USA v. TRUMP Document 194: Reply in Support

District Of Columbia District Court
Case No. 1:23-cr-00257-TSC
Filed January 12, 2024

REPLY in Support by DONALD J. TRUMP re [192] MOTION for Order to Show Cause Why Prosecutors Should Not Be Held in Contempt (Lauro, John)

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Page 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Case No. 1:23-cr-00257-TSC
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP,
Defendant.
PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Having been caught knowingly, repeatedly, and blatantly violating this Court’s Stay Order,
Doc. 186, the Special Counsel and his assistants (the “prosecutors”) offer no excuse. Instead, they
engage in a failed attempt to re-write the record, claiming that the Stay Order prohibits only those
“actions [that] require [a] response from the defendant.” Doc. 193 at 2. As the prosecutors are fully
aware, the Stay Order says nothing of the sort. Rather, the Stay Order expressly prohibits “any
further proceedings” that: (1) “impose additional burdens of litigation” on President Trump or
(2) “move this case towards trial.” Doc. 186 at 2 (emphasis added). The prosecutors’ filings and
productions, Docs. 188, 191, attempt to achieve both of those unlawful goals. Accordingly, the
Court should order the prosecutors to show cause why they should not be held in contempt.
ARGUMENT
A. The Prosecutors’ Actions Impose Burdens of Litigation on President Trump
The prosecutors argue that President Trump is not “obligated to review” or respond to the
prosecutors’ filings and discovery, and therefore faces no burden. Doc. 193 at 2. This is false. As
an initial matter, President Trump must examine all documents the prosecutors file in this case,
when they are filed, to determine whether and how he should respond. This is because both the
prosecutors and the Court have taken the unsettled position that the Court may address and resolve
Page 2 certain issues notwithstanding the Stay Order. Doc. 182 at 2 (“The Court should not assume at this
juncture that no issue can arise that is not involved in the appeal.”); Doc. 186 at 2 (“[T]he court
does not understand the required stay of further proceedings to divest it of jurisdiction to enforce
the measures it has already imposed to safeguard the integrity of these proceedings.”). President
Trump cannot know whether a filing relates, in whole or in part, to an issue that the prosecution
contends is somehow “not involved in the appeal” without reviewing the full filing. Therefore, he
must perform that review on receipt—an unquestionably burdensome task that the Stay Order and
applicable law relieve him from performing. Likewise, where, as here, a filing violates the Stay
Order, President Trump must preserve his rights by clarifying that he will not accept or
substantively respond to the filing—a burden the prosecutors have already wrongly forced
President Trump to carry multiple times. See Docs. 189, 189-1, 192.
Second, as the prosecutors are fully aware and no doubt intend, their filing of politically
charged invective, such as the recently filed motion in limine (Doc. 191, the “MIL”), induces
substantial negative media coverage against President Trump, burdening him both personally (by
falsely impugning his character) and professionally (by undermining his leading campaign for the
2024 Presidential Election). Worse, the prosecutors publicize their untruthful arguments knowing
that any press coverage will be entirely one-sided without President Trump’s substantive
responses. Just as the Stay Order shields President Trump from the burdens of trial and discovery,
it protects him from these “other burdens of litigation” as well. See Blassingame v. Trump, F.4th 1, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, (1985)).
Although the prosecutors generically deny a political motivation, such words are empty.
The prosecutors’ filings, including the MIL, closely mirror the Biden Campaign’s dishonest
talking points—a fact the prosecutors do not and cannot deny. Doc. 192 at 6–8. The timing of the
Page 3 prosecutors’ filings, likewise, cannot be explained by the posture of this case (which is stayed),
but instead synchronize with the Biden Campaign’s recent media blitz, which relies on the same
discredited appeals to emotion that pervade the prosecutors’ filings. See David Smith, Fired-up
Biden shows gloves are off in January 6 anniversary speech, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 5, 2024 (“This
time it’s personal. On Friday Joe Biden tore into his predecessor Donald Trump as never before.
He brimmed with anger, disdain and contempt.”).
And once more, anonymous “sources familiar with what Smith’s team has learned during
its Jan. 6 probe” have resumed their deliberate and unlawful effort to damage President Trump
through leaks of false and defamatory information. Katherine Faulders, Mike Levine, Alexander
Mallin, and Will Steakin, Special counsel probe uncovers new details about Trump's inaction on
Jan. 6: Sources, ABCNEWS, Jan. 7, 2024.
It is not a coincidence that the Biden Campaign, the prosecutors, and “sources” close to the
prosecutors are all attempting to simultaneously flood the airwaves with matching anti-Trump
rhetoric during the Stay. See In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litig., No. MC 15-(CKK), 2023 WL 5930973, at *9 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2023) (“[P]arallel action . . . gives rise to a
suspicion of unlawful coordination.” (citation omitted)).
Thus, the prosecutors’ filings impose a prohibited burden on President Trump by
wrongly—and very publicly—accusing him of committing a crime when the appellate courts
should determine that he acted lawfully under applicable immunity principles. Such false
accusations are irreparably harmful to President Trump’s reputation and represent defamation per
se in any other context. See Grossman v. Goemans, 631 F. Supp. 972, 974 (D.D.C. 1986). For the
same reason, President Trump cannot ignore “the practical implications” of the prosecutors’
unlawful actions, but must instead take “reasonable steps to defend [his] reputation,” especially
Page 4 considering the politically charged nature of this case and the prosecutors’ filings. Gentile v. State
Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1043, (1991) (opinion of Kennedy, J.). Given this, it is unsurprising
that the prosecutors cannot cite a single case that has allowed continued motion and discovery
practice during a stay.
Finally, the prosecutors’ assertion that President Trump is not legally “obligated” to
review discovery, Doc. 193 at 2, is meaningless. A defendant is never “obligated” to review
discovery, See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1). Moreover, and regardless, the prosecutors previously
argued for an unconstitutionally rapid trial based on the idea that President Trump somehow should
have identified and reviewed millions of publicly available documents before indictment, despite
his obvious lack of any obligation to do so. Doc. 32 at 2–3. Although such documents represented
only a small fraction of the total discovery in this matter (which includes many millions of nonpublic documents as well), the Court accepted this unconstitutional argument for a speedy trial,
denying President Trump his rights to due process and to counsel with adequate time to prepare
for trial. Doc. 38 at 28:22–29:1 ([The Court]: “You’ve known this was coming. Mr. Trump’s
counsel has known this was coming for some time. And I’m sure any able, diligent, zealous defense
counsel would not have been sitting on their hands waiting for an indictment.”). The prosecutors
make no secret that they will attempt the same maneuver here, Doc. 182 at 1, thereby defeating
the purpose of the Stay Order and unlawfully imposing an enormous burden on President Trump.
B. The Prosecutors’ Actions Attempt to Move This Case Toward Trial
The prosecutors bizarrely and inconsistently argue that their filings and productions do not
move this case toward trial, Doc. 193 at 2, while simultaneously claiming that such filings and
productions are necessary to ensure the “prompt resolution of this case,” id. at 3; see also Doc. (asserting production was necessary “to help ensure that trial proceeds promptly if and when the
Page 5 mandate returns”); Doc. 191 at 1 n.1 (same). The prosecutors’ embrace of Orwellian doubletalk
aside, this argument defeats itself. If the filings and productions help prepare the case for trial and
are necessary for a “prompt resolution,” Doc. 193 at 2, then by definition they move the case
toward trial. Indeed, the prosecutors present no reason for the filings and productions other than
their unlawful desire to accelerate the trial schedule.
This stated intention is illogical, violates the Stay Order, and has no basis in law. The
actions at issue—filing motions on the docket and producing additional discovery—are
archetypical examples of proceedings that advance a criminal case toward trial. So much so that
the Court used those exact proceedings to illustrate the Stay Order’s prohibitions. Doc. 186 at 3.
Although the prosecutors attempt to distinguish the Court’s example by pointing to the word
“requiring,” that misses the point. “Requiring additional discovery or briefing” would violate the
Stay Order because those activities “advance the case toward trial,” not because they are required.
So too, here. The prosecutors’ MIL and discovery productions are admitted attempts to advance
this case, and thus violate the Stay Order, regardless of whether President Trump is required to
immediately respond.
C. The Prosecutors’ Remaining Arguments Are Meritless
The prosecutors claim that they do “not understand [the Stay Order] to prohibit either party
from voluntarily complying with the Pretrial Order.” Doc. 193 at 1. Nothing in the Stay Order
suggests that it is optional. It explicitly and plainly stays “any further proceedings that would move
this case towards trial or impose additional burdens of litigation on Defendant.” Doc. 186 at (emphasis added). This is entirely logical because, as explained above, the prosecutors’
“voluntary” efforts to advance the case toward trial and impose burdens on President Trump harm
him in the same manner as proceedings required by the Court. The protections provided by the
Page 6 Stay Order—and mandated by law—would be meaningless if the prosecutors could circumvent
them simply by characterizing their deleterious conduct as “voluntary.”
Next, the prosecutors argue that the Stay Order silently excludes Rule 16 discovery from
its ambit. Doc. 193 at 1. This is baseless. “[A]ny further proceedings” means “any further
proceedings.” Doc. 186 at 2. To the extent the prosecutors had any genuine confusion regarding
the meaning of the word “any,” they should have conferred in good faith with President Trump’s
counsel and asked for clarification from the Court. Indeed, seeking clarification about a court’s
order is routine, a fact these well-seasoned federal prosecutors know. Any claimed confusion now
is nothing more than an ex-post cover for the prosecutors’ intentional misconduct.
Finally, the prosecutors claim that they “informed the Court and the defendant” of their
unlawful plans and “did what [they] said [they] would do” because the Court supposedly “did not
forbid” such actions. Doc. 193 at 2. The prosecutors are wrong. The plain language of the Stay
Order forbids the prosecutors’ actions, notwithstanding their prior request for an exception. Any
reasonable person would understand this to mean that the Court had considered and denied the
prosecutors’ request. And again, at the very least, the prosecutors should have, but did not, request
clarification before violating the Stay Order and unlawfully burdening President Trump.
CONCLUSION
The prosecutors claim they “never intentionally would violate . . . an order of the Court,”
yet have repeatedly done just that, without a shred of support and without asking for clarification.
The prosecutors now brazenly promise to continue their misconduct unless the Court intervenes to
enforce the plain and straightforward requirements of the Stay Order. Doc. 193 at 3. The Court
should reject this blatant effort to undermine its authority and order the prosecutors to show cause
why they should not be held in contempt.
Page 7 Dated: January 12,
Respectfully submitted,
/s/John F. Lauro
John F. Lauro, Esq.
D.C. Bar No. jlauro@laurosinger.com
Gregory M. Singer, Esq. (PHV)
gsinger@laurosinger.com
Filzah I. Pavalon, Esq. (PHV)
fpavalon@laurosinger.com
LAURO & SINGER
400 N. Tampa St., 15th Floor
Tampa, FL (813) 222-Counsel for President Donald J. Trump
Todd Blanche, Esq. (PHV)
toddblanche@blanchelaw.com
Emil Bove, Esq. (PHV)
Emil.Bove@blanchelaw.com
BLANCHE LAW
99 Wall St., Suite New York, NY (212) 716-
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