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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
UNITED STATES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GOOGLE LLC,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 1:23-cv-00108-LMB-IDD
PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S AMENDED RESPONSES TO
DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC’S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
TO THE UNITED STATES
Pursuant to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Civil Rule 26(c) of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Plaintiff United States of America
(“United States”) provides the following amended responses to Defendant Google LLC’s
(“Google’s”) First Set of Requests for Admissions to the United States (the “Responses”). These
Responses are subject to the United States’ Objections to Defendant Google LLC’s First Set of
Requests for Admissions to the United States (the “Objections”), which the United States
previously served on Google in this action. For clarity, the United States’ Objections are restated
herein.
OBJECTIONS APPLICABLE TO EACH REQUEST
1.
The United States objects to each request to the extent it (1) imposes any
obligation greater than those imposed or authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Local Civil Rules of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, or any other
applicable rule or order, or (2) seeks information covered by the attorney client privilege,
attorney work product protection, common interest doctrine, deliberative process privilege,
EXHIBIT Page 2 PageID#
and/or any other applicable privilege or protection. The United States expressly incorporates
these objections into each response below.
2.
The United States objects to each request to the extent it seeks a legal conclusion.
No answer is required for such requests.
OBJECTIONS TO GOOGLE’S DEFINITIONS
3.
The United States objects to the definition of “Federal Agency Advertiser” as
overly broad and burdensome to the extent it purports to encompass purchases that do not form
the basis of the United States’ claim for damages, and the United States will not provide
information with respect to advertising spending that does not form the basis for the United
States claim for damages.
4.
The failure to object to any definition is not an admission that Google has
properly defined the term. In the course of responding to these requests, should any ambiguity
arise in the application of a term purportedly defined by Google, the United States reserves the
right to meet and confer with Google to resolve any such ambiguity.
OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that, during the Damages Period, the Federal Agency Advertisers did
not purchase “open web display advertising” directly from Google.
Objections to Request No. The United States objects to this request on the grounds that it requires a legal analysis of
Google’s term “directly.” The United States further objects to this request as vague and
ambiguous, as the difference between “purchase” as used in Request No. 1 and “pay” as used in
Request No. 2 is neither specified nor clear.
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Response to Request No. As this request improperly calls for a legal conclusion, and Google has provided no
clarity regarding how “purchase . . . directly” differs from a legal assessment of what constitutes
a "direct purchaser" under antitrust law, the United States stands on its objections. Furthermore,
the United States objects to this request as vague and ambiguous with respect to the phrase
“purchase ‘open web display advertising’ directly from Google,” as Google is not a publisher of
“open web display advertising” as defined in the Complaint.
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that, during the Damages Period, the Federal Agency Advertisers did
not pay Google directly for “open web display advertising.”
Objections to Request No. The United States objects to this request on the grounds that it requires a legal analysis of
Google’s term “directly.” The United States further objects to this request as vague and
ambiguous, as the difference between “purchase” as used in Request No. 1 and “pay” as used in
Request No. 2 is neither specified nor clear.
Amended Response to Request No. The United States is unaware of the extent to which Google sells “open web display
advertising” inventory on its owned-and-operated websites but, to the extent it does, and to the
extent the FAAs purchased such display advertising inventory on Google’s owned-and-operated
websites, the FAA’s practice is for the FAAs’ Agencies to pay Google for any such advertising
purchased on the FAAs’ behalf and for the FAA to fully reimburse the FAAs’ Agencies for those
purchases. Accordingly, and subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, in
particular that the request calls for a legal conclusion, the United States, based on the
clarification in Google’s July 11 Letter, admits that all costs or obligations to pay Google for the
purchase of “open web display advertising,” are borne by the FAAs, including the fees charged
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by any ad tech providers, and those costs or obligations are either reimbursed or paid in full by
the FAAs even though the FAAs’ Agencies may make the initial payment on behalf of the
FAAs.
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that during the Damages Period, the Federal Agency Advertisers paid
Agencies for the use of Ad Tech Products offered by Google.
Objections to Request No. The United States objects to the phrase “paid for the use of” as vague and ambiguous.
Subject to those objections, the United States will respond to this request.
Amended Response to Request No. The United States notes that the FAAs’ Agencies do not sell ad tech services but that
these Agencies may purchase “open web display advertising” on behalf of the FAAs through ad
tech tools which impose fees on the FAA’s successful bids for advertising purchases. Such
purchases are made pursuant to paid media plans, which the Agencies develop and the FAAs
approve, to meet the FAAs’ advertising needs. The costs of any executed paid media buys,
including the fees charged by any ad tech providers, are borne exclusively by the
FAAs. Accordingly, and subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, the United
States, based on the definition of “pay” Google provided in its July 11 Letter, denies that the
FAAs paid Agencies “for the use of” Ad Tech Products because the Agencies do not sell ad tech
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services and admits the FAAs paid Agencies for the costs incurred in connection with their use
of Ad Tech Products on behalf of the FAAs.
Dated: August 2, Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Julia Tarver Wood
JULIA TARVER WOOD
KATHERINE E. CLEMONS
MICHAEL E. WOLIN
United States Department of Justice
Antitrust Division
450 Fifth Street NW, Suite Washington, DC Telephone: (202) 307-Fax: (202) 616-Email: Julia.Tarver.Wood@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for the United States
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 2, 2023, I served the foregoing to all counsel of record via
email.
/s/ Michael Wolin
Michael Wolin
Trial Attorney
United States Department of Justice
Antitrust Division
450 Fifth Street NW, Suite Washington, DC
EXHIBIT 1
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PlainSite Cover Page
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Case 1:23-cv-00108-LMB-JFA Document 292-1 Filed 08/04/23 Page 1 of 6 PageID# 3433
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
UNITED STATES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GOOGLE LLC,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 1:23-cv-00108-LMB-IDD
PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S AMENDED RESPONSES TO
DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC’S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
TO THE UNITED STATES
Pursuant to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Civil Rule 26(c) of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Plaintiff United States of America
(“United States”) provides the following amended responses to Defendant Google LLC’s
(“Google’s”) First Set of Requests for Admissions to the United States (the “Responses”). These
Responses are subject to the United States’ Objections to Defendant Google LLC’s First Set of
Requests for Admissions to the United States (the “Objections”), which the United States
previously served on Google in this action. For clarity, the United States’ Objections are restated
herein.
OBJECTIONS APPLICABLE TO EACH REQUEST
1.
The United States objects to each request to the extent it (1) imposes any
obligation greater than those imposed or authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Local Civil Rules of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, or any other
applicable rule or order, or (2) seeks information covered by the attorney client privilege,
attorney work product protection, common interest doctrine, deliberative process privilege,
EXHIBIT 1
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Case 1:23-cv-00108-LMB-JFA Document 292-1 Filed 08/04/23 Page 2 of 6 PageID# 3434
and/or any other applicable privilege or protection. The United States expressly incorporates
these objections into each response below.
2.
The United States objects to each request to the extent it seeks a legal conclusion.
No answer is required for such requests.
OBJECTIONS TO GOOGLE’S DEFINITIONS
3.
The United States objects to the definition of “Federal Agency Advertiser” as
overly broad and burdensome to the extent it purports to encompass purchases that do not form
the basis of the United States’ claim for damages, and the United States will not provide
information with respect to advertising spending that does not form the basis for the United
States claim for damages.
4.
The failure to object to any definition is not an admission that Google has
properly defined the term. In the course of responding to these requests, should any ambiguity
arise in the application of a term purportedly defined by Google, the United States reserves the
right to meet and confer with Google to resolve any such ambiguity.
OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that, during the Damages Period, the Federal Agency Advertisers did
not purchase “open web display advertising” directly from Google.
Objections to Request No. 1
The United States objects to this request on the grounds that it requires a legal analysis of
Google’s term “directly.” The United States further objects to this request as vague and
ambiguous, as the difference between “purchase” as used in Request No. 1 and “pay” as used in
Request No. 2 is neither specified nor clear.
EXHIBIT 1
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Case 1:23-cv-00108-LMB-JFA Document 292-1 Filed 08/04/23 Page 3 of 6 PageID# 3435
Response to Request No. 1
As this request improperly calls for a legal conclusion, and Google has provided no
clarity regarding how “purchase . . . directly” differs from a legal assessment of what constitutes
a "direct purchaser" under antitrust law, the United States stands on its objections. Furthermore,
the United States objects to this request as vague and ambiguous with respect to the phrase
“purchase ‘open web display advertising’ directly from Google,” as Google is not a publisher of
“open web display advertising” as defined in the Complaint.
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that, during the Damages Period, the Federal Agency Advertisers did
not pay Google directly for “open web display advertising.”
Objections to Request No. 2
The United States objects to this request on the grounds that it requires a legal analysis of
Google’s term “directly.” The United States further objects to this request as vague and
ambiguous, as the difference between “purchase” as used in Request No. 1 and “pay” as used in
Request No. 2 is neither specified nor clear.
Amended Response to Request No. 2
The United States is unaware of the extent to which Google sells “open web display
advertising” inventory on its owned-and-operated websites but, to the extent it does, and to the
extent the FAAs purchased such display advertising inventory on Google’s owned-and-operated
websites, the FAA’s practice is for the FAAs’ Agencies to pay Google for any such advertising
purchased on the FAAs’ behalf and for the FAA to fully reimburse the FAAs’ Agencies for those
purchases. Accordingly, and subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, in
particular that the request calls for a legal conclusion, the United States, based on the
clarification in Google’s July 11 Letter, admits that all costs or obligations to pay Google for the
purchase of “open web display advertising,” are borne by the FAAs, including the fees charged
EXHIBIT 1
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Case 1:23-cv-00108-LMB-JFA Document 292-1 Filed 08/04/23 Page 4 of 6 PageID# 3436
by any ad tech providers, and those costs or obligations are either reimbursed or paid in full by
the FAAs even though the FAAs’ Agencies may make the initial payment on behalf of the
FAAs.
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that during the Damages Period, the Federal Agency Advertisers paid
Agencies for the use of Ad Tech Products offered by Google.
Objections to Request No. 3
The United States objects to the phrase “paid for the use of” as vague and ambiguous.
Subject to those objections, the United States will respond to this request.
Amended Response to Request No. 3
The United States notes that the FAAs’ Agencies do not sell ad tech services but that
these Agencies may purchase “open web display advertising” on behalf of the FAAs through ad
tech tools which impose fees on the FAA’s successful bids for advertising purchases. Such
purchases are made pursuant to paid media plans, which the Agencies develop and the FAAs
approve, to meet the FAAs’ advertising needs. The costs of any executed paid media buys,
including the fees charged by any ad tech providers, are borne exclusively by the
FAAs. Accordingly, and subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, the United
States, based on the definition of “pay” Google provided in its July 11 Letter, denies that the
FAAs paid Agencies “for the use of” Ad Tech Products because the Agencies do not sell ad tech
EXHIBIT 1
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Case 1:23-cv-00108-LMB-JFA Document 292-1 Filed 08/04/23 Page 5 of 6 PageID# 3437
services and admits the FAAs paid Agencies for the costs incurred in connection with their use
of Ad Tech Products on behalf of the FAAs.
Dated: August 2, 2023
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Julia Tarver Wood
JULIA TARVER WOOD
KATHERINE E. CLEMONS
MICHAEL E. WOLIN
United States Department of Justice
Antitrust Division
450 Fifth Street NW, Suite 7100
Washington, DC 20530
Telephone: (202) 307-0077
Fax: (202) 616-8544
Email: Julia.Tarver.Wood@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for the United States
EXHIBIT 1
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Case 1:23-cv-00108-LMB-JFA Document 292-1 Filed 08/04/23 Page 6 of 6 PageID# 3438
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 2, 2023, I served the foregoing to all counsel of record via
email.
/s/ Michael Wolin
Michael Wolin
Trial Attorney
United States Department of Justice
Antitrust Division
450 Fifth Street NW, Suite 8000
Washington, DC 20530
EXHIBIT 1
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