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Page 1 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Alameda Superior Court / HHJ, Department 520
JUDICIAL OFFICER: HONORABLE JULIA SPAIN
Courtroom Clerk: Danielle Labrecque
CSR: None
23CV028922
July 7, 2023
2:00 PM
TAYLOR, et al.
vs
TESLA, INC.
MINUTES
APPEARANCES:
Plaintiff Sharonda Taylor represented by Matthew C. Helland via virtual conference.
Plaintiff Tatianna Smith represented by Matthew C. Helland via virtual conference.
Plaintiff Zenobia Milligan represented by Matthew C. Helland via virtual conference.
Plaintiff Shaka Green represented by Matthew C. Helland via virtual conference.
Defendant Tesla, Inc. represented by Christina Theresa Tellado via virtual conference.
Other Appearance Notes: Matter is reported by Thomas, Victoria CSR # 12927
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Motion to Strike anti-SLAPP; filed by Tesla,
Inc. (Defendant)
The Motion to Strike (not anti-SLAPP) - without Demurrer filed by Tesla, Inc. on 05/12/2023 is
Denied.
Defendant Tesla, Inc.’s (“Tesla”) Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Complaint Without Leave to
Amend Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 is DENIED.
OVERVIEW
Plaintiffs Sharonda Taylor, Tatianna Smith, Zenobia Milligan, and Shaka Green brought this
representative action on behalf of themselves and all aggrieved Tesla employees for certain
Labor Code violations under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”), Labor Code
section 2698 et seq. Plaintiffs seek civil penalties, injunctive and declaratory relief, and
attorney’s fees based on Tesla’s alleged violations of Labor Code sections 226 (inspection and
copying of wage statements), 432 (copying of instruments signed by employee), and 1198.5
(inspection and copying of personnel files).
Tesla has now brought a special motion to strike the entire action as a strategic lawsuit against
public participation (an “anti-SLAPP motion”).
TESLA DID NOT MEET ITS INITIAL BURDEN OF PROOF AS THE MOVING PARTYPage 2 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Tesla did not meet its initial burden as the movant to make a “threshold showing that [Plaintiffs’]
claims arise from petitioning activity within the purview of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Hylton v.
Frank E. Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1274; see City of Cotati v. Cashman
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 77-80.)
Tesla has not shown that the “principal thrust or gravamen” of Plaintiffs’ Complaint implicates
constitutionally protected activity. (Freeman v. Schack (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 719, 727.) The
anti-SLAPP statute does not apply when “allegations referring to arguably protected activity are
only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity.” (Ibid.)
Tesla’s position is that this action is an indirect attack on its refusals to produce personnel files in
response to requests from Plaintiffs’ counsel on the basis that Plaintiffs’ right to make such
requests was suspended by the earlier filing of the Vaughn putative class action, Case No.
RG17882082. (Lab. Code, § 1198.5, subd. (n).) But this argument assumes that Plaintiffs were
parties to Vaughn. No class was ever certified in Vaughn. Under both federal and state law,
purported members of a putative class that was never actually certified are not parties to that
action. (Bowser v. Ford Motor Co. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 587, 619.) On this record, Plaintiffs
were merely exercising their statutory rights under the Labor Code to inspect and copy wage
statements, signed instruments, and personnel files, independent of anything happening in
Vaughn.
In general, it has already been held that the mere failure to comply with discovery is not
protected petitioning activity. (See Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th
624, 632.) Furthermore, Tesla did not show that its refusals to produce personnel files “relate to a
substantive issue” under consideration in the Vaughn action. (Cf. Crossroads Investors, L.P. v.
Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 757, 779.) Crossroads illustrates how
the substantive issue must be actually tendered in the prior action, in that the borrower expressly
placed payoff and cure amounts at issue in its filings in the bankruptcy proceeding. (Id. at p.
779.) Tesla did not do the same here. In its moving and reply papers, Tesla analyzed the issues in
Vaughn at a very high level of abstraction and did not clearly articulate what issues were under
consideration in the Vaughn action which relate to Plaintiffs’ PAGA claim in this action. The
various discovery motions in the Vaughn action and the resulting orders on privacy waivers only
addressed Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents No. 18, not production of entire
personnel files to putative class members pursuant to Labor Code section 1198.5.
TESLA DID NOT SHOW THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THEIR
LABOR CODE DISCOVERY REQUESTS WERE MADE IN CONNECTION WITH AN
ISSUE UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE VAUGHN PUTATIVE CLASS ACTION
Tesla’s argument appears to be based in part on the fact that Plaintiffs’ Labor Code document
requests refer to “Tesla Class Action: Personnel Records Request and Privacy Waiver.” (Exs. 3
and 6 to Tellado Decl.; Def.’s MPA at 7:9-26.) In and of itself, this says nothing about Vaughn,
let alone any connection between the two.
Tesla’s Motion seems to be implicitly invoking some form of estoppel by accusing Plaintiffs of
Minute Order
Page 2 of 3Page 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
using their stand-alone statutory rights under the Labor Code to “circumvent” the discovery
process in Vaughn, but never uses the word or argues its implications. Accordingly, Tesla did not
show that Plaintiffs are estopped from denying that their Labor Code discovery was in fact part
and parcel of discovery in the Vaughn matter. (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60
Cal.App.4th 171, 181 [explaining judicial, collateral, and equitable estoppel].) The most likely
reason for this omission is that Plaintiffs never actually appeared as parties in the Vaughn class
action and could not be estopped with respect to an action in which they never appeared.
Clerk is directed to serve copies of this order, with proof of service, to counsel and to selfrepresented parties of record.
By:
Minutes of: 07/07/2023
Entered on: 07/07/2023
Minute Order
Page 3 of 3
PDF Page 1
PlainSite Cover Page
PDF Page 2
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Alameda Superior Court / HHJ, Department 520
JUDICIAL OFFICER: HONORABLE JULIA SPAIN
Courtroom Clerk: Danielle Labrecque
CSR: None
23CV028922
July 7, 2023
2:00 PM
TAYLOR, et al.
vs
TESLA, INC.
MINUTES
APPEARANCES:
Plaintiff Sharonda Taylor represented by Matthew C. Helland via virtual conference.
Plaintiff Tatianna Smith represented by Matthew C. Helland via virtual conference.
Plaintiff Zenobia Milligan represented by Matthew C. Helland via virtual conference.
Plaintiff Shaka Green represented by Matthew C. Helland via virtual conference.
Defendant Tesla, Inc. represented by Christina Theresa Tellado via virtual conference.
Other Appearance Notes: Matter is reported by Thomas, Victoria CSR # 12927
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Motion to Strike anti-SLAPP; filed by Tesla,
Inc. (Defendant)
The Motion to Strike (not anti-SLAPP) - without Demurrer filed by Tesla, Inc. on 05/12/2023 is
Denied.
Defendant Tesla, Inc.’s (“Tesla”) Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Complaint Without Leave to
Amend Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 is DENIED.
OVERVIEW
Plaintiffs Sharonda Taylor, Tatianna Smith, Zenobia Milligan, and Shaka Green brought this
representative action on behalf of themselves and all aggrieved Tesla employees for certain
Labor Code violations under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”), Labor Code
section 2698 et seq. Plaintiffs seek civil penalties, injunctive and declaratory relief, and
attorney’s fees based on Tesla’s alleged violations of Labor Code sections 226 (inspection and
copying of wage statements), 432 (copying of instruments signed by employee), and 1198.5
(inspection and copying of personnel files).
Tesla has now brought a special motion to strike the entire action as a strategic lawsuit against
public participation (an “anti-SLAPP motion”).
TESLA DID NOT MEET ITS INITIAL BURDEN OF PROOF AS THE MOVING PARTY
PDF Page 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Tesla did not meet its initial burden as the movant to make a “threshold showing that [Plaintiffs’]
claims arise from petitioning activity within the purview of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Hylton v.
Frank E. Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1274; see City of Cotati v. Cashman
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 77-80.)
Tesla has not shown that the “principal thrust or gravamen” of Plaintiffs’ Complaint implicates
constitutionally protected activity. (Freeman v. Schack (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 719, 727.) The
anti-SLAPP statute does not apply when “allegations referring to arguably protected activity are
only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity.” (Ibid.)
Tesla’s position is that this action is an indirect attack on its refusals to produce personnel files in
response to requests from Plaintiffs’ counsel on the basis that Plaintiffs’ right to make such
requests was suspended by the earlier filing of the Vaughn putative class action, Case No.
RG17882082. (Lab. Code, § 1198.5, subd. (n).) But this argument assumes that Plaintiffs were
parties to Vaughn. No class was ever certified in Vaughn. Under both federal and state law,
purported members of a putative class that was never actually certified are not parties to that
action. (Bowser v. Ford Motor Co. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 587, 619.) On this record, Plaintiffs
were merely exercising their statutory rights under the Labor Code to inspect and copy wage
statements, signed instruments, and personnel files, independent of anything happening in
Vaughn.
In general, it has already been held that the mere failure to comply with discovery is not
protected petitioning activity. (See Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th
624, 632.) Furthermore, Tesla did not show that its refusals to produce personnel files “relate to a
substantive issue” under consideration in the Vaughn action. (Cf. Crossroads Investors, L.P. v.
Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 757, 779.) Crossroads illustrates how
the substantive issue must be actually tendered in the prior action, in that the borrower expressly
placed payoff and cure amounts at issue in its filings in the bankruptcy proceeding. (Id. at p.
779.) Tesla did not do the same here. In its moving and reply papers, Tesla analyzed the issues in
Vaughn at a very high level of abstraction and did not clearly articulate what issues were under
consideration in the Vaughn action which relate to Plaintiffs’ PAGA claim in this action. The
various discovery motions in the Vaughn action and the resulting orders on privacy waivers only
addressed Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents No. 18, not production of entire
personnel files to putative class members pursuant to Labor Code section 1198.5.
TESLA DID NOT SHOW THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THEIR
LABOR CODE DISCOVERY REQUESTS WERE MADE IN CONNECTION WITH AN
ISSUE UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE VAUGHN PUTATIVE CLASS ACTION
Tesla’s argument appears to be based in part on the fact that Plaintiffs’ Labor Code document
requests refer to “Tesla Class Action: Personnel Records Request and Privacy Waiver.” (Exs. 3
and 6 to Tellado Decl.; Def.’s MPA at 7:9-26.) In and of itself, this says nothing about Vaughn,
let alone any connection between the two.
Tesla’s Motion seems to be implicitly invoking some form of estoppel by accusing Plaintiffs of
Minute Order
Page 2 of 3
PDF Page 4
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
using their stand-alone statutory rights under the Labor Code to “circumvent” the discovery
process in Vaughn, but never uses the word or argues its implications. Accordingly, Tesla did not
show that Plaintiffs are estopped from denying that their Labor Code discovery was in fact part
and parcel of discovery in the Vaughn matter. (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60
Cal.App.4th 171, 181 [explaining judicial, collateral, and equitable estoppel].) The most likely
reason for this omission is that Plaintiffs never actually appeared as parties in the Vaughn class
action and could not be estopped with respect to an action in which they never appeared.
Clerk is directed to serve copies of this order, with proof of service, to counsel and to selfrepresented parties of record.
By:
Minutes of: 07/07/2023
Entered on: 07/07/2023
Minute Order
Page 3 of 3
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