Garrison et al v. Sullivan & Cromwell LLP Document 1: Complaint, Attachment 2

Florida Southern District Court
Case No. 1:24-cv-20630-XXXX
Filed February 16, 2024

COMPLAINT CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL against All Defendants. Filing fees $ 405.00 receipt number AFLSDC-17301225, filed by Shengyun Huang, Gregg Podalsky, Brandon Orr, Edwin Garrison, Vitor Vozza, Sunil Kavuri, Alexander Chernyavsky, Leandro Cabo, Chukwudozie Ezeokoli, Julie Papadakis, Kyle Rupprecht, Warren Winter, Vijeth Shetty, Ryan Henderson, Michael Norris, Michael Livieratos. (Attachments: # (1) Civil Cover Sheet, # (2) Exhibit 1, # (3) Exhibit 2, # (4) Exhibit 3, # (5) Summon(s))(Moskowitz, Adam)

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
Chapter In re:
Case No. 22-11068 (JTD)
FTX Trading Ltd., et al.,
(Jointly Administered)
Debtors.
DECLARATION OF DANIEL FRIEDBERG IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED
OBJECTION OF WARREN WINTER TO DEBTORS1' APPLICATION
FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE RETENTION AND
EMPLOYMENT OF SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP AS COUNSEL TO
THE DEBTORS AND DEBTORS IN-POSSESSION NUNC PRO TUNC TO
THE PETITION DATE
I, Daniel Friedberg, under penalty of perjury, declare as follows:
1.
I am a citizen and permanent resident of the United States. I am
over 18 and am competent to make this Declaration.
2.
I am admitted to practice law in the State of Washington. I served
as chief compliance officer of West Realm Shires Services, Inc. ("FTX.US") and
chief regulatory officer of FTX Trading Ltd. ("FTX International") until I resigned
as further described below.
3.
I submit this Declaration in support of Mr. Warren Winter's
Amended Objection to Debtors ' Application for an Order Authorizing the Retention
and Employment of Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP as Counsel to the Debtors and
The last four digits of FTX Trading Ltd.'s and Alameda Research LLC's tax
identification numbers are 3288 and 4063 respectively. Due to the large number of
debtor entities in these Chapter 11 Cases, a complete list of the debtors and the last
four digits of their federal tax identification numbers is not provided herein. A
complete list of such information may be obtained on the website of the Debtors'
claims and noticing agent at https://cases.ra.kroll.com/FTX.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit

EXHIBIT
Page 1 of
Witness: FRIEDBERG
Date: MARCH 27, Court Reporter. Tamara Nasser
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Debtors-in-Possession Nunc Pro Tunc to the Petition Date [Dkt. 459]. Except where
otherwise noted, I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein.
4.
This Supplemental Declaration provides additional information
about potential claims that the Debtors have against S&C, false statements made by
S&C, as well as other misconduct as described below.
I.
5.
My Standing as a Creditor
I purchased a total of 25 bitcoin relatively early on in the growth
of bitcoin, at about $300 or less. Like most employees for the Debtors, I transferred
my bitcoin to the FTX.US cryptocurrency exchange, in reliance on the FTX.US
disclosures that FTX.US customer assets were fully backed 1:1 and that
cryptocurrency held by FTX.US on behalf of customers was owned by those
customers and not FTX.US. As of the date of this Declaration, this bitcoin would
have been worth in excess of $500,000.
6.
I purchased about $400,000 of Solana on the FTX.US
cryptocurrency exchange months before the bankruptcy filing, in reliance on the
FTX.US disclosures that FTX.US customer
assets
were fully backed 1:1 and that
cryptocurrency held by FTX.US on behalf of customers was owned by those
customers and not FTX.US. I don't have a record of the number of Solana coins
purchased and held on the FTX.US exchange, but the value of Solana has gone down
tremendously in value since date of purchase.
7.
I have been unable to login to the FTX.US exchange since I
returned my computer to FTX.US after my resignation, and therefore lack access to
documentation of the above. I have been included on US Trustee correspondence
as a creditor in this matter.
II.
8.
My Role with the Debtors
I was introduced to Samuel Bankman-Fried ("Sam") by his
father who is a prominent tax professor at Stanford. I represented Alameda Research
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LLC ("Alameda") and then FTX International as outside counsel when I served as
Chair of the Fintech group at an outside law firm since about the time that Sam left
Jane Street to form his own trading firm.
9.
In early 2020, when Sam decided to form FTX.US, I left my law
firm to work full time for certain of the Debtors (including FTX.US, FTX
International, and Alameda). My primary role was to focus on licensing and to help
hire a legal staff including general counsels for the various companies owned
or
controlled by Sam.
10.
Ultimately, the Debtors hired over a dozen lawyers including the
general counsel for FTX.US (Ryne Miller), the general counsel for FTX
International (Can Sun), the general counsel for FTX Ventures (Tim Wilson), as well
as counsel for the Europe, Australia, and Japan operations, and Bahamian counsel.
11.
The goal was for the general counsels to report directly to Sam
where possible in the case of FTX International, the President of FTX.US in the case
of FTX.US, and to the CEO of Alameda in the case of FTX Ventures, and we made
a lot of progress towards this, but I did oversee all lawyers as needed to efficiently
deliver legal services to the organization.
III. Hiring of Ryne Miller
12.
In 2021, the then President of FTX.US made the decision to hire
Ryne Miller ("Mr. Miller") as general counsel of FTX.US and counsel for Alameda,
and FTX International. Mr. Miller's salary was paid by FTX.US and Alameda, but
services were also performed by Mr. Miller for FTX International in addition to
FTX.US and Alameda.
13.
Mr. Miller was a partner at Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, and his
background was with CFTC licensing and SEC matters. Mr. Miller positioned
himself as being the answer to the licensing efforts of LedgerX, and an expert on
CFTC rnatters. Mr. Miller also emphasized his familiarity with SEC officials, often
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referring to the SEC Commissioner as "Gary", and explaining to the FTX personnel
what "Gary" would or wouldn't do. Indeed, Mr. Miller had previously worked for
the SEC Commissioner and emphasized his close relationship with him at every
possible opportunity.
14.
After being hired, Mr. Miller came to me and asked if he could
engage Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP ("S&C") as counsel for the Debtors. I responded
that as general counsel, it was his role to generally approve outside counsel for
FTX.US.
15.
Mr. Miller informed me that it was very important for him
personally to channel a lot of business to S&C as he wanted to return there as a
partner after his stint at the Debtors. This bothered me very much and I told him that
his job was to only hire the best outside counsel for the job, and that his allegiance
was now to the Debtors and not S&C. This continued to be a problem throughout
his work at the Debtors as further described below.
16.
Mr. Miller quickly engaged S&C on many matters for FTX.US
and S&C acted as primary counsel for FTX.US, FTX Derivatives (formerly Ledger
X) which was a subsidiary of FTX.US ("LedgerX"), and Emergent (an entity owned
by Sam that invested in Robinhood shares). S&C also acted as personal counsel to
Nishad and Sam.
17.
Mr. Miller often reminisced that his mentors at S&C were
partners Andrew G. Dietderich and Mitchell Eitel, and that he would do anything to
help those partners, and looked forward to returning as a partner to S&C after his
stint at the Debtors.
IV. Explanation of the Different Debtor Entities
18.
From the filings to date, it is clear that there is confusion that all
entities acted as one group. This is not the case. Instead, there are three separate
corporate groups amongst the debtors — the FIX International Group, the FTX.US
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Group, and the Alameda Group. The following descriptions of these groups are
based on my knowledge of the entities prior to the uncovering of any fraudulent
activity of the groups.
19.
FTX International Group operated a crypto-derivatives exchange
and did not accept US customers. FTX International Group operated from Bahamas
and the Bahamian Securities Division was its primary regulator through its FDM
subsidiary. FTX International Group had its own set of outside investors, and had
raised significant sums (over $1 billion) in various stock sales.
20.
The FTX.US Group operated a cryptocurrency exchange, a
derivatives platform through LedgerX, and a stock brokerage. FTX.US operated
from the United States and did accept US customers. The FTX.US Group had a set
of outside investors different from FTX International Group, and had raised
hundreds of millions in various stock sales.
21.
The Alameda Group was beneficially owned 90% by Sam and
10% by the Chief Technology Officer ("Gary"). The Alameda Group was
understood by me and the lawyers as Sam's company. The Alameda Group engaged
in proprietary trading and venture investments. The Alameda Group had no outside
investors but significant lenders.
22.
Based on advice of counsel, each of these groups were intended
to be separated. For example, the FTX International exchange was operated from a
server housed in Japan, while the FTX.US exchange was operated from a server in
Virginia. The wallets and assets of FTX International and FTX.US were separated
in these different instances.
23.
There are conflicting claims that arise between each of these
entities as set forth below, and each of these groups deserve separate independent
counsel as described in the chart below. Note that the chart below raises just a few
of the myriad of conflicts between the group entities requiring separate counsel.
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Alameda Group
FTX International
Group
FTX
International
Group will likely
assert a claim against
Alameda Group for
stealing assets from
FTX
International
Group.
Alameda Group
FTX International Alameda Group has
Group
various creditors who
loaned
substantial
funds to Alameda
Group. These debtors
will likely claim that
the FTX International
Group loaned funds to
Alameda but that their
security interests have
priority over the
security interest of
FTX
International
Group.
FTX.US Group
24.
Alameda Group has
loaned
substantial
funds to Sam, Gary
and Nishad Singh
("Nishad"), who used
those
funds
to
capitalize FTX.US.
Alameda
Group
creditors will likely
argue
that
these
transfers need to be
clawed back.
FTX.US Group
FTX.US
Group
creditors will likely
assert a claim that
funds from FTX.US
are wrongfully being
used to pay for
Alameda
Group
bankruptcy expenses.
FTX.US
Group
creditors will likely
assert a claim that
funds from FTX.US
are wrongfully being
used to pay for FTX
International Group
bankruptcy expenses.
FTX
International
creditors will likely
assert a claim against
FTX.US that funds
loaned from Alameda
to
FTX.US
to
capitalize
FTX.US
originated from funds
stolen from FTX
International.
Each of these groups have different creditor classes which each
deserve separate legal representation as well as separate creditor committees.
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25.
S&C represented all of these groups simultaneously without
proper conflict waiver. S&C also represented Sam and Nishad personally. The
lawyers in this important bankruptcy proceeding should be independent and not have
a history of representing all of the various groups and the principals at one time.
V. Discovery of the Customer Deficit
26.
On November 7, 2023, certain FTX personnel including Sam
informed certain executives in the Bahamas of the existence of an $8 billion
customer deficit with respect to FTX International.
27.
The FTX International general counsel contacted me by zoorn to
inform me of this shocking development.
28.
was
Prior to this disclosure, I had no idea of any customer deficit. It
not my job as regulatory counsel to conduct a customer proof of reserves;
indeed, I would have no idea how to do this. I relied on the executives, the finance
team, and the auditors, and believed that the customer assets were fully funded on a
1:1 basis as advertised to the customers.
29.
I was in the New York office of FTX.US at the time and went to
Ryne Miller to inform him of the development. Mr. Miller was already aware of the
development and said that he was busy contacting "all the billionaires that he knew"
to provide emergency financing to cover the customer deficit.
30.
I explained to Mr. Miller that he had to review his ethical
obligations before continuing to represent FTX.US under such circumstances, and
soliciting financing under the circumstances might conflict with his ethical duties.
He dismissed my concems and remained optimistic about helping Sam get future
financing.
31.
I reviewed my ethical obligations that evening and felt that there
was substantial risk that I would be used to further additional fraud in connection
with the additional investment efforts if I stayed on. In addition, I no longer trusted
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Sam, Gary, or Nishad, and did not think that I could proceed under such
circumstances.
32.
I therefore tendered my resignation the following day.
VI. Final Discussion with Ryne Miller
33.
A day or two later, I had a final call with Ryne Miller as I was
concerned about the direction of the companies. This was after CZ of Binance had
announced that he was abandoning the purchase of the Debtors and it looked like
bankruptcy was the only answer for the FTX International Group and the Alameda
Group.
34.
On that call, I first informed Mr. Miller that we had been
counseled by all our other law firms that the bankruptcy filings of FTX International
Group and the Alameda Group should occur outside the United States, and likely in
Bahamas or Europe. This was in part because of the unnecessary expense of the US
bankruptcy system, the situs of the primary regulator, as well as the fact that creditors
of the FTX International Group were outside the United States, amongst other legal
issues.
35.
Mr. Miller told me that the bankruptcy filings of FTX
International Group, the Alameda Group, and the FTX.US Group had to be in the
United States because otherwise S&C couldn't do the job.
36.
I then told Mr. Miller that FTX.US should not file bankruptcy at
all until it was certain that there were insufficient assets at FTX.US. Indeed, the tech
team checked the wallets and had told the FTX International general counsel at the
time of the disclosure of the customer deficit that FTX.US was not affected. I told
Mr. Miller that the FTX.US crypto exchange needed to be retained if at all possible
and sold as a going concern to allow the preferred shareholders to be paid back. Mr.
Miller stated that he needed to include FTX.US as part of the bankruptcy because
FTX.US had the cash to pay S&C its retainer. Without this retainer from FTX.US,
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S&C wouldn't file. I told him that it wasn't proper for FTX.US to pay for the
expenses of the bankruptcy of FTX International Group or the Alameda Group.
37.
Mr. Miller informed me that S&C was installing "S&C's guy" to
run all the companies.
38.
I told Mr. Miller that S&C was not the proper law firm to select
because of the claims and conflicts, as well as the exorbitant costs of the firm. Mr.
Miller told me that there was over $200 million cash in LedgerX and that he was
going to send these funds to S&C, and that bankruptcy legal costs were therefore not
a problem.
39.
I was horrified at this response and started to try to remind him
of his ethical obligations and that he was stealing further funds from customers, but
he hung up the phone on me and terminated the call.
VII. Inappropriate Conduct of S&C After Bankruptcy Filings
40.
I have had several disturbing interactions with S&C following
the bankruptcy filing.
41.
In my first call with an S&C female partner who specialized in
white collar crime (I forget her name), I asked who S&C was representing in this
matter. She indicated that S&C was representing all the companies and that all the
assets were being combined. I started to explain to her that there were unwaivable
conflicts considering the bankruptcy (as described above) between the entities. She
told me that the conflict rules do not apply in the bankruptcy context. I was later
told by other counsel that this was not correct. This was a knowingly false statement
made to me in violation of the New York ethical rules that prohibits a lawyer from
making a false statement of fact or law made to third persons in the course of
representation.
42.
a lawyer
Then that same S&C lawyer told me that I should personally hire
at the Covington law firm that was representing FTX personnel in this
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matter. I spoke to the lawyer at Covington who informed me that he had received
assurances from S&C that they would foot his bill through indemnification.
43.
I asked how much he would charge me for this personal
representation and he said it would likely be in the hundreds of thousands and under
$1 million but that I could rest assured that he would get the Debtors to pay because
the "lawyers are always paid first".
44.
I was horrified of the thought that customer assets were being
used to frivolously pay lawyers at the behest of S&C. I did not hire this lawyer.
45.
Finally, I approached S&C and asked them to waive my attorney-
client privilege solely for the purpose of aiding the FBI, the SEC, the CFTC and the
regulators in their investigations. S&C has repeatedly refused this request and
attempted to muzzle me in an effort to avoid me raising issues adverse to S&C. I
think this is totally inappropriate and I should be allowed to freely help law
enforcement under these circumstances.
46.
In addition, from Bahamian regulators, I was told that S&C
refuses to communicate with the Bahamas on this important matter.
This is
attributed to the fact that the bankruptcies of the FTX International Group and the
Alameda Group should have been made in the Bahamas, and the Bahamas were the
appropriate place of jurisdiction, notwithstanding that S&C couldn't represent those
groups in such a proceeding.
VIII. Claims that the Debtors have against S&C
47.
The Debtors have at least four significant claims against S&C
arising from their past work and also related to the bankruptcy.
Under any
reasonable reading, these potential claims are sufficient to disqualify S&C from
acting as a lawyer at all for the Debtors in this proceeding.
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48.
The first claim involves a breach of ethical obligations and
overbilling by S&C during their representation of Alameda in its credit bid in the
Voyager bankruptcy.
49.
At the time that this Voyager credit bid matter commenced, S&C
sent me their retention letter which I signed with respect to that particular matter.
Regretfully, I did not fully read the exhibit to the letter. S&C was our prior counsel
and I did not imagine that they would try to slip something in the engagement letter.
I was proved to be wrong.
50.
S&C represented Alameda for a few months on this matter
without tendering a bill. I saw that there were an unnecessary number of S&C
lawyers working on the matter, and assumed that it would be a high bill, and
expected a cost of $500,000. This sounds like a shocking fee but this would be
normal for S&C.
51.
Andrew Dietrich sent me a bill for $6.5 million as a flat fee for
the entire matter and stated that the engagement letter I had signed provided for
"value billing" and this was a $1 billion transaction. I was absolutely shocked and
told him that we only pay by the hour.
52.
To be clear, Alameda engaged S&C to place a bid on assets in a
bankruptcy that took a few months and they charged $6.5 million for the matter!
53.
I told Ryne Miller to fix the problem and Mr. Miller told me that
we should help Andy on this as he needed the bankruptcy work. I angrily told Mr.
Miller to get them to bill us by the hour or I would have to involve Sam. Mr. Miller
told me not to tell Sam and promised to fix the matter.
54.
I later learned that Ryne Miller authorized payment of $2.
million to S&C for the matter.
55.
This was a significant amount more than the work performed and
the fees were not reasonable. The overbilling is unethical and needs to be recouped
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by the Debtors. In addition, if this really were "value billing", the Debtors received
no value for the work performed in light of the circumstances, and the entire amount
should be recouped.
56.
The second incident giving rise to a claim from the Debtors
against S&C involved the investment of the Alameda Group into Blockfi.
57.
An entity in the Alameda Group invested I believe $200 million
in a loan into Blockfi which included an option to purchase Blockfi. I did not work
on the loan but worked on regulatory diligence on whether the Alameda Group or
FTX.US should exercise the option.
58.
S&C acted as SEC counsel to Blockfi and they also provided
Alameda advice with respect to diligence on whether the option should be exercised.
I was concerned because Blockfi had kept dodging my questions as to what the
exemption under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities Act") was
for Blockfi's continuing offering of their "BPY" product. The normal exemption
(Regulation D for accredited investors) could not be relied upon as Blockfi was
disqualified from using this exemption under the "bad boy" provisions.
59.
Eventually I straight out asked this by email to the S&C team.
They ultimately responded with a cryptic message that they had not looked at this.
This was not credible as they were Blockfi's SEC counsel and had helped Blockfi
enter into an SEC consent whereby Blockfi promised not
to violate
the Securities
Act, amongst other requirements.
60.
I was furious at S&C and at a follow-up call, the partner for S&C
said that he could not deliver anything in writing on this as there was no exemption
under the Securities Act. I told Ryne Miller that it was unethical for S&C to
represent a company as SEC counsel that was violating the Securities Act, and that
they were furthering and aiding and abetting the securities fraud.
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61.
The response of Blockfi was that it was unlikely that the SEC
would look at this matter because the minimum investment for the product was $million and because the SEC hadn't brought it up yet. I explained that a client could
not make a business decision to violate the Securities Act, and that a lawyer was not
permitted to aid and abet a client in violating the Securities Act.
62.
I ultimately told Sam and the team that Alameda couldn't
exercise the option to purchase Blockfi without first getting Blockfi to comply with
the Securities Act.
63.
If S&C had told us of this problem, the Alameda Group would
not have entered into the loan agreement with Blockfi in the first place. Accordingly
the Debtors have a claim of $200 million (or the amount of the loan) against S&C
with respect to this matter.
64.
The third claim that the Debtors have against S&C is filing for
bankruptcy for FTX.US when the group appears to have been solvent. This resulted
in the destruction of an ongoing exchange which was worth at least $500 million in
fire sale value. I note that LedgerX, a subsidiary of FTX.US, had I believe over
$200 million in cash to cover any shortfall. I understand that these LedgerX funds
have now been channeled by S&C and the liquidator to cover costs of the other
entities which is improper. This potentially premature bankruptcy filing cost the
FTX.US preferred shareholders a substantial return.
65.
I further note that after the disclosure of the existence of the $
billion shortfall to the legal team, I was told by the general counsel of FTX
International that the tech team told the legal team in Bahamas that FTX.US
customers were not affected and covered.
66.
The fourth claim involves the unexplainable decision to leave
open withdrawals at FTX.US for several days and not secure the crypto assets of the
entities after filing bankruptcy. If FTX.US were insolvent, how could withdrawals
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been left open? How could the crypto of the Debtors not be secured upon filing the
bankruptcy? This points to potential malpractice and certainly negligence of those
in charge upon filing the bankruptcy. The value of this claim appears to be above
$400 million.
IX.
67.
False Statements of S&C
S&C has made numerous false statements in addition to the one
described in paragraph 41 above.
68.
Reference is made to the Supplemental Declaration of Andrew
G. Dietderich in Support of Debtors' Application for an Order Authorizing the
Retention and Employment of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP as Counsel to the Debtors
and Debtors-in-Possession Nunc Pro Tunc to the Petition Date [Dkt. 510] (the
"Dietderich Supplemental Declaration").
69.
In paragraph 5 of the Dietderich Supplemental Declaration, Mr.
Dietderich states that Mr. Ray was the one who decided to file the Debtors for
Chapter 11 protection. As stated above, S&C and Ryne Miller selected this route
and chose "their guy" to run it.
70.
In paragraphs 15 and 63 of the Dietderich Supplemental
Declaration, Mr. Dietderich states that Tim Wilson, former S&C counsel, was not
the general counsel of FTX Ventures and instead worked for the FTX Trading legal
team. This is false. Tim Wilson's title was the general counsel of FTX Ventures. I
have been told that there is recent S&C correspondence between S&C and certain of
the portfolio companies that confirms their knowledge of his title. Tim Wilson was
hired for the purpose of venture investments and his title was general counsel of FTX
Ventures.
71.
In paragraph 40 of the Dietderich Supplemental Declaration, Mr.
Dietderich states that no "FTX entity was ever a regular client of S&C at any time.
This is false. S&C acted as primary counsel for FTX.US, LedgerX, as well as the
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Emergent entity. The significant entities of the Debtors were certainly regular
clients of S&C as demonstrated by the substantial fees charged.
72.
In the congressional hearing, Mr. Ray stated that about 2% of the
FTX International customers were US persons. This is false to my knowledge.
There was continued ongoing review and efforts to bar US customers from the FTX
International exchange. Mr. Ray's assertion would mean that there are about 20,US customers of FTX International. S&C told the CFTC in their information
requests in their representation of FTX International that FTX International had no
known continuing US customers. The reason for this false statement likely was to
try to create a jurisdictional argument to substantiate the bankruptcy filing of FTX
International in
73.
the US.
In court filings, it was stated that FTX Digital Markets, the
Bahamian subsidiary of FIX International ("FDM") had no revenue. This is false.
Substantially all customers of FTX International were migrated to FDM in May or
June of 2023 and all associated revenue moved to FDM at that time. This statement
was likely made to diminish the importance of the Bahamian entity and again attempt
to establish jurisdiction in the US bankruptcy court.
74.
S&C claims to never have served as primary outside counsel of
the FTX entities. This is false. S&C was primary outside counsel of FTX.US,
LedgerX, and the Emergent entity.
75.
S&C has stated publicly that there was an enormous line of credit
from FIX International to Alameda of about $60 billion. For there to be a line of
credit or legal indebtedness, there are numerous required factors including a promise
to repay and interest. In this case I know of no promise to repay and no interest paid.
This to my knowledge was misappropriation and not a line of credit.
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X.
Retaliation of S&C Feared
76.
I am not the only former FTX employee who has serious
concerns about S&C. Both former employees and current employees are scared to
raise these issues because S&C might take adverse action against them.
77.
commence
Any reputable law firm would withdraw from this matter and
an
internal investigation on the above issues. Instead, I expect S&C to
take adverse action against me and disparage me publicly.
XI.
78.
wasn't time
79.
Apologies for Late Filing
I apologize for having to file this at the last moment but there
as the Dietderich Supplemental Declaration was just filed.
I note that the US Trustee in the Objection of the United States
Trustee to Debtors' Application for an Order Authorizing the Retention and
Employment of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP as Counsel to the Debtors and Debtors in
Possession Nunc Pro Tunc to the Petition Date [Dkt 496] in paragraph 9 asked for
a meaningful opportunity for the public to review the Dietderich Supplemental
Declaration. I had assumed this would be granted.
80.
However, the decision was made to proceed on this matter
without providing meaningful opportunity so I felt I needed to file as it appeared that
S&C had set the matter up to be "rubber stamped" by the Court without opportunity
for the public to respond to the Dietderich Supplemental Declaration.
81.
set out
If called upon to testify, I would testify competently to the facts
in this Declaration.
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82.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United
States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.
Dated: January 19,
/s/ Daniel Friedberk
Daniel Friedberg
Declarant
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