835 F.2d 881
266 U.S.App.D.C. 304, 56 USLW 2358,
10 Fed.R.Serv.3d 66,
9 Employee Benefits Ca 1177
Donna L. NICHOLS, et al., Appellants,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the ASBESTOS WORKERS LOCAL 24 PENSION
PLAN, et al.
No. 82-1959.
United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued June 3, 1983.
Decided Sept. 24, 1987.
Opinions Filed Dec. 11, 1987.
Daniel M. Schember, with whom Katharyn M. Marks and James B. Klimaski, Washington, D.C., were on brief, for appellants.
Michael J. Roach, Atty., Dept. of Justice, with whom Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Stanley S. Harris, U.S. Atty., and Michael L. Paup, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., were on brief, for federal appellees.
Thomas P. McErlean, Washington, D.C., for appellee Board of Trustees of Asbestos Workers Local 24 Pension Plan. James Buckley Ostmann, Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance for the Board.
Before ROBINSON and STARR, Circuit Judges and WRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROBINSON.
Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge STARR.
SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge:
1
In May, 1979, the board of trustees of the Asbestos Workers Local 24 Pension Plan proposed amendments designed to effect a retroactive decrease in the plan's retirement benefits. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) approved the amendments shortly thereafter. Three adversely-affected retirees then filed suit in the District Court to block the amendments, contending that Section 302(c)(8) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) prohibits retroactive alteration of the Plan, that the trustees' action flouted statutorily-prescribed fiduciary duties, and that agency approval of the benefit reduction was arbitrary and procedurally deficient. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court dismissed the case, concluding that neither the trustees, IRS, nor the plan amendments themselves transgressed ERISA or any other applicable provision of law.
2
We find that IRS approved and thereby validated the benefit decrease on the basis of deliberations plainly inadequate to satisfy ERISA's specific, unequivocal requirements. We therefore vacate the judgment appealed from and remand to the District Court with instructions to return the case to IRS for appropriate further proceedings.
3
* The Asbestos Workers Local 24 Pension Plan is a defined-benefit, multiemployer program established pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement between the Insulation Contractors Association of Washington, D.C., Inc., and the Asbestos Workers Local No. 24 of the International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators. In 1977, the plan entitled eligible participants to monthly retirement benefits of $16.80 for each year of service in covered employment. On April 12, 1977, the trustees increased the monthly benefit for plan participants retiring after October 1, 1977, to $24.80 per credit year. Ernest Nichols, Raymond Bell, and Ralph Tomlin, who later became the plaintiffs herein, fell within the category, and qualified for and received monthly payments at the higher level.
4
The plan did not fare well during the two years following this change. The number of hours worked annually in covered employment declined markedly, and a significant number of plan participants unexpectedly elected early retirement. At the then-existing contribution rate and benefit level, this combination of factors resulted in substantial unfunded plan liabilities. To secure the plan's financial viability, and to enhance the prospect of a merger with the larger and potentially more stable National Asbestos Workers Pension Plan, the trustees, on May 30, 1979, adopted amendments repealing the 1977 monthly benefit retroactively to July 1, 1977, and reinstating the previous monthly benefit of $16.80 per credit year. The amendments mandated recalculation of pensioners' retirement payments at the lower level and thus pared their monthly benefits by approximately one-third.
5
The benefit reduction did not become effective immediately because Section 302(c)(8) of ERISA requires retroactive amendments to qualifying plans to be cleared with IRS. The trustees submitted the amendments and supporting materials to IRS on September 21, 1979, and IRS formally approved them on December 17 following. This removed the statutory impediment to their implementation by the trustees, and thereupon retirees' monthly payments under the plan decreased.
6
Nichols' repeated efforts to obtain relevant information from the trustees and to participate in the IRS review of the plan amendments met with resistance and refusal. Before the trustees submitted the amendments to IRS, Nichols twice sought a copy of the accompanying materials. The trustees not only rejected each request, but did not even notify Nichols individually when, much later, they made duplicates available for inspection or purchase. Nichols' attempts to procure copies from IRS and to intervene in the agency's Section 302(c)(8) proceeding for review of the amendments proved similarly futile; IRS denied the request for the materials and simply ignored the query respecting participation. Nichols obtained the requested documents from the trustees on January 9, 1980, three weeks after IRS, without his input, approved the amendments and sanctioned the benefit decrease he had hoped to forestall.
II
7
Unable to defeat the benefit rollback by administrative means, Nichols, later joined by Bell and Tomlin, filed suit in the District Court for declaratory and injunctive relief against the trustees and IRS. They contended that the amendments were invalid because the trustees, by adopting them, by denying Nichols' information request, by submitting incomplete financial data to IRS, and by failing to collect employer contributions due under reciprocal agreements, contravened the fiduciary obligations imposed by Section 404 of ERISA. The plaintiffs also attacked IRS's review of the trustees' action, arguing that the agency ignored statutorily-mandated factors, denied the intervention request in violation of their statutory and constitutional rights, and approved the amendments without the support of substantial evidence. Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that even aside from improprieties in trustee conduct or IRS deliberation, the benefit reduction failed to satisfy Section 302(c)(8)'s substantive requirements.
8
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court rejected these claims and refused to invalidate the challenged amendments. The court concluded that the trustees' adoption and approval of the amendments did not violate Section 404, citing a number of considerations--the broad discretion customarily accorded trustees in matters of fund administration, the trustees' evenhanded treatment of plan beneficiaries, compliance with IRS procedures and requests, and seemingly good faith efforts to oversee payment of reciprocal contributions, preserve the financial viability of the plan, and submit accurate data to IRS.
9
The court also rejected, on different grounds, the contention that the trustees' denials of Nichols' information requests breached the fiduciary duties imposed by Section 404. Because ERISA subjects trustees of qualifying funds to several express disclosure requirements, none of which the plaintiffs claimed the trustees infringed, the court held that it would find a breach of fiduciary obligation for lack of disclosure only if the trustees had engaged in "egregious" conduct or otherwise acted in a manner inconsistent with "fundamental fairness." The trustees had granted access to the application materials in December, 1979, and Nichols acquired copies less than a month later. The plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate that more timely disclosure would have altered the administrative outcome was deemed confirmation of the court's determination that the trustees' refusal of Nichols' presubmission requests was neither egregious nor fundamentally unfair.
10
The District Court was similarly unresponsive to the plaintiffs' contention that the amendment exceeded Section 302(c)(8)'s bounds on retroactivity. The plaintiffs wielded a single statement in the legislative history to support their construction of Section 302(c)(8) as restricting the permissible retroactive effect of amendments to a two-year period; they argued that the plan amendments overstepped this limitation by retroactively reducing the retirement benefits to which they were entitled for all the years they had worked in covered employment, not only those after 1977. The court dismissed this contention, accepting instead the agency's interpretation of Section 302(c)(8) as prohibiting only those amendments that, unlike the one disputed here, reduced benefits already accrued at the beginning of the first validly affected plan year.
11
The plaintiffs' challenge to IRS's deliberative process fared no better. The court put aside, not their assertion that IRS did not consider all statutorily-enumerated factors, but their argument that ERISA required the agency to do so. It then dismissed the plaintiffs' claim, finding that "[t]he record in this case shows that the IRS considered a sufficient number of the pertinent factors in light of the evidence submitted by the Trustees ... and existing circumstances."
12
Proceeding to the plaintiffs' final contention, the court held that the agency's refusal to allow Nichols to intervene did not taint the proceeding from which it excluded him. Because Section 302(c)(8) contemplates action by IRS within ninety days after submission of a proposed retroactive amendment, denial of Nichols' request to intervene was thought to promote substantially "the orderly conduct of public business" and thus survived scrutiny under Section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, upon which the claim was grounded in part. Congress' decision not to include in ERISA a proposed provision entitling interested persons to intervene in these proceedings was read as supportive of the court's conclusion.
13
Finally, the court dismissed the alternative contention that IRS contravened the Fifth Amendments' Due Process Clause by denying Nichols' participation plea. Performing the constitutionally-required balancing test, the court reasoned that the low risk of erroneous deprivation under present procedure, the slight likelihood that beneficiaries could contribute significantly to agency decisionmaking, the trustees' ethical and fiduciary obligations to at least consider beneficiaries' interests, and the administrative burden caused by intervention, rendered constitutional IRS's streamlined procedure.
14
Thus the court rejected all of the plaintiffs' challenges to the retroactive plan amendments and therefore dismissed the case. The plaintiffs then sought review by this court.
III
15
At the outset, we are confronted by the question whether appellants timely served and filed a notice of appeal from the judgment they now seek to attack. Very shortly after the District Court dismissed their case, appellants tendered to the District Court a motion for reconsideration which, under Federal Civil Rule 59(e), operated as a motion to alter or amend the judgment. Appellants explicitly anchored their motion in Rule 59, and the well-established doctrine is that regardless of the way a caption characterizes a motion, a post-judgment filing challenging the correctness of the judgment falls within Rule 59(e)'s perimeter.
16
Undeniably, appellants' motion for reconsideration satisfied the time demands of the Civil Rules. Appellants met Rule 59(e)'s ten-day service requirement by providing the prescribed notice on July 28, 1982, nine days following entry of the judgment, and the terms of Federal Civil Rule 5(d) by filing the motion within a reasonable time after service--on August 2, 1982. We conclude that the motion for reconsideration qualifies as a timely motion under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment from which this appeal emanates.
17
This determination directly affects the timeliness of appellants' notice of appeal. Federal Appellate Rule 4(a)(4) provides that filing of a timely motion under Civil Rule 59(e) tolls the period for appeal until the District Court rules on the motion, and that a notice of appeal filed in the meantime "shall have no effect." The Supreme Court has held that this command is immune from judicial waiver. Appellants strayed from the narrow path prescribed by the rule when they filed a notice of appeal on August 18, 1982, before the District Court denied the motion to reconsider on September 14. Applying the rule's sanction for premature filing, we hold that the August 18, 1982, notice of appeal was ineffective.
18
This conclusion, however, does not necessarily require dismissal of the appeal. The premature filing eviscerated the notice of appeal involved, but did not foreclose appellants' ability to cure the deficiency by timely filing of a new notice of appeal after disposition of the motion to reconsider. We find that the certificate appellants filed in this court pursuant to Federal Appellate Rule 10(b)(1), which notified us that they would not order a transcript of the District Court proceedings for use on appeal, constituted just such a curative instrument. And since appellants filed this certificate on September 22, 1982, eight days after the District Court denied their motion for reconsideration, it unquestionably satisfied, as the earlier notice of appeal clearly did not, Appellate Rule 4(a)'s requirement of filing within sixty days after the court's disposition of that motion.
19
The substantial issue then becomes whether the certificate contains the data Federal Appellate Rule 3(c) necessitates for an efficacious notice of appeal. We hold that it does. Appellants' failure to label the certificate explicitly as a "notice of appeal" does not subvert its sufficiency under Rule 3(c); indeed, that rule unequivocally rejects that result by providing that "[a]n appeal shall not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal." Would-be appellants, the cases hold, need only serve and file a document evincing with reasonable clarity an intention to appeal. Appellants' Rule 10(b)(1) certificate served on appellees and filed in this court recites the title and docket number of the case, and then asserts that
20
[a]ppellants hereby certify that no transcript of proceedings below will be ordered. The decision from which this appeal is brought was rendered on cross-motions for summary judgment, with no proceedings transcribed.
21
This certificate plainly reveals appellants' resolve to pursue an appeal from the District Court's order on the cross-motions for summary judgment, and therefore functions as a notice of appeal therefrom.
22
Even so, the adequacy of the certificate for jurisdictional purposes depends additionally upon satisfaction of Appellate Rule 3(c)'s requirement that it specify the parties taking the appeal, designate the judgment appealed from, and identify the court to which the appeal is taken. The certificate easily fulfills the first and last of these prerequisites: it identifies the parties bringing the appeal and the court in which appellate review is sought. It also designates the judgment appealed from with enough specificity to meet Rule 3(c)'s second requirement, not only by supplying the case title and docket number but also by stating that the District Court rendered the decision appealed from on cross-motions for summary judgment. Since the District Court made only one of that kind, there can be no doubt about the judgment to which the certificate refers. Furthermore, courts generally excuse an inexact designation so long as the would-be appellant discloses a desire to appeal from a specific judgment and the indecisiveness does not prejudice opposing parties. Appellants' Rule 10(b)(1) certificate plainly reveals their intention to appeal from a particular judgment, and appellees do not assert prejudice from the designation utilized. We find that the Rule 10(b)(1) certificate possesses each of the prerequisites called for by Rule 3(c), and accordingly qualifies as a valid notice of appeal.
23
We therefore hold that while appellants' prematurely-filed notice of appeal must be discarded under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4), their Rule 10(b)(1) certificate operated as a valid notice of appeal under Rule 3, cured the defect of the earlier notice, and preserved this appeal.
IV
24
A. The Statutory Scheme.
25
Section 204(g) of ERISA, as codified, states that "[t]he accrued benefit of a participant under a [qualifying] plan may not be decreased by an amendment of the plan, other than an amendment described in section [302(c)(8) ]." Section 302(c)(8), in turn, establishes two independent sets of hurdles that a plan must clear before an amendment retroactively reducing accrued benefits may take effect. First, three substantive provisions govern the adoption, scope, and reasonableness of an amendment proposing a reduction, requiring that it
26
(A) [be] adopted after the close of [the affected] plan year but no later than 2 1/2 months after the close of the plan year (or, in the case of a multi-employer plan, no later than 2 years after the close of such plan year),
27
(B) ... not reduce the accrued benefit of any participant determined as of the beginning of the first plan year to which the amendment applies, and
28
(C) ... not reduce the accrued benefit of any participant determined as of the time of adoption except to the extent required by the circumstances....
29
The section's use of the conjunction "and" makes clear that validity of the proposed amendment requires fulfillment of each of these prerequisites.
30
Second, Section 302(c)(8) erects an elaborate mandatory procedure for agency preclearance of the amendment. The plan administrator must file the measure with IRS, and the amendment becomes effective upon agency endorsement or, absent agency disapproval, after ninety days from its submission. The section also supplies a standard to govern IRS review of the sought-after amendment:
31
[n]o amendment described in this subsection shall be approved by [IRS] unless [that agency] determines that such amendment is necessary because of a substantial business hardship (as determined under section 1083(b) of this title) and that waiver [of the minimum funding standard] is unavailable or inadequate.
32
Moreover, Section 302(c)(8) expressly incorporates Section 303(b), which enumerates four factors that must be considered during the inquiry into substantial business hardship:
33
[T]he factors taken into account in determining substantial business hardship shall include (but shall not be limited to) whether--
34
(1) the employer is operating at a economic loss,
35
(2) there is substantial unemployment or underemployment in the trade or business and in the industry concerned,
36
(3) the sales and profits of the industry concerned are depressed or declining, and
37
(4) it is reasonable to expect that the plan will be continued only if the waiver is granted.
38
Validation of a retroactive amendment requires successful invocation of the preclearance procedure, satisfaction of the substantive standard, and a finding that waiver of ERISA's minimum funding requirements "would not solve the fund's problems."
39
B. The Agency's Finding of "Substantial Business Hardship."
40
Appellants' primary contention on appeal is that IRS did not consider the factors mandated in Section 303(b) in determining whether the Asbestos Workers Local 24 Pension Plan faced substantial business hardship. Upon review of the record, we agree that IRS did not evaluate each of the factors enumerated in this section; rather, IRS articulated just one rationale for its finding of substantial business hardship. Since the plan was confronted by both substantial unfunded liabilities and decreasing hours annually worked in covered employment, IRS feared that preservation of the plan's financial stability by an elevation of the contribution level would ignite an "increasing assessment spiral" wreaking precisely the opposite effect. In this scenario, an incremental hike in the contribution rate inuring primarily to the benefit of retired participants rather than present employees could cause some participating employers to leave the plan in favor of one less tilted against current recipients. This, in turn, could further erode the plan's funding base, and launch the plan upon a self-fueling spiral of rising contribution levels and mounting employer defections that ultimately would cause its collapse. Concerned that a higher contribution level for participating employers conceivably might trigger such a destructive course, IRS concluded that there was substantial business hardship justifying approval of an alternate solution--the proposed retroactive reduction in benefits.
41
The agency's deliberations on the specter of an assessment spiral, though undeniably germane to the inquiry into substantial business hardship, obviously did not constitute a survey of the factors enumerated by Section 303(b). The record contains no evidence revealing meaningful agency consideration of several questions specified in Section 303(b): industry sales, profits, and employment patterns; the economic positions of participating employers; or the likelihood that the plan would in fact fail absent the proposed amendment. IRS does not claim that it explored these elements: indeed, its lack of relevant information largely foreclosed any effort of that sort. As a matter of practice, IRS primarily confines its statutorily-required deliberations to materials initially submitted by plan administrators with approval applications. The agency's glaring inattention to vital Section 303(b) factors directly correlates to the failure of the plan trustees to supply the data necessary for their appraisal by IRS. The informational deficiencies and our review of the record render inescapable the conclusion that IRS did not evaluate all factors specified by Section 303(b).
42
The District Court did not disagree with this conclusion, but nevertheless dismissed appellants' claim on the ground that the agency considered a "sufficient number" of Section 303(b)'s elements in light of the evidence submitted and the circumstances. Implicitly, the District Court construed Section 303(b) as not requiring agency appraisal of each of its elements. We cannot accept this proposition. The section states emphatically that "the factors taken into account in determining substantial business hardship shall include (but shall not be limited to)" the four listed components. This peremptory language will not tolerate an interpretation that accords IRS discretion to select which of the identified factors, if any, to consider in assessing substantial business hardship. We do not disagree with the District Court's endorsement of statements culled from the legislative history that not all specified elements need be met, but it does not follow that IRS may avoid its plain statutory duty at least to consider each factor.
43
As we find that IRS neglected to assay the Section 303(b)-mandated points, we conclude that the challenged agency decision cannot stand. IRS plainly failed to discharge its duty to reach an "express and considered conclusion" with respect to each listed question. We therefore vacate the agency's approval of the proposed amendment and remand the case to District Court for further proceedings.
V
44
We come, finally, to the claim that IRS impermissibly denied appellant Nichols' petition to intervene in the proceedings to review the amendment. Appellants ground this contention upon Section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, as amended, which provides:
45
[s]o far as the orderly conduct of public business permits, an interested person may appear before an agency or its responsible employees for the presentation, adjustment, or determination of an issue, request, or controversy in a proceeding, whether interlocutory, summary, or otherwise, or in connection with an agency function.
46
Because IRS does not dispute that its Section 302(c)(8) review of proposed amendments falls generally within the purview of this clause, the validity of appellants' claim rests solely upon the determination whether a plan beneficiary such as Nichols qualifies as an "interested person" and whether intervention would harm "the orderly conduct of public business." We shall address each in turn.
47
Beneficiaries in a plan qualifying under ERISA unquestionably possess an "interest" in agency deliberations that might reduce their retirement benefits. ERISA Section 502(a)(3)(A) authorizes plan beneficiaries to maintain civil actions to enjoin any injurious act or practice that violates ERISA Subchapter I or the terms of the plan. Because a party entitled to judicial review of agency action clearly qualifies as an "interested person" who normally may intervene in the administrative proceeding, we hold that Nichols possessed such status under Section 6(a) when he requested permission to participate in the proceedings under review.
48
Despite qualifying as an "interested person," Nichols had a right to intervene only if his participation in the administrative process dovetailed with "the orderly conduct of public business." Courts have long accorded agencies broad discretion in fashioning rules to govern public participation and have for the most part permitted denials of requests for leave to intervene when, for example, other parties to the proceeding adequately represent the would-be intervenor's viewpoint or intervention would broaden unduly the issues considered, obstruct or overburden the proceedings, or fail to assist the agency's decisionmaking. As a general rule, however, courts will not rubberstamp a challenged denial based merely upon an assertion of justification, especially if the agency contends simply that intervention would prove impermissibly dilatory or burdensome. Courts willingly overturn challenged denials when the responsible agency, either by failing to fashion equitable procedures or by employing its power in an unreasonably overbroad or otherwise arbitrary manner, has not acted to preserve the participation opportunities of interested persons.
49
Here, IRS interpreted its regulations governing submission of Section 302(c)(8) applications as prohibiting intervention even by interested persons, and purportedly denied Nichols' participation request on this ground. In support of this flat rule, IRS argues that the section's ninety-day period for agency review of retroactive amendments does not permit the consumption of time resulting from intervention. We cannot accept this position. IRS here faced an intervention plea from a single plan beneficiary who sought neither party status nor trial-type hearings and privileges, but only permission to "comment" on the trustees' application. In these circumstances, we see no basis for apprehension that granting the participation request would unduly prolong the deliberations. Indeed, not only might appellants' intervention have enhanced the soundness of IRS decisionmaking through alleviating the agency's informational deficit, but their substantial pecuniary interests in completion of the proceedings before the advent of the ninety-day automatic approval would have ensured expeditious action. Thus, we can discern no reason to believe that granting Nichols' request would have interfered with the agency's discharge of its statutory obligations within the Section 302(c)(8) time period.
50
Furthermore, IRS has substantially overstated the inflexibility of the ninety-day period. As the agency's own rules contemplate and the legislative history confirms, IRS may defuse the automatic-effectuation rule, thereby gaining additional time to collect data or to deliberate upon the application, by announcing its tentative disapproval of the proposed measure before the period lapses. Indeed, IRS has the power to disapprove a retroactive amendment under Section 302(c)(8) even after passage of the ninety-day interval renders the measure effective by operation of the statute. That the ninety-day deadline neither precludes timely announcement of tentative disapproval nor limits administrative review of the proposed amendment further undermines the agency's claim that the statutory scheme forecloses intervention.
51
To be sure, intervention by substantial numbers of plan beneficiaries could conceivably swamp the agency's Section 302(c)(8) review process. However, we traditionally resist acceptance at face value of undifferentiated claims of prospective immersion under multiple intervention petitions, especially when, as here, the cost of participation is likely to deter many potential applicants. We adhere to that practice in this case. IRS retains untapped authority to ensure orderly procedure by promulgating rules limiting both the number of intervenors and the nature of their participation. The agency may not avoid its obligation to wield this power responsibly by implementing a flat ban upon all intervention--a ban for which IRS has adduced no reasonable justification.
52
Therefore, we hold that "the orderly conduct of public business" does not interpose a bar to Nichols' participation request and consequently does not justify denial of that request by the agency. Because Nichols' status as an interested person entitled him to intervene in the agency's proceedings to review the amendment, neither the denial of his participation request nor the regulatory interpretation that purportedly supported that denial can stand. Although we decline to speculate under what standards the agency might grant or deny petitions for leave to intervene lodged by plan beneficiaries or others in the proceedings upon remand, we note that compliance with Section 6(a)'s directive at minimum requires agency action designed to accommodate the legitimate interests of would-be intervenors with the need for orderly administrative processes.
VI
53
We find that appellants' Rule 10(b)(1) certificate qualifies as an efficacious notice of appeal in place of the earlier notice invalid for premature filing. We vacate IRS's decision to approve the disputed retroactive amendment because IRS failed to consider statutorily-mandated factors in its required inquiry into substantial business hardship. Finally, we hold that the agency's flat rule prohibiting intervention in Section 302(c)(8) proceedings contravenes Section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act. The agency must therefore reconsider whether and upon what conditions it will permit public participation in such proceedings. We thus remand the case to the District Court with instructions to return it to IRS for further proceedings.
STARR, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
55
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the court's formalistic interpretation of ERISA's section 303(b), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1083(b) (1982), unduly burdens the Internal Revenue Service in its treatment of proposed amendments and will do substantial harm to the workability of the statutory scheme crafted by Congress.
56
* The court's interpretation of section 303(b)'s four-factor analysis is intuitively appealing, if only because it is straightforward. Based upon a perceived statutory command, the court requires IRS, in its decision to approve or disapprove proposed plan amendments, to engage (at minimum) in a boilerplate recitation of the impact of the four listed factors. In the court's not entirely unpersuasive view, the plain meaning of "shall" makes further analysis unnecessary.
57
I readily concede that my colleagues' reading of the statute is quite natural. But upon further analysis, especially of the statute's structure and purposes, the court's natural reading turns out to be the wrong reading. The Supreme Court has taught time and again that broader statutory purposes and the statute's structure may overcome even the most seemingly clear statutory command. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 2726, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979) ("It is a 'familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.' " (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459, 12 S.Ct. 511, 512, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892))); cf. Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, 476 U.S. 974, 106 S.Ct. 2360, 90 L.Ed.2d 959 (1986) (statutory command that agency "shall promulgate regulations" sufficiently ambiguous to allow agency to proceed by informal "action levels" rather than formal "regulations"). This is one instance in which, upon careful analysis, the structure and purpose of a statute speak more clearly than some of the words within it.
58
First, section 303(b)'s four enumerated factors are not even keyed to review of amendments to plans. The "substantial business hardship" test primarily governs waivers of minimum funding responsibilities for employers, see 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1083(a), and was adopted only by reference to apply to amendments to plans. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1082(c)(8) (1982). And the majority commendably concedes that applying section 303(b)'s enumerated factors to plan amendments makes no sense without "judicial construction." Maj. op. at 891 n. 83. The language of section 303(b) clearly contemplates analysis focusing on individual employers. The first factor, section 303(b)(1), refers to whether "the employer is operating at an economic loss," a consideration which is inapposite when the IRS is inquiring into the viability of a multi-employer plan. In order to make sense in the amendment context, the reference to "employer" must be read in the plural, thus turning section 303(b)(1)'s inquiry into something more akin to an industry-wide analysis. But this commonsense interpretation necessarily renders indistinct the four factors that the court requires IRS to examine. In the plan amendment context, the first three enumerated factors--all relating to the economic health of the industry--constitute premises for the ultimate conclusion, contained in the fourth factor, on which approval of the amendment properly hinges: whether "it is reasonable to expect that the plan will be continued only if the [amendment] is granted." 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1083(b)(4). As it should be, this fourth factor seems to be the ultimate consideration Congress had in mind. Separate consideration of each of the factors, it seems to me, would likely be repetitive and unnecessary in many instances.
59
In addition to the difficulty in applying section 303(b)'s four-factor analysis to the amendment context, the structure of section 303(b) itself contemplates that the four factors will not necessarily be determinative. As the court candidly recognizes, Congress explicitly did not require that each of the four factors be present; what is more, Congress explicitly provided that IRS may consider whatever other factors it deems relevant. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 303(b) (stating that the factors to be considered include "but shall not be limited to" the four-factor analysis); see also H.R.Rep. No. 807, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1974) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1974, p. 4639 ("The determination of substantial business hardship is not to be limited to an examination of these factors, ... nor must all these factors be met for there to be a finding of substantial business hardship.") As a result, today's decision creates a situation in which IRS may approve proposed amendments on bases entirely irrelevant to the four enumerated factors, but it nonetheless must indicate explicitly--most likely in a boilerplate fashion--that it considered each of the four factors. Failure to jump through these formalistic hoops, even if compliance would be burdensome for an agency already faced with a 90-day approval deadline, constitutes reversible error. This is an odd as well as unfortunate result of the court's rigid approach to statutory interpretation.
60
Along with the provisions of section 303(b) itself, other parts of the statute evince Congress' intent that IRS review be flexible and informal. Congress has, after all, put IRS in the position of having to take action within strict time constraints. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1082(c)(8). Ninety days is not a very long time. The need for speed is no small matter, especially when, as must be the case if approval is warranted, the very viability of the plan is threatened if the amendment is not accomplished. The court disagrees, arguing that the burden of investigating and considering each of the four factors is slight, and discounting the significance of the normal review period of 90 days. In the majority's view, if 90 days is not long enough to do the agency's job, then regulations are in place for an extension until the job is properly done. See Rev.Proc. 79-18, Sec. 7, 1979-1 C.B. 525, 527.
61
To be sure, IRS regulations provide for extensions, but they were certainly not intended to be routine, and until today were not so. I fear that today's holding will go a long way toward transforming the 90-day approval time in the ERISA context into what the 10-day reply time in the Freedom of Information Act context, see 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(d)(2)(A) (1982), has become: a practical nullity. This transformation would be an unfortunate and unnecessary development, inflicted only by a wooden interpretation of the statute.
II
62
With respect to the court's treatment of the intervention issue, I am satisfied that it is correct. The District Court's conclusion that ERISA preempted the otherwise applicable APA provision for intervention, see 5 U.S.C. Sec. 555(b) (1982), cannot stand. The APA states explicitly that a "[s]ubsequent statute may not be held to supersede or modify this subchapter ... except to the extent that it does so expressly." 5 U.S.C. Sec. 559 (1982). There being no express statement of preemption in ERISA, the agency is bound to allow interested parties to intervene "so far the orderly conduct of public business permits." 5 U.S.C. Sec. 555(b). Under such a statutory command, the agency may not adopt a blanket rule, however reasonable, prohibiting intervention.
63
In light of my agreement with the court's judgment in this respect, I write only to emphasize the narrowness of today's holding: the court holds only that a blanket prohibition of intervention is impermissible. It does not hold that intervention is required in all or even most instances. In my view, by virtue of the constraints placed upon it by the 90-day deadline, the IRS in most instances will likely be well within its discretion in denying intervention. In each case, however, the agency is obliged to supply an adequate explanation of why intervention would be unduly burdensome.
III
64
On a different front, I am troubled by one less obvious aspect of the court's treatment of this case, and thus add a brief comment. In Footnote 102 of its opinion, see Maj. op. at 895 n. 102, the court properly rejects IRS' argument that since the injury complained of was caused by plan trustees and not by IRS' approval of the plan amendments, the case presents no case or controversy under Article III. In IRS' view, because the amendments would have gone into effect had the agency not acted, the agency's affirmative steps did not work any harm to the plaintiffs. The court properly rejects this argument, for the harm alleged to have been caused by the agency's affirmative steps is sufficient to satisfy Article III's standing requirements (and Congress has provided by statute for judicial review). See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1132(a)(3) (1982).
65
To this point, I have no quarrel. But the court goes further and suggests that judicial review would have been available even if the agency had not acted within 90 days, and the amendments therefore had taken effect by operation of law. The majority states "[b]ecause the amendment could not be enforced absent submission to IRS and its explicit or de facto approval, appellants' injury cannot reasonably be construed as springing solely from the actions of the trustees." Maj. op. at 895 n. 102 (emphasis added). The majority thus apparently believes that agency inaction resulting in approval of amendments is amenable to judicial review, and seemingly so holds.
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For my part, the issues of whether Congress provided for judicial review of de facto approval of amendments or whether such a cause of action can properly be implied, are fraught with difficulty. However, because the agency affirmatively approved the amendments in this instance, these questions are not part of the case before us. As a result, any statements as to the reviewability of de facto approvals of plan amendments constitute no part of today's holding.
IV
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A final observation. If the administrative process, as Congress has fashioned it, takes time, so be it. But in the context of ERISA plan amendments, the substance of the statutory scheme is thwarted, not advanced, by delay. Beneficiaries are adequately protected by judicial review--easily obtained--following IRS approval. IRS approval is intended to be expeditious, focusing primarily on whether a proposed amendment is justified by economic necessity, while judicial review properly focuses on substantive legal issues, such as questions concerning fiduciary duties. Today, the court frustrates this sensible structure by imposing delay at the administrative level to the detriment of all concerned. The judicial branch is well-advised to give credence not only to individual words within a statute, but to reflect upon and give life to the statute's structure and purpose. Because the court fails to discern what I am satisfied is Congress' intent, I am constrained respectfully to dissent.