Complaint against All Defendants. Answer due by 6/23/2025. Filed by Brian Simmonds Marshall of Oregon Department of Justice on behalf of All Plaintiffs.(Marshall, Brian)
Page 1 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 1 of 38
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
THE STATE OF OREGON, THE STATE OF
ARIZONA, THE STATE OF COLORADO,
THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, THE
STATE OF DELAWARE, THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS, THE STATE OF MAINE, THE
STATE OF MINNESOTA, THE STATE OF
NEVADA, THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, and THE
STATE OF VERMONT,
Case No. 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
COMPLAINT
THREE-JUDGE COURT REQUESTED
Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his capacity as
President of the United States;
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; KRISTI NOEM, in her official
capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security; UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION;
PETER R. FLORES, in his official capacity as
Acting Commissioner for U.S. Customs and
Border Protection; and THE UNITED
STATES,
Defendants.
I..
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution assigns to Congress, not the President, the “Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.” Art. I, § 8. Yet over the last three months, the
President has imposed, modified, escalated, and suspended tariffs by executive order,
memoranda, social media post, and agency decree. These edicts reflect a national trade policy
that now hinges on the President’s whims rather than the sound exercise of his lawful authority.
By claiming the authority to impose immense and ever-changing tariffs on whatever goods
entering the United States he chooses, for whatever reason he finds convenient to declare an
emergency, the President has upended the constitutional order and brought chaos to the
American economy.
Page 1 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 2 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 2 of 38
The President has no authority to arbitrarily impose tariffs as he has done here.
The text and history of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)—the statute
the President has invoked for the most damaging of his tariffs—confirm that the President cannot
impose such tariffs under that law. And even if it did, it would not allow the worldwide tariffs he
has imposed, which were not a response to an emergency as IEEPA defines it and have no nexus
to the circumstances that purported to justify them..
Because these tariffs are unlawful, this Court should declare that they are not in
force, enjoin the Defendant agencies and officers from enforcing them, and vacate the agency
actions implementing them.
II.
A.
PARTIES
Plaintiff States.
The State of Oregon is a sovereign state of the United States. Oregon is
represented by Attorney General Dan Rayfield. The Attorney General is the chief legal officer of
Oregon and is authorized to institute this action..
The State of Arizona is a sovereign state of the United States. Arizona is
represented by Attorney General Kris Mayes. The Attorney General is Arizona’s chief law
enforcement officer and is authorized to institute this action..
The State of Colorado is a sovereign state in the United States. Colorado is
represented by Phil Weiser, the Attorney General of Colorado. The Attorney General acts as the
chief legal representative of the state and is authorized by Colo Rev. Stat. § 24-31-101 to pursue
this action..
The State of Connecticut is a sovereign state of the United States. Connecticut is
represented by and through its chief legal officer, Attorney General William Tong, who is
authorized under General Statutes § 3-125 to pursue this action on behalf of the State of
Connecticut.
Page 2 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 3 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 3 of 38
The State of Delaware is a sovereign state of the United States. Delaware is
represented by and through its Attorney General, Kathleen Jennings. The Attorney General is
Delaware’s chief law enforcement officer and is authorized to pursue this action pursuant to 29
Del. C. § 2504..
The State of Illinois is a sovereign state of the United States. Illinois is
represented by Attorney General Kwame Raoul. The Attorney General is Illinois’s chief law
enforcement officer and is authorized to institute this action. See Ill. Const. art. V, § 15; 15 ILCS/4..
The State of Maine is a sovereign state of the United States. Maine is represented
by Attorney General Aaron Frey. The Attorney General is Maine’s chief law enforcement officer
and is authorized to institute this action pursuant to 5 Me. Rev. Stat. § 191..
The State of Minnesota is a sovereign state of the United States. Minnesota is
represented by and through its chief legal officer, Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison,
who has common law and statutory authority to sue on Minnesota’s behalf..
The State of Nevada, represented by and through Attorney General Aaron D.
Ford, is a sovereign State within the United States. The Attorney General is the chief law
enforcement of the State of Nevada and is authorized to pursue this action under Nev. Rev. Stat..110 and Nev. Rev. Stat. 228.170..
The State of New Mexico is a sovereign state in the United States. New Mexico is
represented by Attorney General Raúl Torrez, who is the chief law enforcement officer of New
Mexico authorized by N.M. Stat. Ann. § 8-5-2 to pursue this action..
The State of New York is a sovereign state in the United States. New York is
represented by Attorney General Letitia James, who is the chief law enforcement officer of New
York.
Page 3 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 4 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 4 of 38
The State of Vermont is a sovereign state of the United States. Vermont is
represented by Attorney General Charity Clark. The Attorney General is the chief legal officer of
Vermont and is authorized to institute this action.
B.
Federal Defendants.
Donald Trump is President of the United States. He is sued in his official capacity
for declaratory relief only..
The Department of Homeland Security is an agency of the United States federal
government..
Kristi Noem is Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is sued in
her official capacity..
U.S. Customs and Border Protection is an agency of the United States federal
government and a component of the Department of Homeland Security..
Pete R. Flores is the Acting Commissioner for U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. He is sued in his official capacity..
The United States is a statutory defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1581. That statute
also waives the United States’ sovereign immunity. See Humane Soc. of U.S. v. Clinton, 236
F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
III.
JURISDICTION
.
This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(1).
.
The Plaintiff States request the Chief Judge of this Court designate three judges
“to hear and determine” this action because it “(1) raises an issue of the constitutionality of an
Act of Congress, a proclamation of the President or an Executive order;” and “(2) has broad or
significant implications in the administration or interpretation of the customs laws.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 255.
Page 4 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 5 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
IV.
A.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 5 of 38
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress’s tariff powers.
The U.S. Constitution provides: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States….” Art. I, § 8..
Congress has exercised this authority by providing an extensive statutory structure
for “Duties, Imposts and Excises” on imports to the United States, which are codified in Title 19
of the U.S. Code..
For most of the nation’s history, Congress directly legislated tariffs.
.
After the disastrous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which contributed to the
Great Depression, Congress moved to create a two-part structure for the nation’s tariffs.
Congress delegated to the President the authority to negotiate agreements with foreign countries
that would reduce the United States’ tariffs in exchange for reductions in other nations’ tariffs.
Today, the United States is party to more than a dozen such trade agreements that set limited
U.S. tariffs. Congress has passed legislation consenting to and implementing these agreements as
a matter of federal law. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. ch. 22 (implementing the Uruguay Round
Agreements); 19 U.S.C. ch. 26 (implementing the Dominican Republic-Central America Free
Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”)); 19 U.S.C. ch. 29 (implementing the United States-MexicoCanada Agreement (“USMCA”))..
Congress has authorized the President to raise duties, more commonly called
tariffs, in specific circumstances. For example, the Executive Branch may impose
“countervailing duties” when “the government of a country or any public entity within the
territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable subsidy” of a product
imported in the United States in a manner that injures a domestic industry. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a).
To impose such tariffs, however, an agency must investigate and enter a “final determination of
Page 5 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 6 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 6 of 38
whether or not a countervailable subsidy is being provided with respect to the subject
merchandise,” 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(a)(1), among other findings..
Similar prerequisites are required to impose antidumping tariffs, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673, et seq.; to institute tariffs to address threats to national security, 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)–(c)
(Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962); to impose tariffs to protect domestic
industries, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974); to institute tariffs to
respond to violations of international trade agreements, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411–2420 (Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974); and to impose a “temporary import surcharge” to “deal with large and
serious United States balance-of-payments deficits,” 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a)(1) (Section 122(a) of
the Trade Act of 1974)..
In addition to requiring a finding of certain facts before imposing tariffs, Congress
also limited the duration and manner of tariffs imposed under each of these statutes. See, e.g., 19
U.S.C. § 1675(a) (requiring annual review of antidumping and countervailing duty orders); 19
U.S.C. § 2132(a)(3) & (d) (limiting tariffs or other import measures to 150 days and requiring
that they be nondiscriminatory). Together, the factual predicates, procedural requirements, and
substantive limits established by these statutes ensure that Congress retains control over its
“Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and
prevents the President from exercising this power arbitrarily..
None of these prerequisites to impose congressionally authorized tariffs has been
met, and the tariffs challenged here do not purport to rest on any of these statutory authorities.
Instead, the President relies on IEEPA as the sole substantive legal authority for his orders.
B.
IEEPA was enacted to restrain the President’s powers, not enlarge them..
Congress enacted IEEPA five decades ago with the goal of restraining the
President’s emergency powers that were frequently invoked and abused in the preceding
decades. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-459, at 3–9 (1977).
Page 6 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 7 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 7 of 38
By the 1970s, Congress had grown troubled with the proliferation of emergency
declarations under laws like the Trading with the Enemies Act (TWEA). Such laws were
originally intended to lend the President special or heightened powers during times of crisis but
were ultimately used as shortcuts around peacetime constraints on the President’s powers.
Congress recognized that the exception threatened to swallow the rule. As one House report on
efforts to reform TWEA noted, TWEA bestowed upon the President “essentially an unlimited
grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the
domestic and international economic arena, without congressional review.” H.R. Rep. No. 95459, at 7 (1977)..
One reform Congress made to curb the President’s emergency powers was to
restrict TWEA to its original purpose, limiting its application to “time[s] of war.” 50 U.S.C.
§ 4305(b)(1). At the same time, Congress enacted IEEPA, which allowed the President to
regulate imports and exports in response to certain non-wartime emergencies, while stressing
that the triggering event had to be an “unusual and extraordinary threat.” 50 U.S.C. § 1701
(emphasis added). Thus, it is not enough that the President declare a national emergency under
the National Emergencies Act (NEA); only those arising from unusual and extraordinary threats
originating “in whole or substantial part outside the United States” unlock IEEPA’s grant of
powers. Id. Congress also subjected the President’s authority under IEEPA to reporting
requirements and reserved for itself the ability to terminate declared emergencies by joint
resolution. 50 U.S.C. § 1706..
The powers set forth in IEEPA do not expressly include imposing or collecting
tariffs. Rather, the President is empowered to:
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit—
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to
any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or
Page 7 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 8 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 8 of 38
payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a
national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities,
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States;
(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation,
regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or
exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or
transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country
or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect
to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States…. U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1). The President has additional authority to confiscate property “when the
United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country or foreign
nationals….” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C)..
Not once has any other President used IEEPA to impose tariffs. In the nearly five
decades since IEEPA was enacted, no other President has imposed tariffs based on the existence
of any national emergency, despite global anti-narcotics campaigns spearheaded by the United
States and longstanding trade deficits. United States v. Yoshida Int’l, 526 F.2d 560, 576 (Cust. &
Pat. App. 1975), held that similar language in TWEA authorized the imposition of a limited
import duty surcharge, but that case does not take into account subsequent actions by Congress
to rein in the President’s authority, as explained above. And Yoshida made clear that even under
TWEA the President lacks authority to impose a surcharge “not reasonably related to the
emergency declared.” Id. at 577.
Page 8 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 9 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 9 of 38
Even in light of Yoshida, there is reason to believe that IEEPA does not authorize
tariffs. Tariffs on products are not currency exchanges or banking transactions, so subsection
(a)(1)(A) should not apply. Subsection (a)(1)(B), which gives the President the power to
“regulate,” should not authorize the challenged tariffs either because the regulation of imports is
not synonymous with and does not include the power to impose tariffs on imports..
Section 1702(a)(1)(B) allows the President to “investigate, block during the
pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit”
transactions involving the property of a foreign country or national. This is the language of
embargoes and sanctions (which is what IEEPA has consistently been used for), and interpreting
“regulate” to mean “ad valorem duty” would be incongruous with the context in which it
appears. See McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550, 569 (2016) (“Under the familiar
interpretive canon noscitur a sociis, ‘a word is known by the company it keeps.’”) (citation
omitted). IEEPA is designed to give the President appropriate powers to respond if a hostile
power were importing items into the United States for nefarious purposes. It is not clear why
under IEEPA that should continue upon payment of an appropriate duty..
It is also noteworthy that IEEPA, in § 1702(a)(1)(B), envisions the President
“regulat[ing]” both imports and exports under its authority. Because the export clause of the
Constitution, Art. I, § 9, cl. 5, expressly prohibits imposing duties on exports, interpreting
“regulate” to mean “impose a duty” would create a facial, and unnecessary, tension with the
Constitution. The more natural reading of the statute is that Congress never intended it to be used
for tariffs. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237 (1998) (statutes “must be
construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but
also grave doubts upon that score”) (internal quotations omitted)..
Even assuming IEEPA does authorize some tariffs when there is an “unusual and
extraordinary threat,” 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (emphasis added), President Trump’s unilateral
imposition of his tariffs invoking IEEPA are aberrations that fly in the face of history and the
Page 9 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 10 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 10 of 38
legislative text. The novelty of citing IEEPA for the carte blanche tariff authority the President
has exercised is itself good reason to treat these Orders with suspicion. See Util. Air Reg. Grp. v.
EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (when the executive branch claims “an unheralded power” to
regulate ‘a significant portion of the American economy’” courts greet such announcements with
skepticism because they “expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency
decisions of vast economic and political significance.” (citations omitted))..
The powers explicitly set forth by IEEPA “may only be exercised to deal with an
unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared
for purposes of this chapter and may not be exercised for any other purpose.” 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701(b).
C.
The IEEPA Tariff Orders.
Since February 1, 2025, President Trump has issued a flurry of executive orders
imposing sweeping tariffs, interspersed with other orders and memoranda modifying,
suspending, and clarifying some of the tariffs he just imposed. The President purported to rely on
IEEPA emergency powers as the substantive authority to impose all the tariffs described below.
These tariffs—defined below as the Canada Tariff Order, the Mexico Tariff Order, the China
Tariff Order, and the Worldwide Tariff Order, each as amended—are herein collectively referred
to as “IEEPA Tariff Orders.”.
The preambles to the IEEPA Tariff Orders also cite other statutes, specifically the
NEA, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.; section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2483; and 3 U.S.C. § 301. However, none of those statutes grants the President substantive
authority: the NEA governs procedures for declaring and ending emergencies but not substantive
emergency powers; section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, requires the President to
memorialize import duties in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States but does not
provide substantive authority to impose tariffs; and 3 U.S.C. § 301 allows the President to
Page 10 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 11 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 11 of 38
delegate powers within the Executive Branch. None of the cited statutes authorizes the President
to impose tariffs.
i.
The Canada Tariff Order
.
On February 1, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14193, 90 Fed.
Reg. 9113 (“Canada Tariff Order”), entitled Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit
Drugs Across Our Northern Border. The Canada Tariff Order imposed an additional 10 percent
tariff on energy imports and an additional 25 percent tariff on most other imports from Canada..
The Canada Tariff Order relies only on IEEPA as the basis for its substantive
authority to unilaterally institute these sweeping changes to U.S. trade policy toward Canada..
The President’s claim of emergency powers was based on “the threat to the safety
and security of Americans, including the public health crisis of deaths due to the use of fentanyl
and other illicit drugs, and the failure of Canada to do more to arrest, seize, detain, or otherwise
intercept [drug trafficking organizations], other drug and human traffickers, criminals at large,
and drugs.” Canada Tariff Order § 1..
The Plaintiff States agree that the fentanyl crisis requires urgent government
action, but the imposition of tariffs is neither an effective nor a lawful response to that crisis. The
Canada Tariff Order lacks any rationale for the tariff rates imposed and bears no relationship
between the goods subject to the Order and the claimed emergency.
ii.
The Mexico Tariff Order.
On February 1, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14194, 90 Fed.
Reg. 9117 (“Mexico Tariff Order”), entitled Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our
Southern Border. The Mexico Tariff Order imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on the import
of goods from Mexico..
The Mexico Tariff Order relies only on IEEPA as the basis for its substantive
authority to unilaterally institute these sweeping changes to U.S. trade policy toward Mexico.
Page 11 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 12 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 12 of 38
The President’s claim of emergency powers was based on “the grave threat to the
United States posed by the influx of illegal aliens and illicit drugs into the United States” and
“the failure of Mexico to arrest, seize, detain, or otherwise intercept [drug trafficking
organizations], other drug and human traffickers, criminals at large, and illicit drugs.” Mexico
Tariff Order § 1..
As with the Canada Tariff Order, the President provided no justification for which
goods would be subject to the Mexico Tariff Order or why he had chosen a 25 percent tariff rate.
iii..
The China Tariff Order
On February 1, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14195, 90 Fed.
Reg. 9121 (“China Tariff Order”), entitled Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our
Southern Border. The China Tariff Order imposed an additional 10 percent tariff on the import of
most goods from China..
The China Tariff Order relies only on IEEPA as the basis for its substantive
authority to unilaterally institute these sweeping changes to U.S. trade policy toward China..
The President’s claim of emergency powers was based on “the grave threat to the
United States posed by the influx of illegal aliens and illicit drugs into the United States” and
“the failure of the [People’s Republic of China] government to arrest, seize, detain, or otherwise
intercept chemical precursor suppliers, money launderers, other [transnational criminal
organizations], criminals at large, and drugs.” China Tariff Order § 1..
And, again, the China Tariff Order contained no rationale for why it was
necessary to tariff all products of China, or why the President had chosen 10 percent as the tariff
rate, departing from the already unexplained 25 percent rate he had imposed on Mexico and
Canada.
iv.
The Worldwide Tariff Order.
On April 2, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14257, 90 Fed. Reg.
(“Worldwide Tariff Order”), entitled Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to
Page 12 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 13 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 13 of 38
Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods
Trade Deficits. The Worldwide Tariff Order imposed a 10% baseline tariff on nearly all imports
to the United States, effective April 5, and additional “reciprocal” tariffs on 57 countries,
effective April 9 (Annex I). The President revised the additional “reciprocal” tariffs in Annex I
on April 3..
The Worldwide Tariff Order relies only on IEEPA as the basis for its substantive
authority to unilaterally institute these sweeping changes to the trade policy of the United States..
A few years before Congress enacted IEEPA, Congress also enacted Section 122
of the Trade Act of 1974 to give the President explicit power to impose tariffs (temporary import
surcharges) in response to balance-of-payments issues but then chose to omit the express power
to tariff under IEEPA. Although the Worldwide Tariff Order purports to address the “large and
persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits,” it does not rely on Section 122(a) of the Trade Act
of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2132, which expressly contemplates tariffs to address the related concern of
balance-of-payment deficits. That statute provides that “[w]henever fundamental international
payments problems require special import measures to restrict imports” in order “(1) to deal with
large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits[,] (2) to prevent an imminent and
significant depreciation of the dollar in foreign exchange markets, or (3) to cooperate with other
countries in correcting an international balance-of-payments disequilibrium,” the President “shall
proclaim, for a period not exceeding 150 days … a temporary import surcharge, not to exceed 15
percent ad valorem, in the form of duties … on articles imported into the United States ….” 19
U.S.C. § 2132(a). The Worldwide Tariff Order neither relies on this statutory authority nor
abides by its limits on the magnitude and duration of the tariffs it imposes..
In providing tariff powers via Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, much like
with other tariff statutes, Congress included substantive limitations and procedural safeguards
limiting the grant of power to the executive. The President attempts to circumvent these types of
substantive limitations and procedural safeguards by imposing tariffs under IEEPA in a
Page 13 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 14 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 14 of 38
unilateral, unpredictable, and far-reaching manner that is entirely unlawful. His unlawful actions
have in turn caused persistent uncertainty that has resulted in erratic financial markets (see § IV.,
D, below)..
In addition, the purported “unusual and extraordinary threats” identified by
President Trump as “national emergencies” do not amount to emergencies. Nor are they
extraordinary or even unusual..
The Worldwide Tariff Order asserts that “U.S. trading partners’ economic policies
… suppress domestic wages and consumption, as indicated by large and persistent annual U.S.
goods trade deficits,” but that does not constitute an “unusual and extraordinary threat” that
would allow the President to invoke IEEPA’s powers. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a)..
As the Worldwide Tariff Order acknowledges, “annual U.S. goods trade deficits”
are “persistent”; thus, by definition, they are not “unusual and extraordinary.” The United States
has run a persistent trade deficit in goods since the 1970s. Similarly, there is no “unusual and
extraordinary” threat to wages or consumption..
The IEEPA Tariff Orders impose, by executive order, the highest tariffs on
imports the country has seen since the 1940s. The baseline 10 percent tariff imposed by the
Worldwide Tariff Order already matches the highest average tariff rates on all imports seen
toward the end of the 1940s. The Worldwide Tariff Orders even impose tariffs on places that are
not involved in international trade, such as the British Indian Ocean Territory, whose only human
inhabitants live on a joint American and British military base on the island of Diego Garcia, and
the Heard and McDonald Islands, which have no known human inhabitants..
Despite being described as “reciprocal” tariffs, the reciprocal tariffs described in
the Worldwide Tariff Order were calculated with the intent of “balanc[ing] bilateral trade deficits
between the U.S. and each of our trading partners.” Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Reciprocal
Tariff Calculations; see also Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Presidential Tariff Actions. The U.S.
Trade Representative has acknowledged that there are “many causes,” including “non-tariff
Page 14 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 15 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 15 of 38
economic fundamentals.” But the U.S. Trade Representative provided no explanation for why
President Trump’s calculation entirely ignores a major driver of trade deficits: relative domestic
purchasing power. In effect, the reciprocal tariff calculation unreasonably ignores that certain
trading partners’ populace simply has less aggregate purchasing power..
The tariffs are also not designed to “deal with” the purported emergencies. The
Administration published its basis for the country-by-country tariff rates. See Office of the
United States Trade Representative, Reciprocal Tariff Calculations. The Administration’s
estimate of a key input of that formula—“the elasticity of import prices with respect to tariffs”—
is a fabrication. The country-by-country tariff rates are based on what the administration claims
as an estimate of “tariff and nontariff barriers” but are in fact a simple ratio of the trade deficit in
goods as a percentage of total U.S. imports from the country arbitrarily subjected to the tariff.
The Administration’s chosen formula is not an accepted methodology for calculating trade
barriers and has no basis in economic theory..
The specific academic work the Administration cites concludes that nearly all of
the cost of tariffs (95%) carries over to domestic purchasers, but the Administration falsely
claims that only 25% of the cost of tariffs is passed through to domestic customers. As the coauthor of the article cited to justify that calculation explained, the Administration’s misstatement
of the evidence results in vastly higher tariff levels than called for by its own methodology. See
Brent Neiman, “The Trump White House Cited My Research to Justify Tariffs. It Got It All
Wrong.” N.Y. Times (Apr. 7, 2025)..
The U.S. Trade Representative also provided no explanation justifying setting the
baseline tariff at 10 percent..
The tariffs are also not designed to “deal with” the purported emergencies,
because they are intended, at least in part, to raise revenue. See, e.g., The President’s News
Conference With Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the United Kingdom (Feb. 27, 2025) (“[W]e
Page 15 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 16 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 16 of 38
took in hundreds of billions of dollars [with past tariffs]. . . . [I]t’s going to make our country
rich.”)..
The tariffs will depress Americans’ wages by slowing economic growth,
increasing unemployment, and raising inflation. And, instead of reducing threats to Americans’
consumption levels, the tariffs will make the goods that Americans (and the Plaintiff States)
depend on more expensive and scarce.
v.
Delaying and adding exceptions to the Canada and Mexico Tariff Orders.
On February 3, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14197, 90 Fed.
Reg. 9183, entitled Progress on the Situation at Our Northern Border, and Executive Order, 90 Fed. Reg. 9185, entitled Progress on the Situation at Our Southern Border. These
executive orders delayed by four weeks implementation of the Canada Tariff Order and the
Mexico Tariff Order, respectively..
On March 6, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14231, 90 Fed. Reg.
, entitled Amendment to Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern
Border, and Executive Order 14232, 90 Fed. Reg. 11788, entitled Amendment to Duties To
Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Southern Border. These orders exempted products
originated in Mexico and Canada under the rules of the United States of America, United
Mexican States, and Canada Agreement. The orders also reduced the tariff rates on potash
imports from both countries from 25 percent to 10 percent.
vi.
Increasing the tariffs on imports from China.
On March 3, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14228, 90 Fed. Reg.
, entitled Further Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in
the People’s Republic of China, which increased the additional tariff on nearly all imports
imposed by the February 1 China Tariff Order from 10 percent to 20 percent. The justification
for this action was his “determin[ation] that the [People’s Republic of China] has not taken
Page 16 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 17 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 17 of 38
adequate steps to alleviate the illicit drug crisis through cooperative enforcement actions, and
that the crisis described in [the China Tariff Order] has not abated.”.
On April 2, the Worldwide Tariff Order imposed two additional tariffs on imports
from China: the 10 percent worldwide tariff, plus a 34 percent “reciprocal tariff” (Annex 1). In
aggregate, that raised the overall additional tariffs on nearly all China imports to 64 percent (20
percent from the China Tariff Order, as amended March 3 and April 2, plus 44 percent from the
Worldwide Tariff Order)..
On April 8, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14259, 90 Fed. Reg.
, entitled Amendment to Reciprocal Tariffs and Updated Duties as Applied to Low-Value
Imports From the People’s Republic of China, which imposed an additional 50 percent tariff on
goods from China under the Worldwide Tariffs Order, raising the total level of tariffs to 114
percent. The President’s justification was that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) imposed a
“34 percent tariff … on all goods imported into the PRC originating from the United States.” “In
[the President’s] judgment, this modification [was] necessary and appropriate to effectively
address the threat to the national security and economy of the United States.”.
The next day, April 9, the President again increased the tariffs on imports from
China, issuing Executive Order 14266, 90 Fed. Reg. 15625, entitled Modifying Reciprocal Tariff
Rates to Reflect Trading Partner Retaliation and Alignment. That executive order amended the
Worldwide Tariff Order to increase the tariff on nearly all imports from China another 31
percent, to a total of 145 percent (20 percent from the China Tariff Order, as amended March 3
and April 2, plus 125 percent from the Worldwide Tariff Order). The executive order again
“determined that it is necessary and appropriate to address the national emergency … by
modifying the [Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States] and taking other actions to
increase the duties imposed on the PRC in response to this latest retaliation. In [the President’s]
judgment, this modification [was] necessary and appropriate to effectively address the threat to
U.S. national and economic security posed by the PRC’s contribution to the conditions reflected
Page 17 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 18 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 18 of 38
in large and persistent trade deficits, including PRC industrial policies that have produced
systemic excess manufacturing capacity in the PRC and suppressed U.S. domestic manufacturing
capacity, which conditions are made worse by the PRC’s recent actions.”.
The President also changed the administration of tariffs with China by applying
tariffs to even low-value imports that had historically been excluded from duties. On April 2,, President Trump issued Executive Order 14256, 90 Fed. Reg. 14899, entitled Further
Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic
of China as Applied to Low-Value Imports, which eliminated the de minimis exclusion on lowvalue imports from China. The President’s April 8 order further changed the rates imposed. On
April 9, Executive Order 14266 further increased the tariff rate for low-value imports to 120
percent, plus $100 per postal item.
vii.
Partially suspending the Worldwide Tariff Order.
Executive Order 14266, issued on April 9, also delayed the country-specific
“reciprocal” tariffs listed in Annex 1 of the Worldwide Tariff Order by 90 days (except for those
imposed on China, as described above). Those tariffs are now scheduled to go into effect on
July 9..
The April 9 executive order left in place, however, the 10 percent tariff on nearly
all goods imported worldwide.
viii..
Exempting electronics from the Worldwide Tariff Order
On April 11, 2025, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum entitled
Clarification of Exceptions Under Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, as Amended. That
memorandum “clarified” that the exclusion in the Worldwide Tariff Order for semiconductors
included various other electronic devices, such as smartphones, solid-state storage devices, and
monitors.
Page 18 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 19 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
ix.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 19 of 38
Current tariff rates under the IEEPA Tariff Orders.
Currently, the Canada and Mexico Tariff Orders, as amended, provide for a 25
percent additional tariff on imports from Canada and Mexico (except for imports governed by
USMCA, which are subject to no additional tariff, and potash imports from both countries and
energy imports from Canada, which are subject to a 10 percent additional tariff). Currently, the
China Tariff Order and Worldwide Tariff Order, as amended, impose a 145 percent tariff rate for
imports from China (except for electronics, steel, aluminum, automotive, copper,
pharmaceutical, lumber, certain minerals, and energy products, and other products listed in
Annex II of the Worldwide Tariff Order, which are subject only to the 20 percent rate under the
China Tariff Order only). Currently, the Worldwide Tariff Order, as amended, imposes a 10
percent tariff rate for imports from the rest of the world (except for electronics, steel, aluminum,
automotive, copper, pharmaceutical, lumber, certain minerals, and energy products, and other
products listed in Annex II of the Worldwide Tariff Order, which are not tariffed under the
order)..
Under the Worldwide Tariff Order, as amended by Executive Order 14266, 90
Fed. Reg. 15625 (Apr. 9, 2025), the Worldwide Tariff Order will impose additional tariffs on 56
trading partners on July 9..
Under the Administration’s interpretation of IEEPA, the President can change
these tariff policies at any time without notice.
D.
Collection and enforcement under the IEEPA Tariff Orders.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection is responsible for the collection of tariffs.
U.S.C. §§ 211(c)(4), 215(1); 19 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(A). To facilitate the collection of tariffs,
Customs and Border Protection uses its Cargo Systems Messaging Service to inform importers
of changes to the amount and administration of import duties. The guidance incorporates and
imposes the current duties imposed under the IEEPA Tariff Orders.
Page 19 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 20 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 20 of 38
Customs and Border Protection enforces the Canada Tariff Order under CSMS #
- GUIDANCE: Additional Duties on Imports from Canada (issued March 3, 2025),
and CSMS # 64336037 - GUIDANCE – Update on Additional Duties on Imports from Canada –
USMCA Qualifying Products and Potash (issued March 6, 2025)..
Customs and Border Protection enforces the Mexico Tariff Order under CSMS #
– Guidance: Additional Duties on Imports from Mexico (issued March 3, 2025), and
CSMS # 64335789 - GUIDANCE – Update on Additional Duties on Imports from Mexico USMCA Qualifying Products and Potash (issued March 6, 2025)..
Customs and Border Protection enforces the China Tariff Order under CSMS #
- UPDATE – Additional Duties on Imports from China and Hong Kong (issued March, 2025)..
Customs and Border Protection enforces the Worldwide Tariff Order under
CSMS # 64701128 - UPDATED GUIDANCE – Reciprocal Tariffs – Increase in Rate for China
and Reversion of Other Country-Specific Rates, Effective April 10, 2025 (issued April 10,), and CSMS # 64724565 - UPDATED GUIDANCE – Reciprocal Tariff Exclusion for
Specified Products; April 5, 2025 Effective Date (issued April 11, 2025)..
IEEPA establishes civil and criminal penalties, including up to 20 years in prison,
for a violation or attempted violation of an order or regulation issued under its statutory
authority. 50 U.S.C. § 1705.
E.
The IEEPA Tariff Orders’ economic destruction.
President Trump has chosen to wield IEEPA to impose tariffs on the world at his
whim, muddled by threats, additions, exceptions, exemptions, and pauses. The direct
consequence has been an erratic financial market and a destabilized U.S. and global economy..
The IEEPA Tariff Orders will cause a substantial increase in prices for goods
within the Plaintiff States and throughout the United States. The U.S. Trade Representative’s
methodology for calculating the size of the “reciprocal” tariffs assumes that 25 percent of the
Page 20 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 21 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 21 of 38
tariffs will be passed on as increases to retail prices on the tariffed goods, and the studies that
USTR’s analysis cites conclude that the actual figure is 95 percent. The overwhelming consensus
of economists is that these price increases will lead to significant inflation and risk recession..
The immediate impact of these predictions can be seen in the capital markets.
Between March 3 and April 8, 2025, the S&P 500 lost about 850 points (a 14.5 percent drop),
and the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost just over 5,500 points (a 13 percent drop). A
substantial majority of those losses from March 3 to April 8—between 70 to 90 precent—
occurred after the date of the Worldwide Tariff Order. Between April 2, and April 8, the S&P lost almost 700 points (a 12 percent drop), and the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost about points (an 11 percent drop)..
The effect on the market of the President’s partial suspension of the Worldwide
Tariff Order further demonstrates the causal relationship. Following the President’s
announcement that he would suspend the country-specific tariffs for 90 days, the markets
partially recovered. On April 9, the S&P 500 recovered by about 480 points, a 9.5 percent gain
from April 8 but still down 10 percent from January 21. Likewise, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average recovered by about 3,000 points, an 8 percent gain from April 8 but still down 8 percent
from January 21..
The market losses are primarily attributable to the IEEPA Tariff Orders. Trade
organization publications, expert commentary, and news reporting is replete with evidence that
the market losses are largely a reaction to the President’s threatened and imposed tariffs.
V.
A.
THE PLAINTIFF STATES’ INTERESTS
The Plaintiff States will have increased costs when purchasing necessary equipment
and supplies essential to their economies..
The Plaintiff States provide a wide range of public services to their residents and
visitors. Essential to the provision of those services is the purchase of equipment, supplies, and
parts, many of which are imported from other countries. Other products are manufactured in the
Page 21 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 22 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 22 of 38
United States but contain components that are imported from other countries. Because tariffs
directly impact the costs of these products, they cause direct financial harm to the Plaintiff
States..
For example, the University of Oregon and Oregon State University are public
research universities that purchase an array of items to provide educational opportunities for their
students and to produce high quality research. The University of Oregon and Oregon State
University are two of Oregon’s seven public universities established by Or. Rev. Stat. § 352.002,
each of which is “a governmental entity performing governmental functions and exercising
governmental powers.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 352.033. Among other things, the State of Oregon’s
public universities act for the State of Oregon by ensuring access and affordability to education,
fostering an informed citizenry, and creating original knowledge and advancing innovation. See,
e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 352.039, 350.001, 350.005, 350.009..
Among the array of items that the University of Oregon purchases is specialized
equipment for scientific research. Because specialized equipment must meet particular
specifications and standards for the research group, it is often only reasonably available from a
few sources, which are all foreign. Purchasing specialized equipment also often requires an order
date several months in advance of delivery. To mitigate the risk of unexpected import costs,
purchase-order terms frequently include a term allowing the vendor to make price adjustments
before delivery..
That has already occurred. On November 8, 2024, the University of Oregon
purchased a cryogenic single-photon counting detector system from ID Quantique, Inc., for its
Center of Optics. At that time, the purchase price was $182,733. IDQ shipped the cryogenic
system from Switzerland on April 8. At that time, the additional “reciprocal” tariff scheduled to
go into effect for imports from Switzerland was 31 percent. The system arrived after the
announced pause, resulting in the lower—but still substantial—10 percent worldwide tariff
collected at the port by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. As a result of that additional tariff,
Page 22 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 23 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 23 of 38
the customs broker required the University of Oregon to pay an additional $18,579 before it
would deliver the cryogenic system..
That is only one example of purchases that are awaiting shipment. If left in place,
the unlawful IEEPA Tariff Orders will increase the cost of each purchase by, at minimum, an
additional 10 percent imposing financial harm to the State of Oregon through the University of
Oregon..
Among other goods, Oregon State University purchases scientific supplies for use
by its students and researchers. Oregon State University’s vendor for these supplies notified
Oregon State University that because of the U.S. Government’s tariffs on materials imported
from China, as well as a tariff on imported steel and aluminum, the vendor was forced to
implement a surcharge of 2.3% on products. The cost of this surcharge is passed on directly to
Oregon State University. Other vendors are also passing along costs of the IEEPA Tariff Orders
to Oregon State University. These surcharges and cost increases have a direct adverse impact on
Oregon State University and, in turn, impose financial harm to the State of Oregon..
Another example is the cost of testing kits purchased by the Oregon Health &
Sciences University. OHSU is a public corporation that performs functions and services for the
benefit of the State of Oregon. It is a “governmental entity performing governmental functions
and exercising governmental powers.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 353.020. Its purpose is to serve the people
of Oregon by “providing education in health, science, [and] engineering”; “[c]onduct[ing]
research in health care, engineering, biomedical sciences, and general sciences”; and provide and
support healthcare throughout the state. Or. Rev. Stat. § 353.030..
OHSU’s pharmacy partner has already seen a 20 percent increase in the price of
testing kits, due to both existing and impending tariffs. OHSU reasonably expects the pharmacy
partner to pass those costs on to OHSU. Because OHSU requires testing kits on a monthly basis,
these tariff impacts will be recurring so long as Tariff Orders—and the continued threatening of
tariffs—remain in place.
Page 23 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 24 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 24 of 38
The Oregon Department of Transportation is a state agency that provides service,
builds infrastructure, and maintains equipment to further transportation safety and efficiency. Or.
Rev. Stat. § 184.615. For that purpose, ODOT has a long-term contract with URS Electronics for
the purchase of traffic video surveillance equipment. On April 16, 2025, URS Electronics
informed ODOT that one of its vendors, Bosch Security division, “announced a 7.9% across the
board price increase that will go into effect on May 1st, to help offset some of their cost
increases experienced due to current federal government trade policies.” Those vendor-price
increases will be passed on to ODOT, harming ODOT with increased operations costs for the
foreseeable future..
The Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT) has a long list of
procurement contracts for the purchase of equipment, supplies, or parts, many of which are
imported from other countries or have component parts imported from other countries. The
tariffs are already increasing costs for ADOT. Notably, on March 14, 2025, one contractor
requested a price increase, citing the increased duty cost stated “in Executive Order 14228 of
March 3, 2025.”.
Arizona’s universities are also directly harmed by the tariffs imposed pursuant to
the IEEPA Tariff Orders. For example, Arizona State University, the largest public university in
the country, conducts research of national significance that depends on its ability to source
specialized equipment not available from domestic sources. Using just one project as an
exemplar, the SHIELD USA program spearheaded by Arizona State University faces the
prospect of up to $1.4 million in increased costs from fully implemented tariffs. This would be
especially counterproductive as SHIELD USA aims to drive innovation in the domestic
microchip packaging ecosystem, expand capacity for domestic advanced packaging, and help to
regain U.S leadership in microelectronics while strengthening national security..
As a purchaser of imported products from countries subject to one or more of the
IEEPA Tariff Orders, the State of Delaware is directly harmed by these tariffs. For example, the
Page 24 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 25 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 25 of 38
Maintenance and Operations Division of the Delaware Department of Transportation purchases
approximately 20 dump trucks per year: both the two-ton bodies of the trucks and truck rims are
imported. Maintenance and Operations also purchases John Deere tractor parts that are made in
Mexico, and Stihl chainsaws and trimmers that are made in Germany. The Office of Fleet
Services of Delaware’s Office of Management and Budget provides state agencies with access to
vehicles. Fleet Services manages a fleet of about 3,000 vehicles, 25 percent of which are
minivans from Stellantis (Chrysler), assembled in Windsor, Ontario. Fleet Services purchases an
average of 70 minivans per year. Also, as Delaware moves to electrify its fleet, Fleet Services
will purchase vehicles such as the Ford Mach-E, Chevrolet Blazer EV, Chevrolet Equinox EV,
and Toyota BZ4x, which are manufactured outside the United States. Even those vehicles in
Delaware’s fleet assembled in the United States often include parts sourced worldwide. Any
increase in tariffs caused by these unlawful tariffs inflicts a direct pecuniary injury to Delaware’s
finances..
New York’s Office of General Services (NYOGS) estimates that tariffs,
particularly those on Mexico, Canada, and China, will have significant impacts on bid prices,
supply chains, and construction claims. NYOGS’s primary responsibilities include managing and
leasing real property, designing and building facilities, and contracting for goods, services, and
technology for the State of New York..
Energy pricing is particularly threatened. In 2024, New York State imported 7.7
Terawatt-hours of Canadian electricity, valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Canada is
the number one supplier of energy to the United States generally, including around 85 percent of
U.S. electricity imports..
When President Trump imposed tariffs on Canada, the Ontario and Quebec
Premiers threatened retaliatory restrictions on electricity exports to the U.S. This would be
catastrophic. NYOGS estimates that if Ontario or Quebec restricted electricity exports to New
York, prices would soar at a time when the State is facing capacity restraints and is relying more
Page 25 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 26 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 26 of 38
heavily on Canadian hydropower than ever. New York cannot simply buy less electricity or buy
electricity from other sources..
In the construction context, NYOGS bid about $1 billion in 2024, with
approximately half on labor and half on materials. Assuming NYOGS bids a comparable annual
portfolio, if even only 37 percent of these materials are subject to tariffs at 25 percent, then the
potential cost impact could be between $40 million and $50 million to New York’s projects. In
NYOGS’s experience, these price increases rarely fully recover to pre-event levels.
Consequently, the tariffs will likely have a long-term negative effect on project costs and,
consequently, agency capital programs..
Outside of the construction context, NYOGS estimates that 50 percent to 75
percent of the products purchased by New York may be manufactured in a tariff-impacted
nation. Based on an estimated average total spend of $5 billion, a 25 percent tariff on Mexico
and Canada and a 10 percent tariff on China will likely have a portfolio-wide impact of roughly
$106 million for New York State agencies..
NYOGS estimates that potential contractual impacts on active construction
projects due to imposed tariffs would be similar to what New York experienced during
COVID. Unlike during COVID, however, when New York was bidding projects in a soft and
uncertain economy, there is no shortage of construction work today. Contractors are very busy
despite higher interest rates..
The IEEPA Tariff Orders also injure Plaintiff States by increasing the price of
goods and services that they purchase from domestic producers and suppliers that rely on
imports. For example, Oregon’s largest natural gas utility imports most of its natural gas from
Canada. It has already made a regulatory filing to reserve the right to show that the cost of tariffs
“should be recovered in rates….” The State of Oregon uses natural gas for most of its building
energy use and it would be injured as an electricity ratepayer by any increase in the rates for
natural gas.
Page 26 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 27 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
B.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 27 of 38
The President’s imposition, modification, and reinstatement of tariffs by executive
order and memoranda forces the Plaintiff States to incur administrative costs..
The President’s invocation of the IEEPA to impose, modify, and reinstate tariffs
by executive order, memoranda, social media post, and other means has resulted in national trade
policy that reflects the President’s whims on a particular day rather than reasoned decision. The
President’s abrupt policy changes have disrupted the economies of the Plaintiff States. In just
March and April, the President has imposed sweeping tariff-rate changes on at least four
occasions, with numerous purported clarifications and exemptions made in between, as well as
the repeated retaliatory rate-hikes for China..
Those erratic swings in trade policy not only affect the markets, but they also
harm the Plaintiff States’ ability to procure goods and services and to budget for and audit price
adjustments..
For example, the Oregon Department of Transportation builds, maintains, and
plans for the State of Oregon’s transportation infrastructure. See, e.g., ORS § 184.615. To build
and maintain that infrastructure, ODOT frequently requires the work of general contractors.
Conditions are currently changing far more quickly than normal. Due to cost volatility, material
suppliers and subcontractors are substantially reducing the length of time that they will commit
to prices, making it more challenging for ODOT to secure bid extensions from prime contractors.
That results in a harm to ODOT by making it more difficult to obtain competitive bids from
high-quality prime contractors..
The IEEPA Tariff Orders have also created procurement uncertainty for Oregon
State University. Oregon State University regularly issues requests for proposals or solicitations
and receives proposals from across the country and internationally. Because of the price
uncertainty caused by the IEEPA Tariff Orders, many of the solicitations received are
conditional and indicate that costs may change depending on cost fluctuations. For example,
Oregon State University recently received a proposal for a robotics system for research from a
Swiss manufacturer that stated the total price with the disclaimer that “[p]ricing is based on
Page 27 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 28 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 28 of 38
current US tariff regulations for imports from Switzerland. In the event that new or increased
tariffs are imposed on the quoted products or their components prior to delivery, [vendor]
reserves the right to adjust the prices accordingly.” These conditional solicitations necessitated
by the IEEPA Tariff Orders make it impossible for Oregon State University to evaluate which
solicitation is the lowest bid and budget accordingly..
In Illinois, the Department of Information Technology (DOIT) purchases about
,000 imported personal computers for state employees each year, along with necessary
accessories and support products (screens, docking stations, etc.). Because of the uncertainty
surrounding tariffs, DOIT's ability to negotiate future contracts has been seriously hindered, and
DOIT’s stock of available computers and hardware inventory has dwindled as negotiations
dragged on. In the end, DOIT was constrained to accept a contract under which the vendor is
explicitly permitted to pass on the cost of any tariff to the State of Illinois..
The potential for tariffs and the chaos around the on-again, off-again tariff
policies have also impacted New York already. When contractors experience financial impacts
that are beyond their control, they will attempt to identify ways to mitigate their losses and
request notices under the contract for relief. New York has already experienced fluctuating prices
and delays caused by vendors adjusting to higher risk..
Cost volatility also affects the ability of state agencies and entities to plan their
budgets. For example, the University of Oregon is currently setting its budget for fiscal year (July 1, 2025 through June 30, 2026). Due to the President’s purported ability to change
tariffs by executive order or memorandum, budgeting for the additional cost of tariffs effectively
requires the University of Oregon to predict the President’s state of mind at particular times of
the fiscal year. As a result, the university must plan its FY 2026 budget with a potential tariff rate
on any given item ranging from 10 to 145 percent, which substantially undermines the
university’s ability to make financial plans and decisions.
Page 28 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 29 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 29 of 38
As another example, OHSU is currently setting its budget for its Fiscal Year
, with its fiscal years also being July 1 through June 30. OHSU’s Board of Directors will
formally adopt the budget in May. Given the uncertainties related to tariffs, OHSU is unable to
accurately plan its expenses for the next fiscal year. Already in past years, despite increasing
revenue, spending has outpaced revenue. The substantial tariffs imposed and threatened by the
President will only worsen that problem. If the costs of tariffs cause OHSU to significantly
exceed its budget, it creates a serious risk that OHSU will need to cut expenses by scaling back
its services and laying off staff, which harms OHSU and the State of Oregon..
Unpredictable tariffs also are already burdening or almost certainly will burden
the Plaintiff States by increasing administrative costs. When tariff rates increased in the past,
many Plaintiff States saw vendors and contractors claim the rate increases as the basis for price
adjustments. Although vendors that ship directly from foreign ports can include documentation
from U.S. Customs and Border Protection evidencing the applied tariff rate, that is not possible
with most domestic manufacturers that use foreign-sourced components. Whether due to
opportunism or avoidance of incurring their own administrative costs, many Plaintiff States have
experienced some vendors and contractors attempting to impose price adjustments that are not
reasonably based on increased tariff rates..
When a vendor or contractor seeks to impose a price-adjustment based on tariff
rates, many Plaintiff States’ agencies audit the adjustment to ensure that it is reasonably based on
actual costs incurred. That is particularly difficult with regard to domestically produced goods
made in part with foreign-sourced components, or contracted services that use some foreignsourced materials. Due to the President’s erratic—and sometimes inconsistent—tariff-rate
directives, many of the Plaintiff States’ agencies must piece together the applicable tariff for a
particular day by reviewing multiple executive orders, memoranda, social media posts, and so
on, and also investigate how much of those costs were actually incurred by the vendor or
contractor. That imposes a substantial and additional administrative cost to many Plaintiff States.
Page 29 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 30 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 30 of 38
CAUSES OF ACTION
Count I
The IEEPA Tariff Orders are Ultra Vires and Violate the Separation of Powers
(Against All Defendants).
The Plaintiff States incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the
preceding paragraphs..
The Constitution grants only Congress, not the President, the “Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises….” Art. I, § 8, cl. 1..
No statute authorizes the President to issue the IEEPA Tariff Orders. The only
statute conveying substantive authority to the President cited in the Orders is IEEPA. But IEEPA
does not authorize the imposition of such tariffs, if it authorizes tariffs at all. In addition, the
Worldwide Tariff Order does not address an “unusual and extraordinary threat.” Moreover, the
tariffs the Orders impose are not designed “to deal with”—and thus have an insufficient nexus
to—the purported “unusual and extraordinary threat[s]” the Orders identify..
The President’s authority under IEEPA may be exercised only to address an
“unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the
United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the
President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.” 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a)..
The statutory requirement of an “unusual and extraordinary threat” is not met by
the President’s declaration of emergency accompanying the Worldwide Tariff Order. As the
Worldwide Tariff Order acknowledges, “annual U.S. goods trade deficits” are “persistent”; thus,
by definition, they are not “unusual and extraordinary.” There is no other “unusual and
extraordinary threat” addressed by the Worldwide Tariff Order..
The President’s emergency powers under the IEEPA “may only be exercised to
deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has
Page 30 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 31 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 31 of 38
been declared for purposes of this chapter and may not be exercised for any other purpose.” 50
U.S.C. § 1701(b)..
The tariffs imposed under the Canada and Mexico Tariff Orders do not “deal
with” the “unusual and extraordinary threat[s]” they identify: there is no connection between the
border security threats the orders identify, including drug trafficking, and the tariffs imposed by
the orders..
The tariffs imposed under the China Tariff Order does not “deal with” the
“unusual and extraordinary threat” it identifies: there is no connection between the manufacture
and trafficking of fentanyl and the tariffs imposed by the order..
The tariffs imposed under the Worldwide Tariff Order do not “deal with” the
purported “unusual and extraordinary threat[s]” the Order identifies:
a.
The nearly worldwide 10 percent tariff level is wholly unconnected to the
stated basis of the emergency declaration: it applies without regard to any
country’s trade practices or purported threat to domestic industries.
b.
The level of additional tariffs published in Annex I of the Tariff Order
exceeds what is necessary “to deal with” the purported emergency.
c.
The Trump Administration has said that it intends to use the Tariff Order
to advance unrelated policy objectives in direct contravention of IEEPA.
White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said during an April 8 press
briefing that: “The President ... is going to have a custom, tailor-made
approach to each and every country, and if that means discussions of
foreign aid, of our military presence in these countries, how those troops
are paid for ... that could be part of the negotiation.” With respect to a
potential change to the Tariff Order with respect to South Korea, the
President wrote: “I just had a great call with the Acting President of South
Korea. We talked about their tremendous and unsustainable Surplus,
Page 31 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 32 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 32 of 38
Tariffs, Shipbuilding, large scale purchase of U.S. LNG, their joint
venture in an Alaska Pipeline, and payment for the big time Military
Protection we provide to South Korea….”
d.
The President’s suspension of the country-specific tariffs underscores the
lack of nexus between the purported economic threats the Worldwide
Tariff Order identifies and the tariffs it imposes.
.
Plaintiff States have a non-statutory right of action to enjoin and declare unlawful
official action that is unconstitutional and ultra vires..
The IEEPA Tariff Orders are not authorized by the IEEPA or any other statute.
As such, they are ultra vires and unlawful..
Further, because the President lacks statutory authority to impose the tariffs in the
IEEPA Tariff Orders, the IEEPA Tariff Orders are an exercise of Congressional authority in
violation of separation of powers.
Count II
No statutory authority — 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C)
(Against U.S. Customs and Border Protection).
The Plaintiff States incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the
preceding paragraphs..
U.S. Customs and Border Protection is an “agency” under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)..
The Customs and Border Protection’s Cargo Systems Messaging Service (CSMS)
# 64297449 - Guidance: Additional Duties on Imports from Canada (as amended by CSMS #, CSMS # 64514918, and CSMS # 64336037), CSMS # 64297292 – Guidance:
Additional Duties on Imports from Mexico (as amended by CSMS # 64335789), and CSMS # – Updated Guidance – Reciprocal Tariffs – Increase in Rate for China and Reversion
of Other Country-Specific Rates, Effective April 10, 2025 (each, a “Guidance”) are each a final
Page 32 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 33 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 33 of 38
agency action subject to review under the APA. Each Guidance marks the consummation of its
decision-making process because it announces the agency’s implementation of the IEEPA Tariff
Orders..
Each Guidance is an action by which rights or obligations have been determined
or from which legal consequences will flow because it immediately changes tariffs rates charged
at importation..
Each Guidance implements a series of tariffs that are without statutory
authorization and are contrary to law. See Count I, above..
The APA requires that a court “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be … in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C)..
Plaintiff States are also entitled to vacatur of each Guidance under 5 U.S.C. § 706,
all appropriate preliminary relief under 5 U.S.C. § 705, and a preliminary and permanent
injunction preventing U.S. Customs and Border Protection from implementing each Guidance.
Count III
Arbitrary and Capricious — 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(Against U.S. Customs and Border Protection).
The Plaintiff States incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the
preceding paragraphs..
U.S. Customs and Border Protection is an “agency” under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)..
The Customs and Border Protection’s Cargo Systems Messaging Service (CSMS)
# 64297449 - Guidance: Additional Duties on Imports from Canada (as amended by CSMS #, CSMS # 64514918, and CSMS # 64336037), CSMS # 64297292 – Guidance:
Additional Duties on Imports from Mexico (as amended by CSMS # 64335789), and CSMS # – Updated Guidance – Reciprocal Tariffs – Increase in Rate for China and Reversion
Page 33 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 34 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 34 of 38
of Other Country-Specific Rates, Effective April 10, 2025 (each, a “Guidance”) are each a final
agency action subject to review under the APA. Each Guidance marks the consummation of its
decision-making process because it announces the agency’s implementation of the IEEPA Tariff
Orders..
Each Guidance is an action by which rights or obligations have been determined
or from which legal consequences will flow because it immediately changes tariffs rates charged
at importation..
The APA requires that a court “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.” 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)..
Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency has “relied on factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983)..
Each Guidance is arbitrary and capricious because it relies on factors unrelated to
an “unusual and extraordinary threat” as required under IEEPA, it fails to consider the economic
consequences of the imposition of tariffs, and is implausible and counter to the evidence..
Plaintiff States are also entitled to vacatur of each Guidance under 5 U.S.C. § 706,
all appropriate preliminary relief under 5 U.S.C. § 705, and a preliminary and permanent
injunction preventing U.S. Customs and Border Protection from implementing each Guidance.
Page 34 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 35 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 35 of 38
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff States pray that the Court:
a.
Declare that the IEEPA Tariff Orders, as amended, are ultra vires and
contrary to law;
b.
Hold unlawful and set aside the Customs and Border Protection’s Cargo
Systems Messaging Service (CSMS) # 64297449 - Guidance: Additional Duties on
Imports from Canada (as amended by CSMS # 64472173, CSMS # 64514918, and
CSMS # 64336037), CSMS # 64297292 – Guidance: Additional Duties on Imports from
Mexico (as amended by CSMS # 64335789), and CSMS # 64701128 – Updated
Guidance – Reciprocal Tariffs – Increase in Rate for China and Reversion of Other
Country-Specific Rates, Effective April 10, 2025;
c.
Preliminarily and permanently enjoin Secretary Noem, Acting
Commissioner Flores, the Defendant agencies, their agents, and anyone acting in concert
or participation with them from implementing, instituting, maintaining, or giving effect to
(i) the IEEPA Tariff Orders, as amended, and (ii) U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s
Cargo Systems Messaging Service (CSMS) # 64297449 (issued March 3, 2025), CSMS # (issued March 6, 2025), CSMS # 64297292 (issued March 3, 2025), CSMS # (issued March 6, 2025), CSMS # 64299816 (issued March 3, 2025), CSMS # (issued April 10, 2025), and CSMS # 64724565 (issued April 11, 2025), by
entering an order consistent with the constitutional requirement that “all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States,” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1;
Page 35 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 36 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
d.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 36 of 38
Award the Plaintiffs States’ costs of suit and reasonable attorneys’ fees
and expenses under any applicable law; and
e.
Award such additional relief as the interests of justice may require.
DATED: April 23, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
DAN RAYFIELD
Attorney General
State of Oregon
KRISTIN K. MAYES
Attorney General
State of Arizona
By: /s/ Brian Simmonds Marshall
Benjamin Gutman
Solicitor General
Dustin Buehler
Special Counsel
Brian Simmonds Marshall
Christopher A. Perdue*
Nina R. Englander*
Senior Assistant Attorneys General
YoungWoo Joh**
Alexander C. Jones*
Assistant Attorneys General
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
Tel (971) 673-1880
Fax (971) 673-5000
Brian.S.Marshall@doj.oregon.gov
Chris.Perdue@doj.oregon.gov
Nina.Englander@doj.oregon.gov
YoungWoo.Joh@doj.oregon.gov
Alex.Jones@doj.oregon.gov
By: /s/ Syreeta A. Tyrell
Joshua D. Bendor*
Solicitor General
Syreeta A. Tyrell*
Assistant Attorney General North Central Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Phone: (602) 542-8310
Joshua.Bendor@azag.gov
Syreeta.Tyrell@azag.gov
ACL@azag.gov
Attorneys for the State of Arizona
Attorneys for the State of Oregon
Page 36 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 37 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 37 of 38
KEITH ELLISON
Attorney General
State of Minnesota
PHILIP J. WEISER
Attorney General
State of Colorado
By: /s/ Pete Farrell
Peter J. Farrell*
Deputy Solicitor General Minnesota Street, Suite 600
St. Paul, Minnesota, 55101
(651) 757-1424
Peter.Farrell@ag.state.mn.us
By: /s/ Sarah H. Weiss
Sarah H. Weiss*
Senior Assistant Attorney General Broadway, #10
Denver, CO 80203
(720) 508-6000
Sarah.Weiss@coag.gov
Attorneys for the State of
Minnesota
Attorneys for the State of Colorado
AARON D. FORD
Attorney General
State of Nevada
WILLIAM TONG
Attorney General
State of Connecticut
By: /s/ Heidi Parry Stern
Heidi Parry Stern*
Solicitor General
Office of the Nevada Attorney
General State of Nevada Way, Ste. 100
Las Vegas, NV 89119
HStern@ag.nv.gov
By: /s/ Michael K. Skold
Michael K. Skold*
Solicitor General Capitol Ave
Hartford, CT 06106
(860) 808-5020
Michael.skold@ct.gov
Attorneys for the State of Nevada
Attorneys for the State of Connecticut
KATHLEEN JENNINGS
Attorney General
State of Delaware
RAÚL TORREZ
Attorney General
State of New Mexico
By: /s/ Ian R. Liston
Ian R. Liston*
Director of Impact Litigation
Vanessa L. Kassab*
Deputy Attorney General
Delaware Department of Justice N. French Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
(302) 683-8899
vanessa.kassab@delaware.gov
By: /s/ James W. Grayson
James W. Grayson*
Chief Deputy Attorney General
New Mexico Department of Justice
P.O. Drawer 1508
Santa Fe, NM 87504-1508
(505) 490-4060
jgrayson@nmdoj.gov
Attorneys for the State of New Mexico
Attorneys for the State of Delaware
Page 37 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 38 Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 38 of 38
KWAME RAOUL
Attorney General
State of Illinois
LETITIA JAMES
Attorney General
State of New York
By: /s/ Gretchen Helfrich
Cara Hendrickson*
Assistant Chief Deputy Attorney General
Gretchen Helfrich*
Deputy Chief, Special Litigation Bureau
Office of the Illinois Attorney General South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60603
Tel. (312) 814-3000
Cara.Hendrickson@ilag.gov
Gretchen.helfrich@ilag.gov
By: /s/ Rabia Muqaddam
Rabia Muqaddam*
Special Counsel for Federal
Initiatives Liberty St.
New York, NY 10005
(929) 638-0447
rabia.muqaddam@ag.ny.gov
Attorneys for the State of New York
Attorneys for the State of Illinois
AARON M. FREY
Attorney General
State of Maine
CHARITY R. CLARK
Attorney General
State of Vermont
By: /s/ Vivian A. Mikhail
Vivian A. Mikhail*
Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Maine Attorney General State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333-0006
(207) 626-8800
Vivian.mikhail@maine.gov
By: /s/ Ryan P. Kane
Ryan P. Kane*
Deputy Solicitor General State Street
Montpelier, VT 05609
(802) 828-2153
Ryan.kane@vermont.gov
Attorneys for the State of Maine
Attorneys for the State of Vermont
* Admission application forthcoming
** Admission application pending
Page 38 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000Page 39
PDF Page 1
PlainSite Cover Page
PDF Page 2
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 1 of 38
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
THE STATE OF OREGON, THE STATE OF
ARIZONA, THE STATE OF COLORADO,
THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, THE
STATE OF DELAWARE, THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS, THE STATE OF MAINE, THE
STATE OF MINNESOTA, THE STATE OF
NEVADA, THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, and THE
STATE OF VERMONT,
Case No. 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
COMPLAINT
THREE-JUDGE COURT REQUESTED
Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his capacity as
President of the United States;
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; KRISTI NOEM, in her official
capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security; UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION;
PETER R. FLORES, in his official capacity as
Acting Commissioner for U.S. Customs and
Border Protection; and THE UNITED
STATES,
Defendants.
I.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution assigns to Congress, not the President, the “Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.” Art. I, § 8. Yet over the last three months, the
President has imposed, modified, escalated, and suspended tariffs by executive order,
memoranda, social media post, and agency decree. These edicts reflect a national trade policy
that now hinges on the President’s whims rather than the sound exercise of his lawful authority.
By claiming the authority to impose immense and ever-changing tariffs on whatever goods
entering the United States he chooses, for whatever reason he finds convenient to declare an
emergency, the President has upended the constitutional order and brought chaos to the
American economy.
Page 1 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 3
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
2.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 2 of 38
The President has no authority to arbitrarily impose tariffs as he has done here.
The text and history of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)—the statute
the President has invoked for the most damaging of his tariffs—confirm that the President cannot
impose such tariffs under that law. And even if it did, it would not allow the worldwide tariffs he
has imposed, which were not a response to an emergency as IEEPA defines it and have no nexus
to the circumstances that purported to justify them.
3.
Because these tariffs are unlawful, this Court should declare that they are not in
force, enjoin the Defendant agencies and officers from enforcing them, and vacate the agency
actions implementing them.
II.
A.
PARTIES
Plaintiff States
4.
The State of Oregon is a sovereign state of the United States. Oregon is
represented by Attorney General Dan Rayfield. The Attorney General is the chief legal officer of
Oregon and is authorized to institute this action.
5.
The State of Arizona is a sovereign state of the United States. Arizona is
represented by Attorney General Kris Mayes. The Attorney General is Arizona’s chief law
enforcement officer and is authorized to institute this action.
6.
The State of Colorado is a sovereign state in the United States. Colorado is
represented by Phil Weiser, the Attorney General of Colorado. The Attorney General acts as the
chief legal representative of the state and is authorized by Colo Rev. Stat. § 24-31-101 to pursue
this action.
7.
The State of Connecticut is a sovereign state of the United States. Connecticut is
represented by and through its chief legal officer, Attorney General William Tong, who is
authorized under General Statutes § 3-125 to pursue this action on behalf of the State of
Connecticut.
Page 2 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 4
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
8.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 3 of 38
The State of Delaware is a sovereign state of the United States. Delaware is
represented by and through its Attorney General, Kathleen Jennings. The Attorney General is
Delaware’s chief law enforcement officer and is authorized to pursue this action pursuant to 29
Del. C. § 2504.
9.
The State of Illinois is a sovereign state of the United States. Illinois is
represented by Attorney General Kwame Raoul. The Attorney General is Illinois’s chief law
enforcement officer and is authorized to institute this action. See Ill. Const. art. V, § 15; 15 ILCS
205/4.
10.
The State of Maine is a sovereign state of the United States. Maine is represented
by Attorney General Aaron Frey. The Attorney General is Maine’s chief law enforcement officer
and is authorized to institute this action pursuant to 5 Me. Rev. Stat. § 191.
11.
The State of Minnesota is a sovereign state of the United States. Minnesota is
represented by and through its chief legal officer, Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison,
who has common law and statutory authority to sue on Minnesota’s behalf.
12.
The State of Nevada, represented by and through Attorney General Aaron D.
Ford, is a sovereign State within the United States. The Attorney General is the chief law
enforcement of the State of Nevada and is authorized to pursue this action under Nev. Rev. Stat.
228.110 and Nev. Rev. Stat. 228.170.
13.
The State of New Mexico is a sovereign state in the United States. New Mexico is
represented by Attorney General Raúl Torrez, who is the chief law enforcement officer of New
Mexico authorized by N.M. Stat. Ann. § 8-5-2 to pursue this action.
14.
The State of New York is a sovereign state in the United States. New York is
represented by Attorney General Letitia James, who is the chief law enforcement officer of New
York.
Page 3 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 5
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
15.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 4 of 38
The State of Vermont is a sovereign state of the United States. Vermont is
represented by Attorney General Charity Clark. The Attorney General is the chief legal officer of
Vermont and is authorized to institute this action.
B.
Federal Defendants
16.
Donald Trump is President of the United States. He is sued in his official capacity
for declaratory relief only.
17.
The Department of Homeland Security is an agency of the United States federal
government.
18.
Kristi Noem is Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. She is sued in
her official capacity.
19.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection is an agency of the United States federal
government and a component of the Department of Homeland Security.
20.
Pete R. Flores is the Acting Commissioner for U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. He is sued in his official capacity.
21.
The United States is a statutory defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1581. That statute
also waives the United States’ sovereign immunity. See Humane Soc. of U.S. v. Clinton, 236
F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
III.
JURISDICTION
22.
This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(1).
23.
The Plaintiff States request the Chief Judge of this Court designate three judges
“to hear and determine” this action because it “(1) raises an issue of the constitutionality of an
Act of Congress, a proclamation of the President or an Executive order;” and “(2) has broad or
significant implications in the administration or interpretation of the customs laws.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 255.
Page 4 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 6
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
IV.
A.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 5 of 38
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress’s tariff powers
24.
The U.S. Constitution provides: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States….” Art. I, § 8.
25.
Congress has exercised this authority by providing an extensive statutory structure
for “Duties, Imposts and Excises” on imports to the United States, which are codified in Title 19
of the U.S. Code.
26.
For most of the nation’s history, Congress directly legislated tariffs.
27.
After the disastrous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which contributed to the
Great Depression, Congress moved to create a two-part structure for the nation’s tariffs.
Congress delegated to the President the authority to negotiate agreements with foreign countries
that would reduce the United States’ tariffs in exchange for reductions in other nations’ tariffs.
Today, the United States is party to more than a dozen such trade agreements that set limited
U.S. tariffs. Congress has passed legislation consenting to and implementing these agreements as
a matter of federal law. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. ch. 22 (implementing the Uruguay Round
Agreements); 19 U.S.C. ch. 26 (implementing the Dominican Republic-Central America Free
Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”)); 19 U.S.C. ch. 29 (implementing the United States-MexicoCanada Agreement (“USMCA”)).
28.
Congress has authorized the President to raise duties, more commonly called
tariffs, in specific circumstances. For example, the Executive Branch may impose
“countervailing duties” when “the government of a country or any public entity within the
territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable subsidy” of a product
imported in the United States in a manner that injures a domestic industry. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a).
To impose such tariffs, however, an agency must investigate and enter a “final determination of
Page 5 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 7
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 6 of 38
whether or not a countervailable subsidy is being provided with respect to the subject
merchandise,” 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(a)(1), among other findings.
29.
Similar prerequisites are required to impose antidumping tariffs, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673, et seq.; to institute tariffs to address threats to national security, 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)–(c)
(Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962); to impose tariffs to protect domestic
industries, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974); to institute tariffs to
respond to violations of international trade agreements, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411–2420 (Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974); and to impose a “temporary import surcharge” to “deal with large and
serious United States balance-of-payments deficits,” 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a)(1) (Section 122(a) of
the Trade Act of 1974).
30.
In addition to requiring a finding of certain facts before imposing tariffs, Congress
also limited the duration and manner of tariffs imposed under each of these statutes. See, e.g., 19
U.S.C. § 1675(a) (requiring annual review of antidumping and countervailing duty orders); 19
U.S.C. § 2132(a)(3) & (d) (limiting tariffs or other import measures to 150 days and requiring
that they be nondiscriminatory). Together, the factual predicates, procedural requirements, and
substantive limits established by these statutes ensure that Congress retains control over its
“Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and
prevents the President from exercising this power arbitrarily.
31.
None of these prerequisites to impose congressionally authorized tariffs has been
met, and the tariffs challenged here do not purport to rest on any of these statutory authorities.
Instead, the President relies on IEEPA as the sole substantive legal authority for his orders.
B.
IEEPA was enacted to restrain the President’s powers, not enlarge them.
32.
Congress enacted IEEPA five decades ago with the goal of restraining the
President’s emergency powers that were frequently invoked and abused in the preceding
decades. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-459, at 3–9 (1977).
Page 6 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 8
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
33.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 7 of 38
By the 1970s, Congress had grown troubled with the proliferation of emergency
declarations under laws like the Trading with the Enemies Act (TWEA). Such laws were
originally intended to lend the President special or heightened powers during times of crisis but
were ultimately used as shortcuts around peacetime constraints on the President’s powers.
Congress recognized that the exception threatened to swallow the rule. As one House report on
efforts to reform TWEA noted, TWEA bestowed upon the President “essentially an unlimited
grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the
domestic and international economic arena, without congressional review.” H.R. Rep. No. 95459, at 7 (1977).
34.
One reform Congress made to curb the President’s emergency powers was to
restrict TWEA to its original purpose, limiting its application to “time[s] of war.” 50 U.S.C.
§ 4305(b)(1). At the same time, Congress enacted IEEPA, which allowed the President to
regulate imports and exports in response to certain non-wartime emergencies, while stressing
that the triggering event had to be an “unusual and extraordinary threat.” 50 U.S.C. § 1701
(emphasis added). Thus, it is not enough that the President declare a national emergency under
the National Emergencies Act (NEA); only those arising from unusual and extraordinary threats
originating “in whole or substantial part outside the United States” unlock IEEPA’s grant of
powers. Id. Congress also subjected the President’s authority under IEEPA to reporting
requirements and reserved for itself the ability to terminate declared emergencies by joint
resolution. 50 U.S.C. § 1706.
35.
The powers set forth in IEEPA do not expressly include imposing or collecting
tariffs. Rather, the President is empowered to:
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit—
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to
any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or
Page 7 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 9
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 8 of 38
payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a
national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities,
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States;
(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation,
regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or
exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or
transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country
or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect
to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States….
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1). The President has additional authority to confiscate property “when the
United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country or foreign
nationals….” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C).
36.
Not once has any other President used IEEPA to impose tariffs. In the nearly five
decades since IEEPA was enacted, no other President has imposed tariffs based on the existence
of any national emergency, despite global anti-narcotics campaigns spearheaded by the United
States and longstanding trade deficits. United States v. Yoshida Int’l, 526 F.2d 560, 576 (Cust. &
Pat. App. 1975), held that similar language in TWEA authorized the imposition of a limited
import duty surcharge, but that case does not take into account subsequent actions by Congress
to rein in the President’s authority, as explained above. And Yoshida made clear that even under
TWEA the President lacks authority to impose a surcharge “not reasonably related to the
emergency declared.” Id. at 577.
Page 8 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 10
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
37.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 9 of 38
Even in light of Yoshida, there is reason to believe that IEEPA does not authorize
tariffs. Tariffs on products are not currency exchanges or banking transactions, so subsection
(a)(1)(A) should not apply. Subsection (a)(1)(B), which gives the President the power to
“regulate,” should not authorize the challenged tariffs either because the regulation of imports is
not synonymous with and does not include the power to impose tariffs on imports.
38.
Section 1702(a)(1)(B) allows the President to “investigate, block during the
pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit”
transactions involving the property of a foreign country or national. This is the language of
embargoes and sanctions (which is what IEEPA has consistently been used for), and interpreting
“regulate” to mean “ad valorem duty” would be incongruous with the context in which it
appears. See McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550, 569 (2016) (“Under the familiar
interpretive canon noscitur a sociis, ‘a word is known by the company it keeps.’”) (citation
omitted). IEEPA is designed to give the President appropriate powers to respond if a hostile
power were importing items into the United States for nefarious purposes. It is not clear why
under IEEPA that should continue upon payment of an appropriate duty.
39.
It is also noteworthy that IEEPA, in § 1702(a)(1)(B), envisions the President
“regulat[ing]” both imports and exports under its authority. Because the export clause of the
Constitution, Art. I, § 9, cl. 5, expressly prohibits imposing duties on exports, interpreting
“regulate” to mean “impose a duty” would create a facial, and unnecessary, tension with the
Constitution. The more natural reading of the statute is that Congress never intended it to be used
for tariffs. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237 (1998) (statutes “must be
construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but
also grave doubts upon that score”) (internal quotations omitted).
40.
Even assuming IEEPA does authorize some tariffs when there is an “unusual and
extraordinary threat,” 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (emphasis added), President Trump’s unilateral
imposition of his tariffs invoking IEEPA are aberrations that fly in the face of history and the
Page 9 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 11
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 10 of 38
legislative text. The novelty of citing IEEPA for the carte blanche tariff authority the President
has exercised is itself good reason to treat these Orders with suspicion. See Util. Air Reg. Grp. v.
EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (when the executive branch claims “an unheralded power” to
regulate ‘a significant portion of the American economy’” courts greet such announcements with
skepticism because they “expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency
decisions of vast economic and political significance.” (citations omitted)).
41.
The powers explicitly set forth by IEEPA “may only be exercised to deal with an
unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared
for purposes of this chapter and may not be exercised for any other purpose.” 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701(b).
C.
The IEEPA Tariff Orders
42.
Since February 1, 2025, President Trump has issued a flurry of executive orders
imposing sweeping tariffs, interspersed with other orders and memoranda modifying,
suspending, and clarifying some of the tariffs he just imposed. The President purported to rely on
IEEPA emergency powers as the substantive authority to impose all the tariffs described below.
These tariffs—defined below as the Canada Tariff Order, the Mexico Tariff Order, the China
Tariff Order, and the Worldwide Tariff Order, each as amended—are herein collectively referred
to as “IEEPA Tariff Orders.”
43.
The preambles to the IEEPA Tariff Orders also cite other statutes, specifically the
NEA, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.; section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2483; and 3 U.S.C. § 301. However, none of those statutes grants the President substantive
authority: the NEA governs procedures for declaring and ending emergencies but not substantive
emergency powers; section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, requires the President to
memorialize import duties in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States but does not
provide substantive authority to impose tariffs; and 3 U.S.C. § 301 allows the President to
Page 10 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 12
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 11 of 38
delegate powers within the Executive Branch. None of the cited statutes authorizes the President
to impose tariffs.
i.
The Canada Tariff Order
44.
On February 1, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14193, 90 Fed.
Reg. 9113 (“Canada Tariff Order”), entitled Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit
Drugs Across Our Northern Border. The Canada Tariff Order imposed an additional 10 percent
tariff on energy imports and an additional 25 percent tariff on most other imports from Canada.
45.
The Canada Tariff Order relies only on IEEPA as the basis for its substantive
authority to unilaterally institute these sweeping changes to U.S. trade policy toward Canada.
46.
The President’s claim of emergency powers was based on “the threat to the safety
and security of Americans, including the public health crisis of deaths due to the use of fentanyl
and other illicit drugs, and the failure of Canada to do more to arrest, seize, detain, or otherwise
intercept [drug trafficking organizations], other drug and human traffickers, criminals at large,
and drugs.” Canada Tariff Order § 1.
47.
The Plaintiff States agree that the fentanyl crisis requires urgent government
action, but the imposition of tariffs is neither an effective nor a lawful response to that crisis. The
Canada Tariff Order lacks any rationale for the tariff rates imposed and bears no relationship
between the goods subject to the Order and the claimed emergency.
ii.
The Mexico Tariff Order
48.
On February 1, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14194, 90 Fed.
Reg. 9117 (“Mexico Tariff Order”), entitled Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our
Southern Border. The Mexico Tariff Order imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on the import
of goods from Mexico.
49.
The Mexico Tariff Order relies only on IEEPA as the basis for its substantive
authority to unilaterally institute these sweeping changes to U.S. trade policy toward Mexico.
Page 11 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 13
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
50.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 12 of 38
The President’s claim of emergency powers was based on “the grave threat to the
United States posed by the influx of illegal aliens and illicit drugs into the United States” and
“the failure of Mexico to arrest, seize, detain, or otherwise intercept [drug trafficking
organizations], other drug and human traffickers, criminals at large, and illicit drugs.” Mexico
Tariff Order § 1.
51.
As with the Canada Tariff Order, the President provided no justification for which
goods would be subject to the Mexico Tariff Order or why he had chosen a 25 percent tariff rate.
iii.
52.
The China Tariff Order
On February 1, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14195, 90 Fed.
Reg. 9121 (“China Tariff Order”), entitled Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our
Southern Border. The China Tariff Order imposed an additional 10 percent tariff on the import of
most goods from China.
53.
The China Tariff Order relies only on IEEPA as the basis for its substantive
authority to unilaterally institute these sweeping changes to U.S. trade policy toward China.
54.
The President’s claim of emergency powers was based on “the grave threat to the
United States posed by the influx of illegal aliens and illicit drugs into the United States” and
“the failure of the [People’s Republic of China] government to arrest, seize, detain, or otherwise
intercept chemical precursor suppliers, money launderers, other [transnational criminal
organizations], criminals at large, and drugs.” China Tariff Order § 1.
55.
And, again, the China Tariff Order contained no rationale for why it was
necessary to tariff all products of China, or why the President had chosen 10 percent as the tariff
rate, departing from the already unexplained 25 percent rate he had imposed on Mexico and
Canada.
iv.
The Worldwide Tariff Order
56.
On April 2, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14257, 90 Fed. Reg.
15041 (“Worldwide Tariff Order”), entitled Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to
Page 12 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 14
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 13 of 38
Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods
Trade Deficits. The Worldwide Tariff Order imposed a 10% baseline tariff on nearly all imports
to the United States, effective April 5, and additional “reciprocal” tariffs on 57 countries,
effective April 9 (Annex I). The President revised the additional “reciprocal” tariffs in Annex I
on April 3.
57.
The Worldwide Tariff Order relies only on IEEPA as the basis for its substantive
authority to unilaterally institute these sweeping changes to the trade policy of the United States.
58.
A few years before Congress enacted IEEPA, Congress also enacted Section 122
of the Trade Act of 1974 to give the President explicit power to impose tariffs (temporary import
surcharges) in response to balance-of-payments issues but then chose to omit the express power
to tariff under IEEPA. Although the Worldwide Tariff Order purports to address the “large and
persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits,” it does not rely on Section 122(a) of the Trade Act
of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2132, which expressly contemplates tariffs to address the related concern of
balance-of-payment deficits. That statute provides that “[w]henever fundamental international
payments problems require special import measures to restrict imports” in order “(1) to deal with
large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits[,] (2) to prevent an imminent and
significant depreciation of the dollar in foreign exchange markets, or (3) to cooperate with other
countries in correcting an international balance-of-payments disequilibrium,” the President “shall
proclaim, for a period not exceeding 150 days … a temporary import surcharge, not to exceed 15
percent ad valorem, in the form of duties … on articles imported into the United States ….” 19
U.S.C. § 2132(a). The Worldwide Tariff Order neither relies on this statutory authority nor
abides by its limits on the magnitude and duration of the tariffs it imposes.
59.
In providing tariff powers via Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, much like
with other tariff statutes, Congress included substantive limitations and procedural safeguards
limiting the grant of power to the executive. The President attempts to circumvent these types of
substantive limitations and procedural safeguards by imposing tariffs under IEEPA in a
Page 13 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 15
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 14 of 38
unilateral, unpredictable, and far-reaching manner that is entirely unlawful. His unlawful actions
have in turn caused persistent uncertainty that has resulted in erratic financial markets (see § IV.,
D, below).
60.
In addition, the purported “unusual and extraordinary threats” identified by
President Trump as “national emergencies” do not amount to emergencies. Nor are they
extraordinary or even unusual.
61.
The Worldwide Tariff Order asserts that “U.S. trading partners’ economic policies
… suppress domestic wages and consumption, as indicated by large and persistent annual U.S.
goods trade deficits,” but that does not constitute an “unusual and extraordinary threat” that
would allow the President to invoke IEEPA’s powers. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
62.
As the Worldwide Tariff Order acknowledges, “annual U.S. goods trade deficits”
are “persistent”; thus, by definition, they are not “unusual and extraordinary.” The United States
has run a persistent trade deficit in goods since the 1970s. Similarly, there is no “unusual and
extraordinary” threat to wages or consumption.
63.
The IEEPA Tariff Orders impose, by executive order, the highest tariffs on
imports the country has seen since the 1940s. The baseline 10 percent tariff imposed by the
Worldwide Tariff Order already matches the highest average tariff rates on all imports seen
toward the end of the 1940s. The Worldwide Tariff Orders even impose tariffs on places that are
not involved in international trade, such as the British Indian Ocean Territory, whose only human
inhabitants live on a joint American and British military base on the island of Diego Garcia, and
the Heard and McDonald Islands, which have no known human inhabitants.
64.
Despite being described as “reciprocal” tariffs, the reciprocal tariffs described in
the Worldwide Tariff Order were calculated with the intent of “balanc[ing] bilateral trade deficits
between the U.S. and each of our trading partners.” Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Reciprocal
Tariff Calculations; see also Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Presidential Tariff Actions. The U.S.
Trade Representative has acknowledged that there are “many causes,” including “non-tariff
Page 14 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 16
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 15 of 38
economic fundamentals.” But the U.S. Trade Representative provided no explanation for why
President Trump’s calculation entirely ignores a major driver of trade deficits: relative domestic
purchasing power. In effect, the reciprocal tariff calculation unreasonably ignores that certain
trading partners’ populace simply has less aggregate purchasing power.
65.
The tariffs are also not designed to “deal with” the purported emergencies. The
Administration published its basis for the country-by-country tariff rates. See Office of the
United States Trade Representative, Reciprocal Tariff Calculations. The Administration’s
estimate of a key input of that formula—“the elasticity of import prices with respect to tariffs”—
is a fabrication. The country-by-country tariff rates are based on what the administration claims
as an estimate of “tariff and nontariff barriers” but are in fact a simple ratio of the trade deficit in
goods as a percentage of total U.S. imports from the country arbitrarily subjected to the tariff.
The Administration’s chosen formula is not an accepted methodology for calculating trade
barriers and has no basis in economic theory.
66.
The specific academic work the Administration cites concludes that nearly all of
the cost of tariffs (95%) carries over to domestic purchasers, but the Administration falsely
claims that only 25% of the cost of tariffs is passed through to domestic customers. As the coauthor of the article cited to justify that calculation explained, the Administration’s misstatement
of the evidence results in vastly higher tariff levels than called for by its own methodology. See
Brent Neiman, “The Trump White House Cited My Research to Justify Tariffs. It Got It All
Wrong.” N.Y. Times (Apr. 7, 2025).
67.
The U.S. Trade Representative also provided no explanation justifying setting the
baseline tariff at 10 percent.
68.
The tariffs are also not designed to “deal with” the purported emergencies,
because they are intended, at least in part, to raise revenue. See, e.g., The President’s News
Conference With Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the United Kingdom (Feb. 27, 2025) (“[W]e
Page 15 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 17
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 16 of 38
took in hundreds of billions of dollars [with past tariffs]. . . . [I]t’s going to make our country
rich.”).
69.
The tariffs will depress Americans’ wages by slowing economic growth,
increasing unemployment, and raising inflation. And, instead of reducing threats to Americans’
consumption levels, the tariffs will make the goods that Americans (and the Plaintiff States)
depend on more expensive and scarce.
v.
Delaying and adding exceptions to the Canada and Mexico Tariff Orders
70.
On February 3, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14197, 90 Fed.
Reg. 9183, entitled Progress on the Situation at Our Northern Border, and Executive Order
14198, 90 Fed. Reg. 9185, entitled Progress on the Situation at Our Southern Border. These
executive orders delayed by four weeks implementation of the Canada Tariff Order and the
Mexico Tariff Order, respectively.
71.
On March 6, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14231, 90 Fed. Reg.
11785, entitled Amendment to Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern
Border, and Executive Order 14232, 90 Fed. Reg. 11788, entitled Amendment to Duties To
Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Southern Border. These orders exempted products
originated in Mexico and Canada under the rules of the United States of America, United
Mexican States, and Canada Agreement. The orders also reduced the tariff rates on potash
imports from both countries from 25 percent to 10 percent.
vi.
Increasing the tariffs on imports from China
72.
On March 3, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14228, 90 Fed. Reg.
11463, entitled Further Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in
the People’s Republic of China, which increased the additional tariff on nearly all imports
imposed by the February 1 China Tariff Order from 10 percent to 20 percent. The justification
for this action was his “determin[ation] that the [People’s Republic of China] has not taken
Page 16 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 18
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 17 of 38
adequate steps to alleviate the illicit drug crisis through cooperative enforcement actions, and
that the crisis described in [the China Tariff Order] has not abated.”
73.
On April 2, the Worldwide Tariff Order imposed two additional tariffs on imports
from China: the 10 percent worldwide tariff, plus a 34 percent “reciprocal tariff” (Annex 1). In
aggregate, that raised the overall additional tariffs on nearly all China imports to 64 percent (20
percent from the China Tariff Order, as amended March 3 and April 2, plus 44 percent from the
Worldwide Tariff Order).
74.
On April 8, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14259, 90 Fed. Reg.
15509, entitled Amendment to Reciprocal Tariffs and Updated Duties as Applied to Low-Value
Imports From the People’s Republic of China, which imposed an additional 50 percent tariff on
goods from China under the Worldwide Tariffs Order, raising the total level of tariffs to 114
percent. The President’s justification was that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) imposed a
“34 percent tariff … on all goods imported into the PRC originating from the United States.” “In
[the President’s] judgment, this modification [was] necessary and appropriate to effectively
address the threat to the national security and economy of the United States.”
75.
The next day, April 9, the President again increased the tariffs on imports from
China, issuing Executive Order 14266, 90 Fed. Reg. 15625, entitled Modifying Reciprocal Tariff
Rates to Reflect Trading Partner Retaliation and Alignment. That executive order amended the
Worldwide Tariff Order to increase the tariff on nearly all imports from China another 31
percent, to a total of 145 percent (20 percent from the China Tariff Order, as amended March 3
and April 2, plus 125 percent from the Worldwide Tariff Order). The executive order again
“determined that it is necessary and appropriate to address the national emergency … by
modifying the [Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States] and taking other actions to
increase the duties imposed on the PRC in response to this latest retaliation. In [the President’s]
judgment, this modification [was] necessary and appropriate to effectively address the threat to
U.S. national and economic security posed by the PRC’s contribution to the conditions reflected
Page 17 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 19
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 18 of 38
in large and persistent trade deficits, including PRC industrial policies that have produced
systemic excess manufacturing capacity in the PRC and suppressed U.S. domestic manufacturing
capacity, which conditions are made worse by the PRC’s recent actions.”
76.
The President also changed the administration of tariffs with China by applying
tariffs to even low-value imports that had historically been excluded from duties. On April 2,
2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14256, 90 Fed. Reg. 14899, entitled Further
Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic
of China as Applied to Low-Value Imports, which eliminated the de minimis exclusion on lowvalue imports from China. The President’s April 8 order further changed the rates imposed. On
April 9, Executive Order 14266 further increased the tariff rate for low-value imports to 120
percent, plus $100 per postal item.
vii.
Partially suspending the Worldwide Tariff Order
77.
Executive Order 14266, issued on April 9, also delayed the country-specific
“reciprocal” tariffs listed in Annex 1 of the Worldwide Tariff Order by 90 days (except for those
imposed on China, as described above). Those tariffs are now scheduled to go into effect on
July 9.
78.
The April 9 executive order left in place, however, the 10 percent tariff on nearly
all goods imported worldwide.
viii.
79.
Exempting electronics from the Worldwide Tariff Order
On April 11, 2025, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum entitled
Clarification of Exceptions Under Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, as Amended. That
memorandum “clarified” that the exclusion in the Worldwide Tariff Order for semiconductors
included various other electronic devices, such as smartphones, solid-state storage devices, and
monitors.
Page 18 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 20
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
ix.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 19 of 38
Current tariff rates under the IEEPA Tariff Orders
80.
Currently, the Canada and Mexico Tariff Orders, as amended, provide for a 25
percent additional tariff on imports from Canada and Mexico (except for imports governed by
USMCA, which are subject to no additional tariff, and potash imports from both countries and
energy imports from Canada, which are subject to a 10 percent additional tariff). Currently, the
China Tariff Order and Worldwide Tariff Order, as amended, impose a 145 percent tariff rate for
imports from China (except for electronics, steel, aluminum, automotive, copper,
pharmaceutical, lumber, certain minerals, and energy products, and other products listed in
Annex II of the Worldwide Tariff Order, which are subject only to the 20 percent rate under the
China Tariff Order only). Currently, the Worldwide Tariff Order, as amended, imposes a 10
percent tariff rate for imports from the rest of the world (except for electronics, steel, aluminum,
automotive, copper, pharmaceutical, lumber, certain minerals, and energy products, and other
products listed in Annex II of the Worldwide Tariff Order, which are not tariffed under the
order).
81.
Under the Worldwide Tariff Order, as amended by Executive Order 14266, 90
Fed. Reg. 15625 (Apr. 9, 2025), the Worldwide Tariff Order will impose additional tariffs on 56
trading partners on July 9.
82.
Under the Administration’s interpretation of IEEPA, the President can change
these tariff policies at any time without notice.
D.
Collection and enforcement under the IEEPA Tariff Orders
83.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection is responsible for the collection of tariffs.
6 U.S.C. §§ 211(c)(4), 215(1); 19 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(A). To facilitate the collection of tariffs,
Customs and Border Protection uses its Cargo Systems Messaging Service to inform importers
of changes to the amount and administration of import duties. The guidance incorporates and
imposes the current duties imposed under the IEEPA Tariff Orders.
Page 19 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 21
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
84.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 20 of 38
Customs and Border Protection enforces the Canada Tariff Order under CSMS #
64297449 - GUIDANCE: Additional Duties on Imports from Canada (issued March 3, 2025),
and CSMS # 64336037 - GUIDANCE – Update on Additional Duties on Imports from Canada –
USMCA Qualifying Products and Potash (issued March 6, 2025).
85.
Customs and Border Protection enforces the Mexico Tariff Order under CSMS #
64297292 – Guidance: Additional Duties on Imports from Mexico (issued March 3, 2025), and
CSMS # 64335789 - GUIDANCE – Update on Additional Duties on Imports from Mexico USMCA Qualifying Products and Potash (issued March 6, 2025).
86.
Customs and Border Protection enforces the China Tariff Order under CSMS #
64299816 - UPDATE – Additional Duties on Imports from China and Hong Kong (issued March
3, 2025).
87.
Customs and Border Protection enforces the Worldwide Tariff Order under
CSMS # 64701128 - UPDATED GUIDANCE – Reciprocal Tariffs – Increase in Rate for China
and Reversion of Other Country-Specific Rates, Effective April 10, 2025 (issued April 10,
2025), and CSMS # 64724565 - UPDATED GUIDANCE – Reciprocal Tariff Exclusion for
Specified Products; April 5, 2025 Effective Date (issued April 11, 2025).
88.
IEEPA establishes civil and criminal penalties, including up to 20 years in prison,
for a violation or attempted violation of an order or regulation issued under its statutory
authority. 50 U.S.C. § 1705.
E.
The IEEPA Tariff Orders’ economic destruction
89.
President Trump has chosen to wield IEEPA to impose tariffs on the world at his
whim, muddled by threats, additions, exceptions, exemptions, and pauses. The direct
consequence has been an erratic financial market and a destabilized U.S. and global economy.
90.
The IEEPA Tariff Orders will cause a substantial increase in prices for goods
within the Plaintiff States and throughout the United States. The U.S. Trade Representative’s
methodology for calculating the size of the “reciprocal” tariffs assumes that 25 percent of the
Page 20 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 22
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 21 of 38
tariffs will be passed on as increases to retail prices on the tariffed goods, and the studies that
USTR’s analysis cites conclude that the actual figure is 95 percent. The overwhelming consensus
of economists is that these price increases will lead to significant inflation and risk recession.
91.
The immediate impact of these predictions can be seen in the capital markets.
Between March 3 and April 8, 2025, the S&P 500 lost about 850 points (a 14.5 percent drop),
and the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost just over 5,500 points (a 13 percent drop). A
substantial majority of those losses from March 3 to April 8—between 70 to 90 precent—
occurred after the date of the Worldwide Tariff Order. Between April 2, and April 8, the S&P
500 lost almost 700 points (a 12 percent drop), and the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost about
4600 points (an 11 percent drop).
92.
The effect on the market of the President’s partial suspension of the Worldwide
Tariff Order further demonstrates the causal relationship. Following the President’s
announcement that he would suspend the country-specific tariffs for 90 days, the markets
partially recovered. On April 9, the S&P 500 recovered by about 480 points, a 9.5 percent gain
from April 8 but still down 10 percent from January 21. Likewise, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average recovered by about 3,000 points, an 8 percent gain from April 8 but still down 8 percent
from January 21.
93.
The market losses are primarily attributable to the IEEPA Tariff Orders. Trade
organization publications, expert commentary, and news reporting is replete with evidence that
the market losses are largely a reaction to the President’s threatened and imposed tariffs.
V.
A.
THE PLAINTIFF STATES’ INTERESTS
The Plaintiff States will have increased costs when purchasing necessary equipment
and supplies essential to their economies.
94.
The Plaintiff States provide a wide range of public services to their residents and
visitors. Essential to the provision of those services is the purchase of equipment, supplies, and
parts, many of which are imported from other countries. Other products are manufactured in the
Page 21 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 23
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 22 of 38
United States but contain components that are imported from other countries. Because tariffs
directly impact the costs of these products, they cause direct financial harm to the Plaintiff
States.
95.
For example, the University of Oregon and Oregon State University are public
research universities that purchase an array of items to provide educational opportunities for their
students and to produce high quality research. The University of Oregon and Oregon State
University are two of Oregon’s seven public universities established by Or. Rev. Stat. § 352.002,
each of which is “a governmental entity performing governmental functions and exercising
governmental powers.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 352.033. Among other things, the State of Oregon’s
public universities act for the State of Oregon by ensuring access and affordability to education,
fostering an informed citizenry, and creating original knowledge and advancing innovation. See,
e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 352.039, 350.001, 350.005, 350.009.
96.
Among the array of items that the University of Oregon purchases is specialized
equipment for scientific research. Because specialized equipment must meet particular
specifications and standards for the research group, it is often only reasonably available from a
few sources, which are all foreign. Purchasing specialized equipment also often requires an order
date several months in advance of delivery. To mitigate the risk of unexpected import costs,
purchase-order terms frequently include a term allowing the vendor to make price adjustments
before delivery.
97.
That has already occurred. On November 8, 2024, the University of Oregon
purchased a cryogenic single-photon counting detector system from ID Quantique, Inc., for its
Center of Optics. At that time, the purchase price was $182,733. IDQ shipped the cryogenic
system from Switzerland on April 8. At that time, the additional “reciprocal” tariff scheduled to
go into effect for imports from Switzerland was 31 percent. The system arrived after the
announced pause, resulting in the lower—but still substantial—10 percent worldwide tariff
collected at the port by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. As a result of that additional tariff,
Page 22 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 24
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 23 of 38
the customs broker required the University of Oregon to pay an additional $18,579 before it
would deliver the cryogenic system.
98.
That is only one example of purchases that are awaiting shipment. If left in place,
the unlawful IEEPA Tariff Orders will increase the cost of each purchase by, at minimum, an
additional 10 percent imposing financial harm to the State of Oregon through the University of
Oregon.
99.
Among other goods, Oregon State University purchases scientific supplies for use
by its students and researchers. Oregon State University’s vendor for these supplies notified
Oregon State University that because of the U.S. Government’s tariffs on materials imported
from China, as well as a tariff on imported steel and aluminum, the vendor was forced to
implement a surcharge of 2.3% on products. The cost of this surcharge is passed on directly to
Oregon State University. Other vendors are also passing along costs of the IEEPA Tariff Orders
to Oregon State University. These surcharges and cost increases have a direct adverse impact on
Oregon State University and, in turn, impose financial harm to the State of Oregon.
100.
Another example is the cost of testing kits purchased by the Oregon Health &
Sciences University. OHSU is a public corporation that performs functions and services for the
benefit of the State of Oregon. It is a “governmental entity performing governmental functions
and exercising governmental powers.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 353.020. Its purpose is to serve the people
of Oregon by “providing education in health, science, [and] engineering”; “[c]onduct[ing]
research in health care, engineering, biomedical sciences, and general sciences”; and provide and
support healthcare throughout the state. Or. Rev. Stat. § 353.030.
101.
OHSU’s pharmacy partner has already seen a 20 percent increase in the price of
testing kits, due to both existing and impending tariffs. OHSU reasonably expects the pharmacy
partner to pass those costs on to OHSU. Because OHSU requires testing kits on a monthly basis,
these tariff impacts will be recurring so long as Tariff Orders—and the continued threatening of
tariffs—remain in place.
Page 23 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 25
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
102.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 24 of 38
The Oregon Department of Transportation is a state agency that provides service,
builds infrastructure, and maintains equipment to further transportation safety and efficiency. Or.
Rev. Stat. § 184.615. For that purpose, ODOT has a long-term contract with URS Electronics for
the purchase of traffic video surveillance equipment. On April 16, 2025, URS Electronics
informed ODOT that one of its vendors, Bosch Security division, “announced a 7.9% across the
board price increase that will go into effect on May 1st, to help offset some of their cost
increases experienced due to current federal government trade policies.” Those vendor-price
increases will be passed on to ODOT, harming ODOT with increased operations costs for the
foreseeable future.
103.
The Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT) has a long list of
procurement contracts for the purchase of equipment, supplies, or parts, many of which are
imported from other countries or have component parts imported from other countries. The
tariffs are already increasing costs for ADOT. Notably, on March 14, 2025, one contractor
requested a price increase, citing the increased duty cost stated “in Executive Order 14228 of
March 3, 2025.”
104.
Arizona’s universities are also directly harmed by the tariffs imposed pursuant to
the IEEPA Tariff Orders. For example, Arizona State University, the largest public university in
the country, conducts research of national significance that depends on its ability to source
specialized equipment not available from domestic sources. Using just one project as an
exemplar, the SHIELD USA program spearheaded by Arizona State University faces the
prospect of up to $1.4 million in increased costs from fully implemented tariffs. This would be
especially counterproductive as SHIELD USA aims to drive innovation in the domestic
microchip packaging ecosystem, expand capacity for domestic advanced packaging, and help to
regain U.S leadership in microelectronics while strengthening national security.
105.
As a purchaser of imported products from countries subject to one or more of the
IEEPA Tariff Orders, the State of Delaware is directly harmed by these tariffs. For example, the
Page 24 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 26
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 25 of 38
Maintenance and Operations Division of the Delaware Department of Transportation purchases
approximately 20 dump trucks per year: both the two-ton bodies of the trucks and truck rims are
imported. Maintenance and Operations also purchases John Deere tractor parts that are made in
Mexico, and Stihl chainsaws and trimmers that are made in Germany. The Office of Fleet
Services of Delaware’s Office of Management and Budget provides state agencies with access to
vehicles. Fleet Services manages a fleet of about 3,000 vehicles, 25 percent of which are
minivans from Stellantis (Chrysler), assembled in Windsor, Ontario. Fleet Services purchases an
average of 70 minivans per year. Also, as Delaware moves to electrify its fleet, Fleet Services
will purchase vehicles such as the Ford Mach-E, Chevrolet Blazer EV, Chevrolet Equinox EV,
and Toyota BZ4x, which are manufactured outside the United States. Even those vehicles in
Delaware’s fleet assembled in the United States often include parts sourced worldwide. Any
increase in tariffs caused by these unlawful tariffs inflicts a direct pecuniary injury to Delaware’s
finances.
106.
New York’s Office of General Services (NYOGS) estimates that tariffs,
particularly those on Mexico, Canada, and China, will have significant impacts on bid prices,
supply chains, and construction claims. NYOGS’s primary responsibilities include managing and
leasing real property, designing and building facilities, and contracting for goods, services, and
technology for the State of New York.
107.
Energy pricing is particularly threatened. In 2024, New York State imported 7.7
Terawatt-hours of Canadian electricity, valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Canada is
the number one supplier of energy to the United States generally, including around 85 percent of
U.S. electricity imports.
108.
When President Trump imposed tariffs on Canada, the Ontario and Quebec
Premiers threatened retaliatory restrictions on electricity exports to the U.S. This would be
catastrophic. NYOGS estimates that if Ontario or Quebec restricted electricity exports to New
York, prices would soar at a time when the State is facing capacity restraints and is relying more
Page 25 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 27
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 26 of 38
heavily on Canadian hydropower than ever. New York cannot simply buy less electricity or buy
electricity from other sources.
109.
In the construction context, NYOGS bid about $1 billion in 2024, with
approximately half on labor and half on materials. Assuming NYOGS bids a comparable annual
portfolio, if even only 37 percent of these materials are subject to tariffs at 25 percent, then the
potential cost impact could be between $40 million and $50 million to New York’s projects. In
NYOGS’s experience, these price increases rarely fully recover to pre-event levels.
Consequently, the tariffs will likely have a long-term negative effect on project costs and,
consequently, agency capital programs.
110.
Outside of the construction context, NYOGS estimates that 50 percent to 75
percent of the products purchased by New York may be manufactured in a tariff-impacted
nation. Based on an estimated average total spend of $5 billion, a 25 percent tariff on Mexico
and Canada and a 10 percent tariff on China will likely have a portfolio-wide impact of roughly
$106 million for New York State agencies.
111.
NYOGS estimates that potential contractual impacts on active construction
projects due to imposed tariffs would be similar to what New York experienced during
COVID. Unlike during COVID, however, when New York was bidding projects in a soft and
uncertain economy, there is no shortage of construction work today. Contractors are very busy
despite higher interest rates.
112.
The IEEPA Tariff Orders also injure Plaintiff States by increasing the price of
goods and services that they purchase from domestic producers and suppliers that rely on
imports. For example, Oregon’s largest natural gas utility imports most of its natural gas from
Canada. It has already made a regulatory filing to reserve the right to show that the cost of tariffs
“should be recovered in rates….” The State of Oregon uses natural gas for most of its building
energy use and it would be injured as an electricity ratepayer by any increase in the rates for
natural gas.
Page 26 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 28
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
B.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 27 of 38
The President’s imposition, modification, and reinstatement of tariffs by executive
order and memoranda forces the Plaintiff States to incur administrative costs.
113.
The President’s invocation of the IEEPA to impose, modify, and reinstate tariffs
by executive order, memoranda, social media post, and other means has resulted in national trade
policy that reflects the President’s whims on a particular day rather than reasoned decision. The
President’s abrupt policy changes have disrupted the economies of the Plaintiff States. In just
March and April, the President has imposed sweeping tariff-rate changes on at least four
occasions, with numerous purported clarifications and exemptions made in between, as well as
the repeated retaliatory rate-hikes for China.
114.
Those erratic swings in trade policy not only affect the markets, but they also
harm the Plaintiff States’ ability to procure goods and services and to budget for and audit price
adjustments.
115.
For example, the Oregon Department of Transportation builds, maintains, and
plans for the State of Oregon’s transportation infrastructure. See, e.g., ORS § 184.615. To build
and maintain that infrastructure, ODOT frequently requires the work of general contractors.
Conditions are currently changing far more quickly than normal. Due to cost volatility, material
suppliers and subcontractors are substantially reducing the length of time that they will commit
to prices, making it more challenging for ODOT to secure bid extensions from prime contractors.
That results in a harm to ODOT by making it more difficult to obtain competitive bids from
high-quality prime contractors.
116.
The IEEPA Tariff Orders have also created procurement uncertainty for Oregon
State University. Oregon State University regularly issues requests for proposals or solicitations
and receives proposals from across the country and internationally. Because of the price
uncertainty caused by the IEEPA Tariff Orders, many of the solicitations received are
conditional and indicate that costs may change depending on cost fluctuations. For example,
Oregon State University recently received a proposal for a robotics system for research from a
Swiss manufacturer that stated the total price with the disclaimer that “[p]ricing is based on
Page 27 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 29
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 28 of 38
current US tariff regulations for imports from Switzerland. In the event that new or increased
tariffs are imposed on the quoted products or their components prior to delivery, [vendor]
reserves the right to adjust the prices accordingly.” These conditional solicitations necessitated
by the IEEPA Tariff Orders make it impossible for Oregon State University to evaluate which
solicitation is the lowest bid and budget accordingly.
117.
In Illinois, the Department of Information Technology (DOIT) purchases about
15,000 imported personal computers for state employees each year, along with necessary
accessories and support products (screens, docking stations, etc.). Because of the uncertainty
surrounding tariffs, DOIT's ability to negotiate future contracts has been seriously hindered, and
DOIT’s stock of available computers and hardware inventory has dwindled as negotiations
dragged on. In the end, DOIT was constrained to accept a contract under which the vendor is
explicitly permitted to pass on the cost of any tariff to the State of Illinois.
118.
The potential for tariffs and the chaos around the on-again, off-again tariff
policies have also impacted New York already. When contractors experience financial impacts
that are beyond their control, they will attempt to identify ways to mitigate their losses and
request notices under the contract for relief. New York has already experienced fluctuating prices
and delays caused by vendors adjusting to higher risk.
119.
Cost volatility also affects the ability of state agencies and entities to plan their
budgets. For example, the University of Oregon is currently setting its budget for fiscal year
2026 (July 1, 2025 through June 30, 2026). Due to the President’s purported ability to change
tariffs by executive order or memorandum, budgeting for the additional cost of tariffs effectively
requires the University of Oregon to predict the President’s state of mind at particular times of
the fiscal year. As a result, the university must plan its FY 2026 budget with a potential tariff rate
on any given item ranging from 10 to 145 percent, which substantially undermines the
university’s ability to make financial plans and decisions.
Page 28 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 30
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
120.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 29 of 38
As another example, OHSU is currently setting its budget for its Fiscal Year
2026, with its fiscal years also being July 1 through June 30. OHSU’s Board of Directors will
formally adopt the budget in May. Given the uncertainties related to tariffs, OHSU is unable to
accurately plan its expenses for the next fiscal year. Already in past years, despite increasing
revenue, spending has outpaced revenue. The substantial tariffs imposed and threatened by the
President will only worsen that problem. If the costs of tariffs cause OHSU to significantly
exceed its budget, it creates a serious risk that OHSU will need to cut expenses by scaling back
its services and laying off staff, which harms OHSU and the State of Oregon.
121.
Unpredictable tariffs also are already burdening or almost certainly will burden
the Plaintiff States by increasing administrative costs. When tariff rates increased in the past,
many Plaintiff States saw vendors and contractors claim the rate increases as the basis for price
adjustments. Although vendors that ship directly from foreign ports can include documentation
from U.S. Customs and Border Protection evidencing the applied tariff rate, that is not possible
with most domestic manufacturers that use foreign-sourced components. Whether due to
opportunism or avoidance of incurring their own administrative costs, many Plaintiff States have
experienced some vendors and contractors attempting to impose price adjustments that are not
reasonably based on increased tariff rates.
122.
When a vendor or contractor seeks to impose a price-adjustment based on tariff
rates, many Plaintiff States’ agencies audit the adjustment to ensure that it is reasonably based on
actual costs incurred. That is particularly difficult with regard to domestically produced goods
made in part with foreign-sourced components, or contracted services that use some foreignsourced materials. Due to the President’s erratic—and sometimes inconsistent—tariff-rate
directives, many of the Plaintiff States’ agencies must piece together the applicable tariff for a
particular day by reviewing multiple executive orders, memoranda, social media posts, and so
on, and also investigate how much of those costs were actually incurred by the vendor or
contractor. That imposes a substantial and additional administrative cost to many Plaintiff States.
Page 29 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 31
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 30 of 38
CAUSES OF ACTION
Count I
The IEEPA Tariff Orders are Ultra Vires and Violate the Separation of Powers
(Against All Defendants)
123.
The Plaintiff States incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the
preceding paragraphs.
124.
The Constitution grants only Congress, not the President, the “Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises….” Art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
125.
No statute authorizes the President to issue the IEEPA Tariff Orders. The only
statute conveying substantive authority to the President cited in the Orders is IEEPA. But IEEPA
does not authorize the imposition of such tariffs, if it authorizes tariffs at all. In addition, the
Worldwide Tariff Order does not address an “unusual and extraordinary threat.” Moreover, the
tariffs the Orders impose are not designed “to deal with”—and thus have an insufficient nexus
to—the purported “unusual and extraordinary threat[s]” the Orders identify.
126.
The President’s authority under IEEPA may be exercised only to address an
“unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the
United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the
President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.” 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
127.
The statutory requirement of an “unusual and extraordinary threat” is not met by
the President’s declaration of emergency accompanying the Worldwide Tariff Order. As the
Worldwide Tariff Order acknowledges, “annual U.S. goods trade deficits” are “persistent”; thus,
by definition, they are not “unusual and extraordinary.” There is no other “unusual and
extraordinary threat” addressed by the Worldwide Tariff Order.
128.
The President’s emergency powers under the IEEPA “may only be exercised to
deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has
Page 30 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 32
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 31 of 38
been declared for purposes of this chapter and may not be exercised for any other purpose.” 50
U.S.C. § 1701(b).
129.
The tariffs imposed under the Canada and Mexico Tariff Orders do not “deal
with” the “unusual and extraordinary threat[s]” they identify: there is no connection between the
border security threats the orders identify, including drug trafficking, and the tariffs imposed by
the orders.
130.
The tariffs imposed under the China Tariff Order does not “deal with” the
“unusual and extraordinary threat” it identifies: there is no connection between the manufacture
and trafficking of fentanyl and the tariffs imposed by the order.
131.
The tariffs imposed under the Worldwide Tariff Order do not “deal with” the
purported “unusual and extraordinary threat[s]” the Order identifies:
a.
The nearly worldwide 10 percent tariff level is wholly unconnected to the
stated basis of the emergency declaration: it applies without regard to any
country’s trade practices or purported threat to domestic industries.
b.
The level of additional tariffs published in Annex I of the Tariff Order
exceeds what is necessary “to deal with” the purported emergency.
c.
The Trump Administration has said that it intends to use the Tariff Order
to advance unrelated policy objectives in direct contravention of IEEPA.
White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said during an April 8 press
briefing that: “The President ... is going to have a custom, tailor-made
approach to each and every country, and if that means discussions of
foreign aid, of our military presence in these countries, how those troops
are paid for ... that could be part of the negotiation.” With respect to a
potential change to the Tariff Order with respect to South Korea, the
President wrote: “I just had a great call with the Acting President of South
Korea. We talked about their tremendous and unsustainable Surplus,
Page 31 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 33
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 32 of 38
Tariffs, Shipbuilding, large scale purchase of U.S. LNG, their joint
venture in an Alaska Pipeline, and payment for the big time Military
Protection we provide to South Korea….”
d.
The President’s suspension of the country-specific tariffs underscores the
lack of nexus between the purported economic threats the Worldwide
Tariff Order identifies and the tariffs it imposes.
132.
Plaintiff States have a non-statutory right of action to enjoin and declare unlawful
official action that is unconstitutional and ultra vires.
133.
The IEEPA Tariff Orders are not authorized by the IEEPA or any other statute.
As such, they are ultra vires and unlawful.
134.
Further, because the President lacks statutory authority to impose the tariffs in the
IEEPA Tariff Orders, the IEEPA Tariff Orders are an exercise of Congressional authority in
violation of separation of powers.
Count II
No statutory authority — 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C)
(Against U.S. Customs and Border Protection)
135.
The Plaintiff States incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the
preceding paragraphs.
136.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection is an “agency” under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
137.
The Customs and Border Protection’s Cargo Systems Messaging Service (CSMS)
# 64297449 - Guidance: Additional Duties on Imports from Canada (as amended by CSMS #
64472173, CSMS # 64514918, and CSMS # 64336037), CSMS # 64297292 – Guidance:
Additional Duties on Imports from Mexico (as amended by CSMS # 64335789), and CSMS #
64701128 – Updated Guidance – Reciprocal Tariffs – Increase in Rate for China and Reversion
of Other Country-Specific Rates, Effective April 10, 2025 (each, a “Guidance”) are each a final
Page 32 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 34
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 33 of 38
agency action subject to review under the APA. Each Guidance marks the consummation of its
decision-making process because it announces the agency’s implementation of the IEEPA Tariff
Orders.
138.
Each Guidance is an action by which rights or obligations have been determined
or from which legal consequences will flow because it immediately changes tariffs rates charged
at importation.
139.
Each Guidance implements a series of tariffs that are without statutory
authorization and are contrary to law. See Count I, above.
140.
The APA requires that a court “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be … in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).
141.
Plaintiff States are also entitled to vacatur of each Guidance under 5 U.S.C. § 706,
all appropriate preliminary relief under 5 U.S.C. § 705, and a preliminary and permanent
injunction preventing U.S. Customs and Border Protection from implementing each Guidance.
Count III
Arbitrary and Capricious — 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(Against U.S. Customs and Border Protection)
142.
The Plaintiff States incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the
preceding paragraphs.
143.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection is an “agency” under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
144.
The Customs and Border Protection’s Cargo Systems Messaging Service (CSMS)
# 64297449 - Guidance: Additional Duties on Imports from Canada (as amended by CSMS #
64472173, CSMS # 64514918, and CSMS # 64336037), CSMS # 64297292 – Guidance:
Additional Duties on Imports from Mexico (as amended by CSMS # 64335789), and CSMS #
64701128 – Updated Guidance – Reciprocal Tariffs – Increase in Rate for China and Reversion
Page 33 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 35
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 34 of 38
of Other Country-Specific Rates, Effective April 10, 2025 (each, a “Guidance”) are each a final
agency action subject to review under the APA. Each Guidance marks the consummation of its
decision-making process because it announces the agency’s implementation of the IEEPA Tariff
Orders.
145.
Each Guidance is an action by which rights or obligations have been determined
or from which legal consequences will flow because it immediately changes tariffs rates charged
at importation.
146.
The APA requires that a court “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.” 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
147.
Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency has “relied on factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
148.
Each Guidance is arbitrary and capricious because it relies on factors unrelated to
an “unusual and extraordinary threat” as required under IEEPA, it fails to consider the economic
consequences of the imposition of tariffs, and is implausible and counter to the evidence.
149.
Plaintiff States are also entitled to vacatur of each Guidance under 5 U.S.C. § 706,
all appropriate preliminary relief under 5 U.S.C. § 705, and a preliminary and permanent
injunction preventing U.S. Customs and Border Protection from implementing each Guidance.
Page 34 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 36
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 35 of 38
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff States pray that the Court:
a.
Declare that the IEEPA Tariff Orders, as amended, are ultra vires and
contrary to law;
b.
Hold unlawful and set aside the Customs and Border Protection’s Cargo
Systems Messaging Service (CSMS) # 64297449 - Guidance: Additional Duties on
Imports from Canada (as amended by CSMS # 64472173, CSMS # 64514918, and
CSMS # 64336037), CSMS # 64297292 – Guidance: Additional Duties on Imports from
Mexico (as amended by CSMS # 64335789), and CSMS # 64701128 – Updated
Guidance – Reciprocal Tariffs – Increase in Rate for China and Reversion of Other
Country-Specific Rates, Effective April 10, 2025;
c.
Preliminarily and permanently enjoin Secretary Noem, Acting
Commissioner Flores, the Defendant agencies, their agents, and anyone acting in concert
or participation with them from implementing, instituting, maintaining, or giving effect to
(i) the IEEPA Tariff Orders, as amended, and (ii) U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s
Cargo Systems Messaging Service (CSMS) # 64297449 (issued March 3, 2025), CSMS #
64336037 (issued March 6, 2025), CSMS # 64297292 (issued March 3, 2025), CSMS #
64335789 (issued March 6, 2025), CSMS # 64299816 (issued March 3, 2025), CSMS #
64701128 (issued April 10, 2025), and CSMS # 64724565 (issued April 11, 2025), by
entering an order consistent with the constitutional requirement that “all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States,” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1;
Page 35 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 37
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
d.
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 36 of 38
Award the Plaintiffs States’ costs of suit and reasonable attorneys’ fees
and expenses under any applicable law; and
e.
Award such additional relief as the interests of justice may require.
DATED: April 23, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
DAN RAYFIELD
Attorney General
State of Oregon
KRISTIN K. MAYES
Attorney General
State of Arizona
By: /s/ Brian Simmonds Marshall
Benjamin Gutman
Solicitor General
Dustin Buehler
Special Counsel
Brian Simmonds Marshall
Christopher A. Perdue*
Nina R. Englander*
Senior Assistant Attorneys General
YoungWoo Joh**
Alexander C. Jones*
Assistant Attorneys General
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
Tel (971) 673-1880
Fax (971) 673-5000
Brian.S.Marshall@doj.oregon.gov
Chris.Perdue@doj.oregon.gov
Nina.Englander@doj.oregon.gov
YoungWoo.Joh@doj.oregon.gov
Alex.Jones@doj.oregon.gov
By: /s/ Syreeta A. Tyrell
Joshua D. Bendor*
Solicitor General
Syreeta A. Tyrell*
Assistant Attorney General
2005 North Central Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Phone: (602) 542-8310
Joshua.Bendor@azag.gov
Syreeta.Tyrell@azag.gov
ACL@azag.gov
Attorneys for the State of Arizona
Attorneys for the State of Oregon
Page 36 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 38
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 37 of 38
KEITH ELLISON
Attorney General
State of Minnesota
PHILIP J. WEISER
Attorney General
State of Colorado
By: /s/ Pete Farrell
Peter J. Farrell*
Deputy Solicitor General
445 Minnesota Street, Suite 600
St. Paul, Minnesota, 55101
(651) 757-1424
Peter.Farrell@ag.state.mn.us
By: /s/ Sarah H. Weiss
Sarah H. Weiss*
Senior Assistant Attorney General
1300 Broadway, #10
Denver, CO 80203
(720) 508-6000
Sarah.Weiss@coag.gov
Attorneys for the State of
Minnesota
Attorneys for the State of Colorado
AARON D. FORD
Attorney General
State of Nevada
WILLIAM TONG
Attorney General
State of Connecticut
By: /s/ Heidi Parry Stern
Heidi Parry Stern*
Solicitor General
Office of the Nevada Attorney
General
1 State of Nevada Way, Ste. 100
Las Vegas, NV 89119
HStern@ag.nv.gov
By: /s/ Michael K. Skold
Michael K. Skold*
Solicitor General
165 Capitol Ave
Hartford, CT 06106
(860) 808-5020
Michael.skold@ct.gov
Attorneys for the State of Nevada
Attorneys for the State of Connecticut
KATHLEEN JENNINGS
Attorney General
State of Delaware
RAÚL TORREZ
Attorney General
State of New Mexico
By: /s/ Ian R. Liston
Ian R. Liston*
Director of Impact Litigation
Vanessa L. Kassab*
Deputy Attorney General
Delaware Department of Justice
820 N. French Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
(302) 683-8899
vanessa.kassab@delaware.gov
By: /s/ James W. Grayson
James W. Grayson*
Chief Deputy Attorney General
New Mexico Department of Justice
P.O. Drawer 1508
Santa Fe, NM 87504-1508
(505) 490-4060
jgrayson@nmdoj.gov
Attorneys for the State of New Mexico
Attorneys for the State of Delaware
Page 37 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
PDF Page 39
Case 1:25-cv-00077-N/A
Document 2
Filed 04/23/25
Page 38 of 38
KWAME RAOUL
Attorney General
State of Illinois
LETITIA JAMES
Attorney General
State of New York
By: /s/ Gretchen Helfrich
Cara Hendrickson*
Assistant Chief Deputy Attorney General
Gretchen Helfrich*
Deputy Chief, Special Litigation Bureau
Office of the Illinois Attorney General
115 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60603
Tel. (312) 814-3000
Cara.Hendrickson@ilag.gov
Gretchen.helfrich@ilag.gov
By: /s/ Rabia Muqaddam
Rabia Muqaddam*
Special Counsel for Federal
Initiatives
28 Liberty St.
New York, NY 10005
(929) 638-0447
rabia.muqaddam@ag.ny.gov
Attorneys for the State of New York
Attorneys for the State of Illinois
AARON M. FREY
Attorney General
State of Maine
CHARITY R. CLARK
Attorney General
State of Vermont
By: /s/ Vivian A. Mikhail
Vivian A. Mikhail*
Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Maine Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333-0006
(207) 626-8800
Vivian.mikhail@maine.gov
By: /s/ Ryan P. Kane
Ryan P. Kane*
Deputy Solicitor General
109 State Street
Montpelier, VT 05609
(802) 828-2153
Ryan.kane@vermont.gov
Attorneys for the State of Maine
Attorneys for the State of Vermont
* Admission application forthcoming
** Admission application pending
Page 38 - COMPLAINT – Oregon, et al. v. Trump, et al.
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market Street
Portland, OR 97201
(971) 673-1880 / Fax: (971) 673-5000
Back to 
