. Honda was second with 90 accidents, followed by Subaru at 10, and Ford at five. 41

79.

On June 8, 2022, NHTSA upgraded its Preliminary Evaluation (PE) 21-020 to

Engineering Analysis (EA) 22-002 to study the potential for driver misuse when Autopilot is engaged.

NHTSA listed additional collisions between Tesla vehicles and vehicles stopped at first responder

scenes to the eleven collisions reported between January 2018 and July 2021 that it was already

investigating. The subject collisions investigated by NHTSA include, but are not limited to, the

following collisions:

a. A collision in January of 2018 in which a Tesla Model S struck a firetruck parked

along Interstate 405 in Culver City, California. NTSB conducted an investigation into

the crash, determining that the driver was overly reliant on the system and that

Autopilot’s design let him disengage from driving. 42

b. A collision in December of 2019 in Norwalk, Connecticut in which a Telsa Model 3

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2PMu7MD9GvI (Nov. 18, 2021).

Metz & Boudette, supra note 2; Tesla, “Tesla Self-Driving Demonstration” (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.tesla.com/videos/autopilot-self-driving-hardware-neighborhood-long

Michael Wayland, “U.S. safety agency says Tesla accounts for most driver-assist crashes, but warns data lacks context” CNBC (June 15, 2022) available at https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/15/data-shows-tesla-accounts-for-most-reported-driver-assistcrashes-but-officials-warn-report-lacks-context.html

National Transportation Safety Board, Highway Accident Brief, “Rear End Collision Between a Car Operating with Advanced Driver Assistance Systems and a Stationary Fire Truck, Culver City, California, January 22, 2018,” Report Date: August 22, 2019.

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on Autopilot crashed into the back of a police cruiser that was parked on the highway

with its emergency lights on and flares placed behind it. 43 The trooper was assisting

another driver that had been involved in an unrelated crash.

c. A collision in December of 2019, in which a Telsa Model 3 on Autopilot crashed into

the rear of a parked fire truck in on a highway in Cloverdale, Indiana, killing the front

seat passenger and seriously injuring the driver. The fire truck was parked in the

passing lane on the highway with its emergency lights on. 44

d. A collision in January of 2020 in which a Telsa operating on Autopilot crashed into

a Massachusetts State Police cruiser that was stopped on in the left lane of a highway

in Bridgewater around 10 p.m. 45

e. A collision in July of 2020 in Cochise County, Arizona in which a Tesla Model S on

Autopilot slammed into the back of a state trooper’s SUV that was parked on the

shoulder of the highway with its emergency lights activated. 46

f. A collision in August of 2020 in North Carolina in which a Tesla on Autopilot crashed

into patrol cars from the Nash County Sheriff’s Office and State Highway Patrol

parked along Highway 64. 47 The incident occurred at night while another traffic crash

was being investigated. The patrol cars had their emergency lights activated.

Torres, Ella. “Tesla on Autopilot Slams into Police Cruiser, Driver Claims He Was Checking on His Dog.” ABC News. ABC News Network, December 7, 2019.

https://abcnews.go.com/US/tesla-autopilot-slams-police-cruiser-driver-claimschecking/story?id=67570199

Slaby, MJ. “One Dead after Vehicle Hits Firetruck Parked on I-20.” Indianapolis Star.

December 29, 2019. https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2019/12/29/one-dead-after-tesla-hitsparked-fire-truck-70/2771593001/

Kath, Ryan. “Federal Government Investigating Tesla Crash in Massachusetts.” 10Boston. November 13, 2020. https://www.nbcboston.com/investigations/federal-governmentinvestigating-tesla-crash-in-massachusetts/2229521/?os=vb&ref=app

Minkler, Alana. “Tesla on Autopilot Crashes into DPS Patrol Car on I-10.” The Arizona Republic. Arizona Republic, July 15, 202.

https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-breaking/2020/07/14/tesla-autopilot-hitsdps-patrol-car-10-near-benson/5439368002/ “Dash Cam Video Released from 2020 Tesla Autopilot Crash that Injured 2 Law Enforcement Officers.” 11ABC Eyewitness News. February 9, 2022. https://abc11.com/tesla-teslacrash-car-accident-dash-camera-nash-county-officers-police/11548699/

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g. A collision in February of 2021 in which a Tesla Model X with Autopilot engaged

crashed into a cruiser working an active scene with flashing lights on the freeway in

Montgomery County, Texas. 48

h. A collision in March of 2021 in which a Tesla on Autopilot crashed into a parked

police car with flashing lights on Interstate 96 near Lansing, Michigan. The trooper

was investigating a car crash at approximately 1:10 a.m. when the Tesla struck his

car. 49

A collision in Florida in May of 2021 in which a Tesla slammed into a Road Ranger

truck with emergency lighting that was being used by police to block an express lane

on the highway for a previous crash. 50

A collision in July of 2021 in which a Tesla on Autopilot drove through a freeway

closure at approximately 1:45 a.m. and slammed into the back of a California Highway

Patrol officer’s car in San Diego, California.

k. A collision in August of 2021 in which a Tesla Model 3 on Autopilot struck a stopped

Florida Highway Patrol car and a disabled car that the Florida state trooper had

stopped to assist on the highway. 51

80.

On July 13, 2022, the Dawn Project, an organization dedicated to increasing the

software safety, published a paper regarding its testing of a Tesla Model 3 equipped with FSD Beta

10.12.2 (released on June 1, 2022) on a closed racetrack. The purpose of the testing was to determine

Campbell, Dawn and Andy Cerota. “Lawsuit Filed Against Tesla After Accident that Injured 5 Police Officers.” Click2Houston.com. September 27, 2021.

https://www.click2houston.com/news/local/2021/09/27/lawsuit-filed-against-tesla-after-accidentthat-injured-5-police-officers/

Associated Press. “Tesla on Autopilot Drives into Michigan Trooper’s Patrol Car.” ABC News. ABC News Network, March 17, 2021. https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/teslaautopilot-drives-michigan-troopers-patrol-car-76524732

Batchelor, Amanda. “3 Injured After Tesla Collides with Road Ranger Truck on 1-95.” Local 10.com. May 19, 2021. https://www.local10.com/news/local/2021/05/19/3-injured-aftertesla-collides-with-road-ranger-truck-on-i-95/

Associated Press. “Tesla on Part-Automated Drive System Slams into Police Car.” https://wagmtv.com, August 28, 2021. https://www.wagmtv.com/2021/08/28/tesla-partautomated-drive-system-slams-into-police-car/

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the FSD software’s safety in terms of its ability to detect and avoid hitting small children. The testing

was performed on a closed racetrack with the Tesla driving itself between a long row of cones with

a child-sized mannequin placed in plain view at the end of the row—i.e., conditions significantly less

complex and more favorable to the FSD software than those that would be encountered in the real

world. Nevertheless, the testing found Tesla’s FSD software consistently failed to detect the

stationary child-size mannequins and “d[id] not avoid the child or even slow down,” but instead

“repeatedly struck the child mannequin in a manner that would be fatal to an actual child.” 52

81.

On July 14, 2022, the editor-in-chief of Electrek, a website that covers electric

vehicles, published an article reviewing his experience of using Tesla’s FSD Beta software over the

course of two months. His ultimate conclusion was that, despite years of development and updates

by Tesla, FSD Beta’s “decision-making is still the equivalent of a 14-year-old who has been learning

to drive for the last week and sometimes appears to consume hard drugs.” 53

82.

On July 28, 2022, following a year-long investigation, the California DMV, which

licenses motor vehicle manufacturers and dealerships in California (including Tesla’s Fremont factory

and dozens of Tesla retail stores), brought two related administrative enforcement actions against

Tesla for “untrue,” “misleading,” and “deceptive” marketing of its Autopilot and FSD technology.

The DMV specifically alleged that Tesla’s use of the product labels “Autopilot” and “Full Self Driving

Capability,” as well as statements about those technologies that have appeared on Tesla’s website in

2022, “represent that vehicles equipped with those ADAS [advanced driver assistance system]

features will operate as an autonomous vehicle, but vehicles equipped with those ADAS features

could not at the time of those advertisements, and cannot now, operate as autonomous vehicles.”

For relief, the DMV seeks restitution and the revocation or suspension of Tesla’s California vehicle

manufacturer license and vehicle dealer license. 54

The Dawn Project, In Scientific Test, Tesla “Full Self-Driving” Technology Consistently Strikes Child-Sized Mannequins (July 13, 2022), available at https://dawnproject.com/wpcontent/uploads/2022/08/The_Dawn_Project___Tesla_FSD_Test__8_.pdf

Fred Lambert, “Elon Musk does the impossible and manages expectations on Tesla’s next Full Self-Driving update,” Electrek (July 14, 2022), available at https://electrek.co/2022/07/14/elon-musk-manages-expectations-tesla-next-big-full-self-drivingupdate/

See In the Matter of the Accusation Against Tesla Inc. dba Tesla Motors, Inc., a Vehicle

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83.

All told, Tesla received thousands of customer reports regarding problems with

Tesla’s “Autopilot” system between 2015 and 2022, including over 1,000 crashes; over 1,500

complaints about sudden, unintentional braking; and 2,400 complaints about sudden acceleration. 55

84.

On December 2023, Telsa acknowledged the defective nature of its ADAS

technology by issuing a recall of every vehicle it had ever manufactured pursuant to Part 573 Safety

Recall Report 23V-838. On the heels of the ‘over the air’ software ‘fix’ that Tesla pushed out in

response to the recall, NHTSA opened a recall query in May 2024 to analyze the efficacy of Tesla’s

recall efforts. Tesla’s response to NHTSA’s further investigation into Tesla’s defective ADAS

technology is on-going.

85.

At all relevant times, Defendant TESLA and DOES 1-30 were and are engaged in

the business of manufacturing, engineering, fabricating, designing, assembling, importing,

distributing, selling, inspecting, servicing, repairing, marketing, advertising, warranting, modifying,

equipping, and leasing, renting, wholesaling, and selling the Subject Vehicle. Defendants knew, or in

the exercise of reasonable care should have known, the Subject Vehicle would be used in the manner

described herein, without inspection for defects in its function, parts, or design, including, but not

limited to, as to Autopilot mode, for use in the State of California and elsewhere. At all relevant times,

the Subject Vehicle, and similar vehicles, were designed, manufactured, marketed, advertised, and

placed into the stream of commerce by TESLA and DOES 1-30, and each of them, and their officers,

directors, employers, salespeople, contractors, and/or managing agents.

86.

At all relevant times, the Subject Vehicle contained design, manufacturing, and

warning defects which posed an unreasonable risk of injury or death to consumers, and others

similarly situated, and to other motorists sharing the road with TESLA’s vehicles, including the

Subject Vehicle. The Subject Vehicle and each of its component parts was unsafe and dangerous

when used for its intended use and reasonably foreseeable misuses by reason of defects in its design

Manufacturer, Case No. 21-02188, Accusation (July 28, 2022); In the Matter of the Accusation Against Tesla Inc. dba Tesla Motors, Inc., a Vehicle Dealer, Case No. 21-02189, Accusation (July 28, 2022). Russ Mitchell, Huge Tesla data leak reportedly reveals thousands of safety complaint. 4 things to know (May 26, 2023), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2023-05-26/tesla-autopilotalleged-data-breach-leak 55

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and/or manufacturing and/or failure to warn by said Defendants, and each of them. 87.

The Subject Vehicle was used by Giovanni on or about February 18, 2023, as intended

and in a reasonably foreseeable manner. The Subject Vehicle did not perform as TESLA and DOES

1-30 claimed the vehicle would perform and as ordinary consumers expect these vehicles to perform.

The Subject Vehicle was travelling in excess of the speed limit and at a speed that was unsafe for

traffic conditions. TESLA’s Autopilot did not timely perceive, sense, or react to changing traffic

conditions in front of the Subject Vehicle; did not perceive, react, and avoid commonly occurring

roadway and traffic conditions and hazards, including but not limited to the presence of first

responder/emergency vehicles; and did not brake or otherwise take evasive action to prevent the

collision with the first responder/emergency vehicles.

88.

The Subject Vehicle and similar vehicles manufactured and/or sold by TESLA and

DOES 1-30 are deceptive and unsafe, including but not limited to, as a result of TESLA conferring

to their customers a false sense of security that Autopilot has autonomous functionality or is

otherwise safe in all traffic collisions, including freeway conditions and in excess of freeway speeds.

As a foreseeable consequence, TESLA’s customers believe they are operating an “autonomous”

vehicle and are less attentive to roadway conditions and hazards, are less focused on driving, and

have a diminished attention to the roadway and to avoid collisions. Ordinary consumers and users

do not appreciate, and are not properly informed of, the potential risks, dangers, and limitations of

TESLA’s Autopilot functionality and ability.

89.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and herein alleges that prior to February 18, 2023,

Defendants knew and were aware of the manufacturing, design, and warning defects, including but

not limited to those related to Autopilot. Defendants knew or should have known of the dangerous

and defective nature of the Subject Vehicle from their own internal inspections, testing, and quality

control procedures, and from prior collisions, lawsuits, warranty claims, and/or news articles.

Defendants should have put in place features to limit the use and/or protect their consumers and

others on the roadway against these dangers.

90.

Despite their awareness of the defects in the Subject Vehicle, Defendants, and each

of them, failed to warn Giovanni and/or other purchaser and users of TESLA’s vehicles of said

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dangers, defects, and limitations of the Subject Vehicle, and failed to properly inform their consumers

and others of the limitations of Autopilot. To the contrary, TESLA misleadingly promotes the

functionality, safety, and autonomy of Autopilot as alleged herein.

91.

As a direct and legal result of the conduct of Defendants and each of them, and of

the defects inherent in the Subject Vehicle, Plaintiff Caleb Mendoza sustained serious personal

injuries and his brother, Giovanni, died in the collision.

First Cause of Action Strict Products Liability (Against Defendant Tesla and Does 1–50)

92.

Plaintiffs incorporate herein each and every allegation set forth in the preceding

paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

93.

Plaintiffs were harmed by the Subject Vehicle, a product that is manufactured,

distributed, marketed, advertised, and sold by Defendants TESLA and DOES 1–50. 94.

At the time Defendants sold the Subject Vehicle, the Subject Vehicle was dangerous,

hazardous, and unsafe both for its intended use and/or for its reasonably foreseeable misuses. The

Subject Vehicle contained inherent vices and defects both in design and manufacturing, and by

Defendants’ failures to warn of the Subject Vehicle’s defects and limitations, all of which Defendants

were aware at all relevant times.

95.

At all relevant times, Defendant TESLA and DOES 1–50 directly and/or indirectly

claims Autopilot is a combination of hardware and software that performs the dynamic driving task.

Defendant TESLA and DOES 1–50 advertise, market, and claim that Autopilot is safe and as good

as or better than a human driver at detecting hazards, changing conditions, and traffic. Consumers

are informed and expect that TESLA’s “Autopilot” vehicles will drive safely and autonomously, and

will steer, maneuver, brake, accelerate, lane keep, detect, avoid, and adapt to hazards and changing

traffic conditions in real time without human input. At all relevant times, TESLA distributed

promotional materials and videos that depict TESLA’s vehicles without a natural person in the

vehicle. TESLA’s advertising, marketing, and promotions depict Autopilot as an autonomous

function that is safe in any traffic conditions.

96.

At all relevant times, Defendant TESLA and DOES 1–50 did not place reasonable

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parameters or limitations on their customers for the use of Autopilot. Owners are allowed to use

Autopilot in any manner, traffic, or conditions, including on metropolitan freeways and at speeds in

excess of the speed limit.

97.

TESLA refuses to implement technology that would warn drivers to remain focused

on driving. For example, other companies have implemented technology to ensure drivers are still

engaged when utilizing SAE Level 2 ADAS technology, since evidence shows the average driver

tends to rely too much on ADAS technology. To that end, General Motors and Ford use infrared

cameras that closely track the driver’s eyes and sound warning chimes if a driver looks away from the

road for more than two or three seconds. TESLA did not initially include such a driver monitoring

system in its vehicles, and later added only a standard camera that is much less precise than infrared

cameras in eye tracking. 56

98.

As a foreseeable consequence, TESLA’s customers believe they are operating an

“autonomous” vehicle and are less attentive to roadway conditions and hazards, less focused on

driving, and have a diminished attentiveness and capacity to avoid collisions. Ordinary consumers

and users are not properly informed of, and otherwise do not fully appreciate, the potential risks,

dangers, and limitations of Autopilot’s functionality and ability.

99.

At all relevant times, Defendant TESLA and DOES 1–50, knew or with reasonable

due care should have known, that their consumers were operating Tesla’s vehicles without the human

operator’s active dynamic input. TESLA knew or with reasonable due care should have known, that

numerous crashes, including fatal crashes, have occurred as a result of their customers belief that

Tesla’s vehicles are autonomous or that Autopilot is an autonomous mode. These foreseeable uses

were a direct and proximate result of TESLA’s representations that “Autopilot” is an autonomous

mode and/or was safe for use without active human dynamic input and supervision.

100.

As a result of and based upon TESLA’s representations, Tesla’s customers regularly

transfer complete control of their vehicles to TESLA, including at times when it is dangerous to do

so. Similarly, Giovanni used Autopilot and transferred complete control of the Subject Vehicle to

Neal E. Boudette, “Federal safety agency expands its investigation of Tesla’s Autopilot system,” The New York Times (June 9, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/09/business/tesla-autopilot-nhtsa-investigation.html 56

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TESLA at the time of the crash.

101.

Defendants knew the Subject Vehicle was to be purchased and used without

inspection for defects by the users of the vehicle, including but not limited to Giovanni. Defendants

did not include sufficient instructions and/or warnings of the potential safety hazards, including but

not limited to Giovanni.

102.

In manufacturing, distributing, marketing, advertising, and selling its vehicles,

including the Subject Vehicle, TESLA acted with conscious disregard for the safety of others.

Specifically, TESLA represented to others—including Giovanni—that the Tesla Model S was capable

of fully autonomous driving even though TESLA knew the vehicle was not safe for fully autonomous

driving. Moreover, TESLA knew that others—including Giovanni—would rely on TESLA’s

“Autopilot” feature to operate their vehicles on public roadways in their stead, and that this presented

a significant risk to others’ safety, including other motorists and their passengers.

103.

TESLA’s conscious decision to expose members of the general public to its

defectively designed product is despicable conduct. TESLA made a conscious decision to

manufacture, distribute, market, advertise, and sell a defectively designed product it knew exposed

members of the general public to a significant risk of harm purely out of a desire to maximize profits.

Indeed, TESLA knew that disclosing the true capabilities of its ADAS software would conflict with

its desire to improve its financial condition and establish itself as a dominant player in the electric

vehicle market, and/or would increase costs and thereby reduce its profit margins. That a major auto

manufacturer would expose members of the general public to a significantly increased risk of serious

injury or death on public roadways simply to maximize profit is loathsome, contemptable, and/or

vile conduct that would be looked down upon by most reasonable, ordinary people.

104.

Further, TESLA intentionally misrepresented the safety of their vehicles and ADAS

software. TESLA did so to generate excitement about the company’s vehicles and thereby improve

its financial condition by, among other things, attracting investment, increasing sales, avoiding

bankruptcy, driving up TESLA’s stock price, and helping to establish TESLA as a dominant player

in the electric vehicle market, all at the expense of the public’s safety.

105.

The Subject Vehicle’s failure to perform safely and as expected and the Defendants’

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malice, oppression, and/or fraud was a substantial factor in—and a direct and proximate cause of—

the collision between the Subject Vehicle and the parked first responder/emergency vehicle, the fire

truck.

106.

As a result of that collision, Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount to be proven at

trial.

Second Cause of Action Negligent Products Liability (Against Defendant Tesla and Does 1–30)

107.

Plaintiffs incorporate herein each and every allegation set forth in the preceding

paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

108.

Plaintiffs were harmed by the Subject Vehicle, a product that is manufactured,

distributed, marketed, advertised and sold by Defendants TESLA and DOES 1–50. 109.

At the time Defendants sold the Subject Vehicle, the Subject Vehicle was dangerous,

hazardous, and unsafe both for its intended use and/or for its reasonably foreseeable misuses. The

Subject Vehicle contained inherent vices and defects both in design and manufacturing, and by

Defendants’ failures to warn of the Subject Vehicle’s defects and limitations, of which they were

aware at all relevant times.

110.

Defendants knew the Subject Vehicle was to be purchased and used without

inspection for defects by the users of the vehicle, including but not limited to Giovanni. Defendants

did not include sufficient instructions and/or warnings of the potential safety hazards, including but

not limited to Giovanni.

111.

Defendants were negligent in the design, manufacturing, installation, promotion,

instructions, and warnings related to the Subject Vehicle, including but not limited to the functionality

and limitations of Autopilot. Said negligence includes, but is not limited to, Defendants’ failures to

place reasonable limitations on the Subject Vehicle’s autonomous features, and/or to reasonably

warn and advise Tesla’s customers about the limitations of Autopilot. As a result, TESLA’s

customers, including Giovanni, used Autopilot by transferring complete control to TESLA in any

manner, traffic, or conditions, including at speeds in excess of the speed limit.

112.

TESLA refuses to implement technology that would warn drivers to remain focused

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on driving. For example, other companies have implemented technology to ensure drivers are still

engaged when utilizing SAE Level 2 ADAS technology, since evidence shows the average driver

tends to rely too much on ADAS technology. To that end, General Motors and Ford use infrared

cameras that closely track the driver’s eyes and sound warning chimes if a driver looks away from the

road for more than two or three seconds. TESLA did not initially include such a driver monitoring

system in its vehicles, and later added only a standard camera that is much less precise than infrared

cameras in eye tracking. 57

113.

In manufacturing, distributing, marketing, advertising, and selling its vehicles,

including the Subject Vehicle, TESLA acted with conscious disregard for the safety of others.

Specifically, TESLA represented to others—including Giovanni—that the Tesla Model S was capable

of fully autonomous driving even though Tesla knew the vehicle was not safe for fully autonomous

driving. Moreover, TESLA knew that others—including Giovanni—would rely on Tesla’s

“Autopilot” feature to operate their vehicles on public roadways in their stead, and that this presented

a significant risk to others’ safety, including other motorists and their passengers.

114.