Page 1 Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. In the Matter of
Space Exploration Holdings, LLC
Request for Modification of the Authorization for
the SpaceX NGSO Satellite System
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)
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IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20190830-Call Signs S2983 and S
PETITION TO DEFER OF SES AMERICOM, INC. AND O3B LIMITED
SES Americom, Inc. and its affiliate O3b Limited (collectively, “SES”), request that the
Commission defer consideration of the above-captioned application of Space Exploration
Holdings, LLC (“SpaceX”) to modify its license for a Ku/Ka-band non-geostationary orbit
(“NGSO”) fixed-satellite service (“FSS”) system by adjusting the orbital spacing. 1 SES has a
strong interest in the Application, as SES entities operate both NGSO and geostationary orbit
(“GSO”) FSS networks that use these bands.
Before acting on the Application, the Commission must ensure that the operational
changes SpaceX proposes will not impose new burdens on other NGSO and GSO operators. In
particular, to protect the operations of dozens of Ku- and Ka-band GSO satellites, the
Commission must require SpaceX to provide additional information in support of its claims
regarding compliance with equivalent power flux-density (“EPFD”) limits set by the
International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”). Changed circumstances also mandate a
reassessment of whether SpaceX should be permitted to continue to deploy spacecraft pending
ITU review of SpaceX’s EPFD filings. In addition, SpaceX must be required to adjust its
proposed operations as necessary to avoid increased interference to other NGSO systems such as
See Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, File No. SAT-MOD-20190830-00087 (“Application”);
Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, 34 FCC Rcd 2526 (IB 2019) (“SpaceX Modification”).Page 2 O3b’s, and SpaceX should be required to accept any increased interference to its system
stemming from its voluntary changes to the system originally authorized by the Commission.
I.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS NEEDED TO PERMIT PARTIES TO
EVALUATE SPACEX’S COMPLIANCE WITH EPFD LIMITS
The Commission must take steps to ensure the integrity of GSO systems operated by SES
and others by mandating that SpaceX make a more robust showing regarding the EPFD
characteristics of its system. SES recognizes that in the SpaceX Modification decision, the
International Bureau determined that SpaceX need not await the completion of ITU review of its
system’s EPFD levels, but a reassessment of that finding is needed in light of intervening events.
The original license granted for the SpaceX NGSO system specified that:
Prior to initiation of service, SpaceX must receive a favorable or
“qualified favorable” finding in accordance with Resolution (WRC-03) with respect to its compliance with applicable
equivalent power flux-density limits in Article 22 of the ITU Radio
Regulations. Section 25.146 of the Commission’s rules imposes the same requirement. When SpaceX later in 2018 sought authority to place 1,584 of its authorized satellites in a
lower orbit of 550 kilometers and make other changes, it also requested a waiver of this
obligation. SpaceX argued that due to a backlog, the ITU was unlikely to complete its EPFD
compliance review before SpaceX would be ready to begin operations, and adhering to the
condition would therefore delay SpaceX’s ability to initiate service to customers.
Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, 33 FCC Rcd 3391, 3407 (2018) (“SpaceX Authorization”).
47 C.F.R. § 25.146(c).
Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, File No. SAT-MOD-20190830-00087 (“2018 Application”),
Waiver Requests at 3-4. Page 3 In its comments on the 2018 Application, SES took no position on this waiver request
provided that any relief from the ITU review requirement was temporary only, with SpaceX
assuming the risk that it would have to cease operations if the ITU issued an unfavorable
finding. 5 Other parties urged the Commission to deny the waiver, observing that because the
Commission had decided not to perform its own review of EPFD compliance, the ITU’s
evaluation was the only safeguard in place to protect GSO systems from disruptive interference. OneWeb emphasized that allowing SpaceX operations to commence before ITU review was
completed also created uncertainty for other NGSO systems, which are required to collectively
meet aggregate EPFD limits. The SpaceX Modification granted by the International Bureau allowed SpaceX to proceed
with deployment pending an ITU finding regarding compliance with relevant EPFD levels but
specified that such relief was conferred at SpaceX’s own risk, subject to a requirement that
SpaceX modify its operations as necessary if the ultimate ITU finding was unfavorable. 8 In
addition, the Bureau instructed SpaceX to cooperate with other NGSO operators to ensure that
the aggregate EPFD limits for protection of GSO networks are met.
Comments of SES Americom, Inc. and O3b Limited, File No. SAT-MOD-20181108-00083,
filed Feb. 8, 2019, at 5.
Reply of EchoStar Satellite Operating Corporation, Hughes Network Systems, LLC, and
Intelsat License LLC, File No. SAT-MOD-20181108-00083, filed Mar. 5, 2019.
Petition to Deny of WorldVu Satellites Limited, File No. SAT-MOD-20181108-00083, filed
Feb. 8, 2019 (the “OneWeb Petition”) at 23-27; Reply of WorldVu Satellites Limited, File No.
SAT-MOD-20181108-00083, filed Mar. 5, 2019, at 9-12.
SpaceX Modification, 34 FCC Rcd at 2538, ¶ 32(n).
Id., ¶ 32(o). Page 4 The instant Application appears to assume that no further waiver of the Commission’s
rules is required to allow SpaceX to implement yet more changes to its system without awaiting
ITU review of its EPFD compliance. 10 SpaceX certifies that it will comply with the ITU’s EPFD
limits, as required by Section 25.146(a)(2) of the Commission’s rules, 11 and the Application
includes a few graphs that purport to demonstrate that the SpaceX system with the proposed
changes will comply with ITU EPFD limits. 12 But SpaceX makes no mention of the ITU finding
mandated by Section 25.146(c).
The Commission must require more before it decides whether SpaceX can continue to
deploy satellites based on an ever-evolving system design that has not been evaluated by the ITU
for EPFD compliance. As noted above, SES did not object to the waiver SpaceX requested in the
2018 Modification, but at the time, SES anticipated that any delay before the ITU determined
whether the SpaceX system as it was being deployed conformed to international EPFD limits
would be only a few months. Because of subsequent SpaceX actions, that expectation has proven
to be misplaced.
First, SpaceX has continued to alter its system design, rendering ITU evaluations of prior
configurations moot and requiring the ITU review to begin anew each time. Because SpaceX
keeps moving the goalposts, SES and other GSO operators have no assurance that there will be a
definitive ITU finding any time in the near future on the SpaceX system as it is actually being
operated.
The only waivers requested in the Application concern departures from the Schedule S
information requirements. See Application, Waiver Requests.
Application, Attachment A at 4, citing 47 C.F.R. § 25.146(a)(2).
Application, Attachment A, Annex 2. Page 5 Second, and even more concerning, according to ITU records, SpaceX has submitted a
total of twenty ITU filings – all with an October 7, 2019, registry date – to be evaluated in
connection with its NGSO system. On its face, this suggests that SpaceX is attempting to evade
the single-entry EPFD limits for its satellite network by dividing the network into multiple parts
and asking the ITU to evaluate them separately. Leaving aside the propriety of this approach, the
simultaneous submission of so many filings will drastically slow down the ITU’s review process.
SpaceX complained of delay due to a backlog in originally seeking relief from the regulatory
obligation to obtain an ITU finding prior to commencing operations, but now SpaceX has singlehandedly created its own twenty-filing backlog. Assuming it takes the ITU two to four months
on average to review each filing, even if it started immediately, the ITU would not complete its
findings regarding the whole set of SpaceX filings until some time between early 2023 and the
middle of 2026.
Yet even that completion schedule may well be optimistic. For example, it assumes the
ITU’s evaluation software remains in place – but at an ITU meeting earlier this year, SpaceX
submitted an extensive set of proposals to alter that software. 13 Moreover, if SpaceX continues to
revise its system configuration, the evaluation process would have to start again from square one
following each change.
Such a lengthy delay in determining EPFD compliance would create an untenable
situation for GSO networks and nullify the purpose of the Commission’s rule relying on ITU
assessments to protect GSO operations. Over this years-long time span, SES and other GSO
See ITU-R WP4A Contribution 904, Draft revision of Recommendation ITU-R S.1503-3:
Further improvements to model capabilities of advanced NGSO FSS satellite systems below
30 GHz, available at: https://www.itu.int/md/meetingdoc.asp?lang=en&parent=R15-WP4A-C0904. Page 6 operators and their customers would have no avenue to determine whether SpaceX’s burgeoning
NGSO constellation was meeting international limits on interfering emissions.
Similarly, this outcome would make it impossible for O3b and other NGSO operators to
meet their obligations to cooperate in order to collectively meet aggregate EPFD limits. As
OneWeb has observed, the absence of ITU review prevents NGSO networks from determining
whether SpaceX is generating EPFD levels that represent more than its proportionate share of the
aggregate cap. In short, the Bureau’s decision in the SpaceX Modification to allow SpaceX to proceed
with satellite deployments while an ITU validation of its EPFD compliance was pending has
paved the way for unforeseen consequences that threaten critical GSO networks and create
substantial uncertainty for other NGSO operators. Fully protecting GSO operations would
require the Commission to reinstate the requirement included in the original SpaceX
Authorization and codified in Section 25.146(c) that SpaceX await the completion of ITU review
before initiating service. Only this measure would remove the incentive for SpaceX to keep
making changes that push the completion of ITU review further and further into the future.
At a minimum, however, before it can consider the Application the Commission must
ensure that interested parties have an opportunity to make their own assessments of the EPFD
levels the SpaceX network would generate. Specifically, the Commission should instruct SpaceX
to make publicly available the PFD masks, EIRP masks, and inter-satellite masks for the SpaceX
ITU filings that should necessarily represent one NGSO system and allow at least a 30-day
period after the files have been supplied for parties to review the data and submit supplemental
comments to the Commission. Even with this documentation, the ability of SES and others to
See OneWeb Petition at 24-25. Page 7 adequately analyze the SpaceX EPFD compliance will be limited given the complexity of the
constellation, the phased roll-out of satellites, and the open issues regarding validation software.
But having access to the information is at least preferable to SES having to trust that its services
to millions of end users will be protected based solely on SpaceX’s unsupported promise of
EPFD compliance pending ITU findings that are years away.
II.
SPACEX MUST NOT BE PERMITTED TO WORSEN THE
INTERFERENCE ENVIRONMENT FOR OTHER NGSO NETWORKS
A critical factor in determining whether the SpaceX Application can be considered in
isolation without triggering a new processing round is whether the proposed changes would
adversely affect other authorized spectrum users. As the Commission explained in its decision
authorizing the prior set of changes to the SpaceX NGSO constellation:
focus[ing] on the public interest in avoiding radiofrequency
interference is consistent with the purpose of the Commission’s
processing round procedure, which is designed to establish the
interference environment in which participants in the processing
round could operate their systems. If a modification would worsen
the interference environment, that would be a strong indication that
grant of the modification would not be in the public interest. The Commission has recognized that changes to the interference environment can occur
in two ways: if the modification creates additional interference into other NGSO systems or
increases the susceptibility of the applicant’s network to interference from other NGSO
systems. 16 If a modification affects either of these two factors, the appropriate Commission
SpaceX Modification, 34 FCC Rcd at 2529, ¶ 9 (footnotes omitted). See also Ex Parte Filing
of Space Exploration Holdings, File Nos. SAT-MOD-20180319-00022, SAT-AMD-2018010400004, & SAT-LOA-20190704-00057, filed July 15, 2019, at 3 (modification applications “that
add potential interference are to be considered in a new NGSO processing round”) (footnote
omitted).
See SpaceX Modification, 34 FCC Rcd at 2531-32, ¶¶ 12-15. Page 8 approach is to begin a new processing round to consider the proposed changes and any other
timely filed requests for new or modified operations in the relevant spectrum.
Because the Application does not provide sufficient assurances regarding either of these
two essential elements, the Commission must impose conditions on any grant to protect the
interests of O3b and other participants in the Ku/Ka-band NGSO processing round that closed in
November of 2016. SpaceX alleges that its “proposed modification will not increase interference
to any other NGSO system operating in the bands used by Starlink satellites,” 17 but SpaceX’s
own analysis shows that in some scenarios, the proposed changes would result in slightly higher
levels of interference to the O3b network. 18 SpaceX dismisses these impacts as “negligible,” but O3b rather than SpaceX is the proper entity to determine the acceptability of any increased
interference to the O3b network.
More critically, SpaceX fails to provide any discussion of whether the proposed changes
would alter the interference environment by increasing the susceptibility of the SpaceX network
to interference from other NGSO systems. As a result of this omission, the Commission is unable
to perform the analysis described in the SpaceX Modification decision:
We must examine not only the potential for increased interference
to other NGSO FSS systems as a result of SpaceX’s modified
operations, but also whether SpaceX’s own system may become
more susceptible to interference from other NGSO FSS systems,
which would change the operating environment. Thus, the Application on its face does not provide the required evidence that grant would
not shift to O3b or other NGSO operators the interference consequences of the voluntary changes
Application, Attachment A, Annex 1 at A1-1.
See id., Annex 1 at A1-19 to A1-26.
See id., Narrative at 7.
SpaceX Modification, 34 FCC Rcd at 2531, ¶ 14. Page 9 SpaceX seeks to make in its constellation. The appropriate approach to resolve these matters –
both any increased interference to the O3b NGSO network and any increased SpaceX
vulnerability to interference from O3b’s operations – is through coordination between the
parties.
Pending the outcome of such coordination, the Commission must preserve the
interference environment for O3b and other NGSO networks by imposing conditions on any
grant of the Application. Specifically, SpaceX must be required to: (1) alter its proposed
operations to eliminate any increase in interference to other NGSO systems resulting from the
changes sought in the Application and (2) accept any additional interference from other NGSO
networks due to SpaceX’s multiple revisions of the constellation design the Commission
approved in the SpaceX Authorization.
Making these obligations explicit will minimize the risk that the Commission’s
expectations will be misinterpreted or ignored. For example, in the SpaceX Modification
decision, the International Bureau discussed ways that SpaceX could mitigate the risk that at the
lowered orbital altitude it was seeking for a portion of its fleet, SpaceX would receive additional
interference from other NGSO systems. 21 Yet the ordering clauses did not obligate SpaceX to
take any such steps, leaving open the possibility that SpaceX would instead impermissibly
attempt to shift to other operators the responsibility to counteract the effects of the modified
SpaceX system’s greater susceptibility to interference. 22 The Commission must avoid these
See id. at 2531-32, ¶ 15 (noting that keeping the transmit power of SpaceX earth stations
unchanged “would allow the SpaceX transmissions to be received in the presence of stronger
signals of other NGSO FSS systems”).
The magnitude of such a shift could be substantial. For example, SpaceX’s decision to lower
the altitude of a portion of its fleet to 550 kilometers from the originally authorized range of
1,110-1,325 kilometers results in a path loss decrease of 6 to 8 dB. Consequently, if the same Page 10 issues by instructing SpaceX that its rights to protection from interference are defined by the
characteristics of the originally authorized SpaceX fleet.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission should defer consideration of the Application
pending submission of additional information regarding EPFD compliance and take steps to
ensure that the changes SpaceX proposes do not threaten GSO service continuity or impose new
burdens on other NGSO operators.
Respectfully submitted,
SES AMERICOM, INC. AND O3B LIMITED
Of Counsel
Karis A. Hastings
SatCom Law LLC
1317 F Street, N.W., Suite Washington, D.C.
By: /s/ Petra A. Vorwig
Senior Legal and Regulatory Counsel
SES Americom, Inc.
1129 20th Street N.W., Suite Washington, D.C. By: /s/ Suzanne H. Malloy
Vice President, Regulatory Affairs
O3b Limited
1129 20th Street N.W., Suite Washington, D.C.
October 15,
SpaceX satellite design was used, the spacecraft would be 6 to 8 db more sensitive to
interference from O3b and other NGSO uplink transmissions due to the altitude change alone.
The Commission must make clear to SpaceX that during coordination it cannot expect O3b and
other NGSO operators to reduce their uplink emissions by 6 to 8 dB in order to accommodate
SpaceX’s voluntary decision to lower the altitude of these satellites. Page 11 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 15th day of October, 2019, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing “Petition to Defer of SES Americom, Inc. and O3b Limited” by first
class mail, postage prepaid, upon the following:
Patricia Cooper
Vice President of Satellite Government Affairs
David Goldman
Director of Satellite Policy
SPACE EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGIES CORP.
1155 F Street, N.W., Suite Washington, D.C.
William M. Wiltshire
Paul Caritj
HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP
1919 M Street, N.W., Suite Washington, D.C.
/s/ Roxana Hernandez
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Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Space Exploration Holdings, LLC
Request for Modification of the Authorization for
the SpaceX NGSO Satellite System
)
)
)
)
)
)
IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20190830-00087
Call Signs S2983 and S3018
PETITION TO DEFER OF SES AMERICOM, INC. AND O3B LIMITED
SES Americom, Inc. and its affiliate O3b Limited (collectively, “SES”), request that the
Commission defer consideration of the above-captioned application of Space Exploration
Holdings, LLC (“SpaceX”) to modify its license for a Ku/Ka-band non-geostationary orbit
(“NGSO”) fixed-satellite service (“FSS”) system by adjusting the orbital spacing. 1 SES has a
strong interest in the Application, as SES entities operate both NGSO and geostationary orbit
(“GSO”) FSS networks that use these bands.
Before acting on the Application, the Commission must ensure that the operational
changes SpaceX proposes will not impose new burdens on other NGSO and GSO operators. In
particular, to protect the operations of dozens of Ku- and Ka-band GSO satellites, the
Commission must require SpaceX to provide additional information in support of its claims
regarding compliance with equivalent power flux-density (“EPFD”) limits set by the
International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”). Changed circumstances also mandate a
reassessment of whether SpaceX should be permitted to continue to deploy spacecraft pending
ITU review of SpaceX’s EPFD filings. In addition, SpaceX must be required to adjust its
proposed operations as necessary to avoid increased interference to other NGSO systems such as
1
See Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, File No. SAT-MOD-20190830-00087 (“Application”);
Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, 34 FCC Rcd 2526 (IB 2019) (“SpaceX Modification”).
PDF Page 3
O3b’s, and SpaceX should be required to accept any increased interference to its system
stemming from its voluntary changes to the system originally authorized by the Commission.
I.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS NEEDED TO PERMIT PARTIES TO
EVALUATE SPACEX’S COMPLIANCE WITH EPFD LIMITS
The Commission must take steps to ensure the integrity of GSO systems operated by SES
and others by mandating that SpaceX make a more robust showing regarding the EPFD
characteristics of its system. SES recognizes that in the SpaceX Modification decision, the
International Bureau determined that SpaceX need not await the completion of ITU review of its
system’s EPFD levels, but a reassessment of that finding is needed in light of intervening events.
The original license granted for the SpaceX NGSO system specified that:
Prior to initiation of service, SpaceX must receive a favorable or
“qualified favorable” finding in accordance with Resolution 85
(WRC-03) with respect to its compliance with applicable
equivalent power flux-density limits in Article 22 of the ITU Radio
Regulations. 2
Section 25.146 of the Commission’s rules imposes the same requirement. 3
When SpaceX later in 2018 sought authority to place 1,584 of its authorized satellites in a
lower orbit of 550 kilometers and make other changes, it also requested a waiver of this
obligation. SpaceX argued that due to a backlog, the ITU was unlikely to complete its EPFD
compliance review before SpaceX would be ready to begin operations, and adhering to the
condition would therefore delay SpaceX’s ability to initiate service to customers. 4
2
Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, 33 FCC Rcd 3391, 3407 (2018) (“SpaceX Authorization”).
3
47 C.F.R. § 25.146(c).
4
Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, File No. SAT-MOD-20190830-00087 (“2018 Application”),
Waiver Requests at 3-4.
2
PDF Page 4
In its comments on the 2018 Application, SES took no position on this waiver request
provided that any relief from the ITU review requirement was temporary only, with SpaceX
assuming the risk that it would have to cease operations if the ITU issued an unfavorable
finding. 5 Other parties urged the Commission to deny the waiver, observing that because the
Commission had decided not to perform its own review of EPFD compliance, the ITU’s
evaluation was the only safeguard in place to protect GSO systems from disruptive interference. 6
OneWeb emphasized that allowing SpaceX operations to commence before ITU review was
completed also created uncertainty for other NGSO systems, which are required to collectively
meet aggregate EPFD limits. 7
The SpaceX Modification granted by the International Bureau allowed SpaceX to proceed
with deployment pending an ITU finding regarding compliance with relevant EPFD levels but
specified that such relief was conferred at SpaceX’s own risk, subject to a requirement that
SpaceX modify its operations as necessary if the ultimate ITU finding was unfavorable. 8 In
addition, the Bureau instructed SpaceX to cooperate with other NGSO operators to ensure that
the aggregate EPFD limits for protection of GSO networks are met. 9
5
Comments of SES Americom, Inc. and O3b Limited, File No. SAT-MOD-20181108-00083,
filed Feb. 8, 2019, at 5.
6
Reply of EchoStar Satellite Operating Corporation, Hughes Network Systems, LLC, and
Intelsat License LLC, File No. SAT-MOD-20181108-00083, filed Mar. 5, 2019.
7
Petition to Deny of WorldVu Satellites Limited, File No. SAT-MOD-20181108-00083, filed
Feb. 8, 2019 (the “OneWeb Petition”) at 23-27; Reply of WorldVu Satellites Limited, File No.
SAT-MOD-20181108-00083, filed Mar. 5, 2019, at 9-12.
8
SpaceX Modification, 34 FCC Rcd at 2538, ¶ 32(n).
9
Id., ¶ 32(o).
3
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The instant Application appears to assume that no further waiver of the Commission’s
rules is required to allow SpaceX to implement yet more changes to its system without awaiting
ITU review of its EPFD compliance. 10 SpaceX certifies that it will comply with the ITU’s EPFD
limits, as required by Section 25.146(a)(2) of the Commission’s rules, 11 and the Application
includes a few graphs that purport to demonstrate that the SpaceX system with the proposed
changes will comply with ITU EPFD limits. 12 But SpaceX makes no mention of the ITU finding
mandated by Section 25.146(c).
The Commission must require more before it decides whether SpaceX can continue to
deploy satellites based on an ever-evolving system design that has not been evaluated by the ITU
for EPFD compliance. As noted above, SES did not object to the waiver SpaceX requested in the
2018 Modification, but at the time, SES anticipated that any delay before the ITU determined
whether the SpaceX system as it was being deployed conformed to international EPFD limits
would be only a few months. Because of subsequent SpaceX actions, that expectation has proven
to be misplaced.
First, SpaceX has continued to alter its system design, rendering ITU evaluations of prior
configurations moot and requiring the ITU review to begin anew each time. Because SpaceX
keeps moving the goalposts, SES and other GSO operators have no assurance that there will be a
definitive ITU finding any time in the near future on the SpaceX system as it is actually being
operated.
10
The only waivers requested in the Application concern departures from the Schedule S
information requirements. See Application, Waiver Requests.
11
Application, Attachment A at 4, citing 47 C.F.R. § 25.146(a)(2).
12
Application, Attachment A, Annex 2.
4
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Second, and even more concerning, according to ITU records, SpaceX has submitted a
total of twenty ITU filings – all with an October 7, 2019, registry date – to be evaluated in
connection with its NGSO system. On its face, this suggests that SpaceX is attempting to evade
the single-entry EPFD limits for its satellite network by dividing the network into multiple parts
and asking the ITU to evaluate them separately. Leaving aside the propriety of this approach, the
simultaneous submission of so many filings will drastically slow down the ITU’s review process.
SpaceX complained of delay due to a backlog in originally seeking relief from the regulatory
obligation to obtain an ITU finding prior to commencing operations, but now SpaceX has singlehandedly created its own twenty-filing backlog. Assuming it takes the ITU two to four months
on average to review each filing, even if it started immediately, the ITU would not complete its
findings regarding the whole set of SpaceX filings until some time between early 2023 and the
middle of 2026.
Yet even that completion schedule may well be optimistic. For example, it assumes the
ITU’s evaluation software remains in place – but at an ITU meeting earlier this year, SpaceX
submitted an extensive set of proposals to alter that software. 13 Moreover, if SpaceX continues to
revise its system configuration, the evaluation process would have to start again from square one
following each change.
Such a lengthy delay in determining EPFD compliance would create an untenable
situation for GSO networks and nullify the purpose of the Commission’s rule relying on ITU
assessments to protect GSO operations. Over this years-long time span, SES and other GSO
13
See ITU-R WP4A Contribution 904, Draft revision of Recommendation ITU-R S.1503-3:
Further improvements to model capabilities of advanced NGSO FSS satellite systems below
30 GHz, available at: https://www.itu.int/md/meetingdoc.asp?lang=en&parent=R15-WP4A-C0904.
5
PDF Page 7
operators and their customers would have no avenue to determine whether SpaceX’s burgeoning
NGSO constellation was meeting international limits on interfering emissions.
Similarly, this outcome would make it impossible for O3b and other NGSO operators to
meet their obligations to cooperate in order to collectively meet aggregate EPFD limits. As
OneWeb has observed, the absence of ITU review prevents NGSO networks from determining
whether SpaceX is generating EPFD levels that represent more than its proportionate share of the
aggregate cap. 14
In short, the Bureau’s decision in the SpaceX Modification to allow SpaceX to proceed
with satellite deployments while an ITU validation of its EPFD compliance was pending has
paved the way for unforeseen consequences that threaten critical GSO networks and create
substantial uncertainty for other NGSO operators. Fully protecting GSO operations would
require the Commission to reinstate the requirement included in the original SpaceX
Authorization and codified in Section 25.146(c) that SpaceX await the completion of ITU review
before initiating service. Only this measure would remove the incentive for SpaceX to keep
making changes that push the completion of ITU review further and further into the future.
At a minimum, however, before it can consider the Application the Commission must
ensure that interested parties have an opportunity to make their own assessments of the EPFD
levels the SpaceX network would generate. Specifically, the Commission should instruct SpaceX
to make publicly available the PFD masks, EIRP masks, and inter-satellite masks for the SpaceX
ITU filings that should necessarily represent one NGSO system and allow at least a 30-day
period after the files have been supplied for parties to review the data and submit supplemental
comments to the Commission. Even with this documentation, the ability of SES and others to
14
See OneWeb Petition at 24-25.
6
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adequately analyze the SpaceX EPFD compliance will be limited given the complexity of the
constellation, the phased roll-out of satellites, and the open issues regarding validation software.
But having access to the information is at least preferable to SES having to trust that its services
to millions of end users will be protected based solely on SpaceX’s unsupported promise of
EPFD compliance pending ITU findings that are years away.
II.
SPACEX MUST NOT BE PERMITTED TO WORSEN THE
INTERFERENCE ENVIRONMENT FOR OTHER NGSO NETWORKS
A critical factor in determining whether the SpaceX Application can be considered in
isolation without triggering a new processing round is whether the proposed changes would
adversely affect other authorized spectrum users. As the Commission explained in its decision
authorizing the prior set of changes to the SpaceX NGSO constellation:
focus[ing] on the public interest in avoiding radiofrequency
interference is consistent with the purpose of the Commission’s
processing round procedure, which is designed to establish the
interference environment in which participants in the processing
round could operate their systems. If a modification would worsen
the interference environment, that would be a strong indication that
grant of the modification would not be in the public interest. 15
The Commission has recognized that changes to the interference environment can occur
in two ways: if the modification creates additional interference into other NGSO systems or
increases the susceptibility of the applicant’s network to interference from other NGSO
systems. 16 If a modification affects either of these two factors, the appropriate Commission
15
SpaceX Modification, 34 FCC Rcd at 2529, ¶ 9 (footnotes omitted). See also Ex Parte Filing
of Space Exploration Holdings, File Nos. SAT-MOD-20180319-00022, SAT-AMD-2018010400004, & SAT-LOA-20190704-00057, filed July 15, 2019, at 3 (modification applications “that
add potential interference are to be considered in a new NGSO processing round”) (footnote
omitted).
16
See SpaceX Modification, 34 FCC Rcd at 2531-32, ¶¶ 12-15.
7
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approach is to begin a new processing round to consider the proposed changes and any other
timely filed requests for new or modified operations in the relevant spectrum.
Because the Application does not provide sufficient assurances regarding either of these
two essential elements, the Commission must impose conditions on any grant to protect the
interests of O3b and other participants in the Ku/Ka-band NGSO processing round that closed in
November of 2016. SpaceX alleges that its “proposed modification will not increase interference
to any other NGSO system operating in the bands used by Starlink satellites,” 17 but SpaceX’s
own analysis shows that in some scenarios, the proposed changes would result in slightly higher
levels of interference to the O3b network. 18 SpaceX dismisses these impacts as “negligible,” 19
but O3b rather than SpaceX is the proper entity to determine the acceptability of any increased
interference to the O3b network.
More critically, SpaceX fails to provide any discussion of whether the proposed changes
would alter the interference environment by increasing the susceptibility of the SpaceX network
to interference from other NGSO systems. As a result of this omission, the Commission is unable
to perform the analysis described in the SpaceX Modification decision:
We must examine not only the potential for increased interference
to other NGSO FSS systems as a result of SpaceX’s modified
operations, but also whether SpaceX’s own system may become
more susceptible to interference from other NGSO FSS systems,
which would change the operating environment. 20
Thus, the Application on its face does not provide the required evidence that grant would
not shift to O3b or other NGSO operators the interference consequences of the voluntary changes
17
Application, Attachment A, Annex 1 at A1-1.
18
See id., Annex 1 at A1-19 to A1-26.
19
See id., Narrative at 7.
20
SpaceX Modification, 34 FCC Rcd at 2531, ¶ 14.
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SpaceX seeks to make in its constellation. The appropriate approach to resolve these matters –
both any increased interference to the O3b NGSO network and any increased SpaceX
vulnerability to interference from O3b’s operations – is through coordination between the
parties.
Pending the outcome of such coordination, the Commission must preserve the
interference environment for O3b and other NGSO networks by imposing conditions on any
grant of the Application. Specifically, SpaceX must be required to: (1) alter its proposed
operations to eliminate any increase in interference to other NGSO systems resulting from the
changes sought in the Application and (2) accept any additional interference from other NGSO
networks due to SpaceX’s multiple revisions of the constellation design the Commission
approved in the SpaceX Authorization.
Making these obligations explicit will minimize the risk that the Commission’s
expectations will be misinterpreted or ignored. For example, in the SpaceX Modification
decision, the International Bureau discussed ways that SpaceX could mitigate the risk that at the
lowered orbital altitude it was seeking for a portion of its fleet, SpaceX would receive additional
interference from other NGSO systems. 21 Yet the ordering clauses did not obligate SpaceX to
take any such steps, leaving open the possibility that SpaceX would instead impermissibly
attempt to shift to other operators the responsibility to counteract the effects of the modified
SpaceX system’s greater susceptibility to interference. 22 The Commission must avoid these
21
See id. at 2531-32, ¶ 15 (noting that keeping the transmit power of SpaceX earth stations
unchanged “would allow the SpaceX transmissions to be received in the presence of stronger
signals of other NGSO FSS systems”).
22
The magnitude of such a shift could be substantial. For example, SpaceX’s decision to lower
the altitude of a portion of its fleet to 550 kilometers from the originally authorized range of
1,110-1,325 kilometers results in a path loss decrease of 6 to 8 dB. Consequently, if the same
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issues by instructing SpaceX that its rights to protection from interference are defined by the
characteristics of the originally authorized SpaceX fleet.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission should defer consideration of the Application
pending submission of additional information regarding EPFD compliance and take steps to
ensure that the changes SpaceX proposes do not threaten GSO service continuity or impose new
burdens on other NGSO operators.
Respectfully submitted,
SES AMERICOM, INC. AND O3B LIMITED
Of Counsel
Karis A. Hastings
SatCom Law LLC
1317 F Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20004
By: /s/ Petra A. Vorwig
Senior Legal and Regulatory Counsel
SES Americom, Inc.
1129 20th Street N.W., Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20036
By: /s/ Suzanne H. Malloy
Vice President, Regulatory Affairs
O3b Limited
1129 20th Street N.W., Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20036
October 15, 2019
SpaceX satellite design was used, the spacecraft would be 6 to 8 db more sensitive to
interference from O3b and other NGSO uplink transmissions due to the altitude change alone.
The Commission must make clear to SpaceX that during coordination it cannot expect O3b and
other NGSO operators to reduce their uplink emissions by 6 to 8 dB in order to accommodate
SpaceX’s voluntary decision to lower the altitude of these satellites.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 15th day of October, 2019, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing “Petition to Defer of SES Americom, Inc. and O3b Limited” by first
class mail, postage prepaid, upon the following:
Patricia Cooper
Vice President of Satellite Government Affairs
David Goldman
Director of Satellite Policy
SPACE EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGIES CORP.
1155 F Street, N.W., Suite 475
Washington, D.C. 20004
William M. Wiltshire
Paul Caritj
HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP
1919 M Street, N.W., Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20036
/s/ Roxana Hernandez
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