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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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GUARDANT HEALTH, INC.,
Plaintiff,
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ORDER ADOPTING SPECIAL
MASTER REPORTS ON SANCTIONS;
GRANTING LIMITED SEALING
v.
NATERA, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
Case No. 21-cv-04062-EMC
Docket Nos. 1017, 1018
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Picture a mid-level litigation associate at a well-recognized law firm. It is the summer of
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2023, and the firmâs client, a maker of cancer tests, has been sued by a competitor for false and
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misleading advertising. The clientâs defense hinges on showing that the science backs up its
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statements.
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In early September, an expert witness retained by the firm contacts the associate with
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intriguing news â a national clinical study of the plaintiffâs product closed early due to higher-
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than-expected false positives. The expert calls it a âmonumental failureâ for the opposition, which
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means it could be a litigation game-changer for the associate and her case team. At the teamâs
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request, their expert prepares a memo about the shuttered study. The memo turns out to be more
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than a summary: it includes data from the clinical trial before it was terminated. Their expert
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warns that this trial data is âconfidentialâ and âembargoed,â and writes, âPLEASE DO NOT
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DISCUSS DETAILS with anyone else.â
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The associateâs supervising partner does not seem concerned with how their expert, who
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was not part of the study, obtained access to embargoed, confidential clinical data. He tells the
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associate to âconvertâ the memo into a supplemental expert report. In January, the associatePage 2 United States District Court
Northern District of California
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circulates a draft expert report based on the memo to her case team. A different partner reviews it,
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questioning the lack of citations for the clinical trial data. The associate explains that the data was
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provided by their expert in confidence and so cannot be cited. She is hoping that this data will be
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revealed to the public when the abstract is published at an upcoming conference. If the data is
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confidential, the reviewing partner asks, how did the expert get it? But she is not interested in
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pursuing this potential ethical problem further. âMaybe I donât want to know,â she says, and the
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conversation ends there.
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The associateâs hopes are mostly met. The abstract is published on schedule and the data
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in it mostly aligns with the data the firmâs expert provided, though some of the data he provided
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didnât make it into the public abstract. At the associateâs next meeting with the expert, she asks
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him where he got his data from. He tells her: âoncologist gossip,â âwatercooler type talk,â and
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âchatters.â Watercooler talk, for specific clinical trial data? Itâs not a real answer, but despite the
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implausibility she accepts it at face value and lets the conversation end there. Trial is set for
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March, and if her team is going to get this supplemental expert report in, she needs to work
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quickly. Itâs not the time or place to second-guess.
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Anyway, she reassures herself, the partners know that the supplemental expert report was
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informed by embargoed data, and their only concern is that she revise the expert report to match
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the public abstract. Thatâs easy enough to do. On the last day of January, with less than six weeks
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to go before trial, the team serves the report on opposing counsel. Opposing counsel responds by
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moving to strike, arguing that the expert report is untimely because it concerns a study that
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concluded five months ago.
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The associate observes the oral argument on opposing counselâs motion to strike.
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Opposing counsel claims that the firmâs expert received the âabstract and the data at least a month
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and a half beforeâ the abstract was published. He argues that this untimely report should not
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vacate a trial that is less than a month away or reopen expert discovery that closed sixteen months
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ago. A different partner from the associateâs team is handling this argument, one who did not
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work with her on the supplemental expert report. He tells the Court that their expert had no âearly
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accessâ or âinside informationâ on the clinical trial results. He implies the information is new and
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late breaking.
Is that true? Technically, the associate thinks, their expert did not have early access to the
actual abstract. Heâd just gotten its data early.
The distinction is thin and evidently not apparent to the Court or opposing counsel. Yet
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the associate keeps quiet. She does not raise the issue with the Court or her legal team. Instead,
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perhaps, she takes the oral argument as a lesson: this is what vigorous advocacy looks like.
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Her team wins the motion. The Court rules that their delay in serving the expert report was
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justified, since the study results were not available to the firm or their expert until mid-January,
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when they were made public. Given the late-breaking evidence, the Court vacates the trial date,
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
Document 1041
pushes trial to August, and reopens discovery.
Opposing counsel refuses to let the issue go. They subpoena the expert, seeking
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documents and communications related to the clinical study. When the associate asks the expert if
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he has any documents responsive to the subpoena, he says no. She asks him to run opposing
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counselâs search terms, and he tells her that no prior correspondence with the sponsors of the study
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came up in his email. When she asks for additional confirmation, he jokes, âasked and answered,
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counselor.â The associate remembers the expertâs memo from back in September, with its
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detailed, embargoed data months before the public release of the study. But she chooses to take
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the expert at his word without any further inquiry. She reports back to her team that there are no
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responsive documents.
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When opposing counsel moves to compel on their request for correspondence between the
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expert and the study sponsor, the associate is given the opportunity to handle the oral argument in
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front of the magistrate judge. Itâs a show of trust by her team, and she is determined to do it right.
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She reassures the judge that their expertâs involvement with the clinical study was âvery limitedâ
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and that his expert report was based on âlooking at the published data.â She represents to the
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judge that there is no correspondence to compel.
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The magistrate judge agrees with her position: there is nothing to compel, end of story.
Another win for her team.
In June, it all comes crashing down. Opposing counsel didnât stop digging â they went
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and subpoenaed a third-party sponsor of the study with access to the expertâs correspondence. The
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third-party production includes emails that show in black and white that the firmâs expert received
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a draft of the abstract on September 13, days before he sent the associate his initial memo. The
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associate finally circulates the memo to the team. She writes in bold and all caps that their expert
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did not just learn about the trial data in January with everyone else. Heâd had âthe actual abstractâ
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the whole time, which means that the data heâd sent the team had been directly taken from the
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abstract.
The team convenes and, after discussing, decides not to correct the record. The decision is
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Northern District of California
Document 1041
not the associateâs to make, but she agrees with it. As for the expert, she accepts his explanation
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for why he failed to turn over that correspondence in response to the discovery request: heâd
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deleted the emails as a matter of course and âforgottenâ that heâd had them. The team resolves to
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rest on that assertion, as implausible as it sounds. Later, and only after the Court orders a forensic
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examination of the expertâs computer, does the expert come clean. He lied: heâd had the emails
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the whole time.
Opposing counsel moves for sanctions. In strategy discussions, the team agrees on the
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party line: nobody misled the Court. Saying that their expert never shared the draft abstract with
them was technically accurate; he hadnât actually shared the abstract, just the information it
contained. More thin distinctions. The associate tells herself that thin distinctions are what
lawyering is all about.
In the end, the Court finds that the associate and her firm deliberately and knowingly
misled the Court. When asked about it later, the associate doesnât believe that she did anything
wrong.
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***
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This is not a Professional Ethics issue spotter. These are the facts of Quinn Emanuelâs
conduct in the instant litigation, as investigated by the appointed Special Master.1 The Special
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In presenting these facts, the Court has taken some liberty in ascribing to the attorneys states of
mind throughout.
4Page 5 United States District Court
Northern District of California
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Master reviewed internal firm communications and took testimony from the involved attorneys
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under oath. His thorough investigation revealed not the misstatement or inadvertence of a single
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attorney but a pattern of conduct that infected an entire litigation team, from mid-level associate to
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managing partner. No less than four partners were involved in propagating misleading statements
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to the Court. At virtually every juncture in this misadventure, these attorneys turned a blind eye to
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the truth, deliberately failed to exercise diligence, violated their duties of candor to the Court, and
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then attempted to justify it â without basis.
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Though each attorney culpable bears individual responsibility for their actions, their
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conduct implicates a culture of lawyering that is deeply disturbing. It is a culture that takes refuge
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in lawyering finesse and prioritizes winning motions over acting ethically. This kind of lawyering
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multiplies proceedings, balloons costs, and erodes trust in counsel. It is not good for anyone: not
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for the Court, not for the client, and not for the attorneys involved, on either side. It is particularly
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damaging to younger associates, who take their cues and learn their practice from partners who
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fail to model ethical behavior, creating a vicious cycle. The undersigned hopes that these events
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â and their consequences â will be educational for Quinn Emanuel, and for the legal profession
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as a whole.
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II. BACKGROUND
The Court will not further belabor the troubling sequence of events that led to this point.
They are discussed in the Courtâs sanction orders at Dkt. Nos. 730 and 945 and at great length in
the Special Masterâs Reports, appended to this Order. In prior orders, the Court found that âQuinn
Emanuel deliberately and knowingly misled this Court,â and awarded Guardant $2,985,909.63 in
compensatory sanctions. Dkt. No. 945 at 2. These fees compensated Guardant for work incurred
as a but-for result of Quinn Emanuelâs sanctionable conduct, including for the costs of reopening
discovery and preparing for an expanded trial based on the supposedly newly discovered clinical
trial results. Id. at 3. Had Quinn Emanuel not made its deliberate misrepresentations to the Court,
the trial would have proceeded in February, fact discovery would not have been reopened, and
these substantial costs would not have been incurred. Id. at 5.
5Page 6 The Court deferred the question of how these compensatory sanctions should be
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apportioned between Natera, Quinn Emanuel, and individual Quinn Emanuel attorneys to a
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Special Master. The Court also deferred the question of whether punitive damages should be
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assessed. The Courtâs Appointment Order instructed the Special Master to determine the
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apportionment of sanctions by taking into account âthe relative culpability of Natera, the firm, and
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individual attorneys responsible.â Dkt. No. 947 at 2. The Special Master was authorized to order
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the production of documents, rule on privilege, conduct evidentiary hearings, and call individual
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attorneys to testify under oath. Id. at 2-3. Guardant was permitted to participate in the
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proceedings at the Special Masterâs discretion, id. at 3, but the Special Master remained firmly in
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control over the investigation. The Natera Parties were charged with the costs of the Special
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Master. Id. at 4.
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The Special Master filed his initial Report on January 9, 2026. The almost 60-page report
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provided detailed factual findings based on the Special Masterâs investigation, which included the
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review of Quinn Emanuelâs internal communications and the testimony of various Quinn
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attorneys, as well as Dr. Hochster, the expert who misled the Court herein. In forming his
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recommendation, the Special Master considered âindividual culpability, mitigating factors, and the
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severity of the firmâs collective responsibility for the series of failures that unnecessarily
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protracted litigation and eroded the integrity of the proceedings.â Report at 59. He looked to
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mitigating factors including âlack of any prior discipline, lack of legal experience, personal
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problems, remorse, cooperative attitude toward proceedings, the imposition of other penalties or
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sanctions,â as well as aggravating factors such as âthe refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature
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of the conduct and substantial experience practicing law.â Id. at 21.
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The Special Master recommended the following apportionment and additional sanctions:
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Natera: No apportionment of liability.
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Quinn Emanuel Firm: Apportionment on a joint and several basis of 100% of the
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sanctions, as well as a $100,000 fine of punitive sanctions. Requirement to develop
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and administer eight hours of ethics training to the team on this litigation, with the
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outline of the training to be submitted to the Court.
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Andrew Bramhall (Quinn Emanuel Partner): Apportionment on a joint and several
Brian Cannon (Quinn Emanuel Partner): Apportionment on a joint and several
basis up to 2% ($58,000) and eight hours of ethics training.
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Ryan Landes (Quinn Emanuel Partner): No apportionment of liability.
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Elle Wang (Quinn Emanuel Associate): Apportionment on a joint and several basis
up to 1% ($29,000) and eight hours of ethics training.
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Margaret Shyr (Quinn Emanuel Partner): No recommendation as to apportionment,
but show cause order from the Court requested.
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Filed 05/19/26
basis up to 2% ($58,000) and eight hours of ethics training.
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â˘
Victoria Maroulis (Quinn Emanuel Managing Partner): No recommendation as to
apportionment, but show cause order from the Court requested.
After receiving the Special Masterâs Report, the Court issued a Show Cause order as to
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Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulis and authorized the Special Master to issue a supplemental report
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discussing potential apportionment for each. Dkt. No. 1010. A subsequent order also directed the
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Special Master to discuss âthe applicable standard and appropriate procedures for imposing any
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punitive sanctions against Quinn Emanuel.â Dkt. No. 1016. The Special Master submitted his
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Supplemental Report on February 27, 2026. The Supplemental Report recommended
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apportionments of 1% for Ms. Shyr and 2% for Ms. Maroulis.
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Quinn submitted consolidated Objections to the Reports on March 23, 2026. Dkt. No.
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1023. Certain Quinn attorneys have also submitted personal letters to the Court. See Dkt. No.
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1012 (Bramhall Letter); Dkt. No. 1013 (Cannon Letter); Dkt. No. 1014 (Landes Letter);
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Dkt. No. 1015 (Wang Letter); Dkt. Nos. 1024 (Maroulis Letter).
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III.
DISCUSSION
A. Sealing of the Special Masterâs Report
The Court initially lodged the Special Master Reports under temporary seal. The parties
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now agree that the portions of the Reports redacted by the Special Master concern privileged
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documents for which no waiver was made, and therefore should remain under seal. Dkt. Nos.
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1025, 1028. Preservation of the attorney-client and work product privilege satisfies the good
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cause standard for sealing. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096
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(9th Cir. 2016) (good cause sealing standard applies for collateral, non-dispositive issues); Capitol
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Specialty Ins. Corp. v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., No. CV 20-672-RSWL-EX, 2021 WL 7708484, at
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*3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2021) (granting requests to seal given that â[a]ttorney-client privileged
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materials, of course, are archetypical examples of material that has traditionally been kept secret
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for important policy reasonsâ) (quoting Lambright v. Ryan, 698 F.3d 808, 820 (9th Cir. 2012)).
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Nateraâs request to seal the redacted portions of the Report is therefore GRANTED. With
those redactions, the Reports may be made public. The Reports are attached hereto.
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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B. Objections of the Quinn Emanuel Parties to the Special Master Report
As a preliminary matter, the Quinn Emanuel Parties have stated in their Objections, and
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confirmed at oral argument, that they make no substantive objections to the Reports or the
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recommendations herein. See Dkt. No. 1023, Consolidated Objections, (â[T]he Quinn Emanuel
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Parties respectfully submit this response and objections to the Special Masterâs Supplemental
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Report not to challenge or contest the specific findings and recommendations he made, but to
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reiterate certain procedural objections regarding how those findings and recommendations were
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made.â) The Quinn Emanuel Parties do not object to the Special Masterâs recommended
apportionment of compensatory sanctions, nor do they object to the Special Masterâs
recommended award of $100,000 in punitive damages. Their only objections are procedural. The
Court is thus not required to examine de novo any findings of fact or conclusions of law made by
the Special Master. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f)(3-4).
1. Scope of Waiver
The first of the Quinn Emanuel Partiesâ objections is not actually an objection but concerns
potential future waiver disputes. During the Special Master proceedings, the Special Master
reviewed in camera numerous privileged attorney-client and work product documents under rule
502(d). 502(d) provides that a disclosure of privileged documents does not have the effect of
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waiving the privilege over those documents. Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 502(d). For a narrow segment of
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these documents, however, the Special Master found waiver of privilege over fact work product.
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Due to this waiver finding, these documents were also produced to Guardant.
The Quinn Emanuel Parties do not object to the Special Masterâs waiver finding over these
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documents. Rather, they are concerned that in some future proceeding, Guardant or another party
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may argue that the production of these documents effected a broad or subject matter waiver of
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Northern District of California
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privilege over other documents that the Special Master did not deem waived and only reviewed in
camera. This concern is premature, since no such assertion has been made. The Court reiterates
that the privilege is presumptively maintained for the class of documents for which the Special
Master found no waiver, without prejudice to any future argument that waiver was in fact effected.
2. Due Process as to Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulis
The Quinn Emanuel parties contend that Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulisâ due process rights
were violated when the Special Master ultimately recommended individual apportionment for
these attorneys, after initially interviewing them only as witnesses in the course of the initial
report.
Some background is helpful. When Guardant filed its motion for sanctions at
Dkt. No. 884-13, it sought to apportion sanctions against âat leastâ four Quinn Emanuel attorneys
it believed bore personal culpability for the sanctionable conduct: Andrew Bramhall, Elle Wang,
Ryan Landes, and Brian Cannon. Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulis were not mentioned in this motion.
Guardant named these four attorneys based on the evidence available to it at the time but deferred
to the Court to determine the extent to which individual Quinn Emanuel attorneys should be held
liable for the compensatory sanctions. Dkt. No. 884-13 at 16. The Court then deferred to the
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Special Master the appropriate apportionment of the âindividual attorneys responsibleâ for the
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sanctionable conduct. Dkt. No. 947 at 2. Notably, the Courtâs order did not limit this inquiry to
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specific Quinn Emanuel attorneys; indeed, the order mentions no specific attorneys by name.
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The Special Master initially interviewed Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulis as witnesses. In his
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initial Report, he made factual findings as to their role in the sanctionable conduct. These factual
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findings were based in large part on the internal emails and documents that the Special Master
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reviewed. For example, the Special Master gleaned from internal documents that Ms. Maroulis
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directed the strategic decision to rely on facile distinctions between the draft abstract and data
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from that abstract in briefing before the Court. Report at 53-54. The Special Masterâs review of
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internal documents also demonstrated that when faced with the knowledge that Dr. Hochester had
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access to non-public data, Ms. Shyrâs response was to write, âIf that data is confidential, how did
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Hochster get it? Maybe I don't want to know.â Report at 55. In his initial Report, the Special
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Master provided these factual findings, and based on them requested that the Court enter a show
cause order specifically authorizing him to make an apportionment recommendation as to Ms.
Shyr and Ms. Maroulis. Once the Court did so, the Special Master provided both attorneys with
the opportunity to provide further testimony under oath or submit additional evidence to amend or
clarify their prior testimony. Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulis submitted a formal waiver declining to
do so. Ex. A to Supp. Report.
On this record, the Court finds Quinn Emanuelâs process objection meritless. First, the
Special Master acted well within the scope of his authority. The Courtâs initial order authorized
him to determine apportionment for any Quinn Emanuel attorney found to be culpable in the
sanctionable conduct; the order did not limit the Special Master to only the four attorneys
Guardant named in their sanctions motion. The Special Master, acting out of an abundance of
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caution, declined to make any apportionment recommendations for Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulis
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without formal notice from the Court authorizing him to do so. Once he received this specific
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authorization, he then provided them with a further chance to provide testimony or evidence,
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which they declined. The Special Master had full authority to make the recommendations he did.
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Quinnâs reliance on In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968) is misplaced. In Ruffalo, the
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Supreme Court held that in quasi-criminal proceedings such as disbarment, an individual must
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know the charge before proceedings commence. Otherwise, such proceedings âbecome a trapâ
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when âcharges are amended on the basis of the testimony of the accused,â who cannot âexpunge
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his earlier statements, even if provided a second chance to testify. Id. at 551. In Ruffalo, the
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attorney provided testimony when he had âno reason even to suspectâ the charges that would lead
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to his disbarment. Id. at n.4. The Court therefore found that he may have been âlulled into a false
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sense of securityâ in his prior testimony that could not be cured by a later opportunity to
10Page 11 testify. Id.
Ruffalo is inapposite for multiple reasons. First, it is not clear that Ms. Shyr and Ms.
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Maroulisâ testimony â as opposed to the written documentation of their conduct (e.g. internal
4
emails) â was the material factor in the Special Masterâs recommendation. As noted, Ms. Shyr
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and Ms. Maroulisâ actions, as documented in their internal communications, provide an
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independent basis for the Special Masterâs finding even without their witness testimony. Ms. Shyr
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and Ms. Maroulis do not point to any statements made by them in testimony that they were
8
âentrappedâ into, nor do they argue they would have said something different to the Special Master
9
had they known they might be subject to shared responsibility for the sanction.
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Second, and more importantly, unlike in Ruffalo, when Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulis
11
testified as witnesses during the initial investigation, they were well aware of the relevant âchargeâ
12
in this case â the misrepresentations made and the failure to correct them. They cannot argue that
13
they had âno reason to suspectâ that they could be sanctioned if their testimony revealed that they
14
engaged in the same pattern of conduct as their colleagues. It is no answer to say that they had no
15
notice because Guardant did not name them in its sanctions motion. Guardant did not know the
16
extent of Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulisâ involvement at that time; only Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulis
17
knew what they knew, said, and did. In short, there was no trap for the unwary here. The Quinn
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Emanuel Partiesâ objection on this score is overruled.
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3. Due Process for Punitive Sanctions
Although Quinn Emanuel claims that it ârecognizes the gravity of the Courtâs and Special
22
Masterâs findings, accepts responsibility, and will not challenge the $100,000 punitive sanction
23
recommended in the Report,â it nonetheless challenges whether the punitive sanction complies
24
with due process. Dkt. No. 1023 at 3.
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As a preliminary matter, Quinn Emanuel suggested at oral argument that its process
26
objections on this score applied not only to the $100,000 punitive sanction award but to the
27
individual apportionment of the compensatory sanctions. Quinnâs position is apparently that
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individual apportionment is inherently punitive. This position holds no water. The sanctions
11Page 12 United States District Court
Northern District of California
1
imposed by this Court were compensatory, not punitive. And apportionment of that compensatory
2
sanction is aimed at ensuring that the actors involved bear only the costs proportionate to their
3
culpability. Rather than being punitive, apportionment puts a limit on personal liability which
4
would otherwise be fully joint and several. If anything, this is the opposite of a punitive process.
5
Indeed, as a result of the apportionment process, Natera â Quinn Emanuelâs client â was
6
absolved entirely of millions in sanctions it might otherwise have had to pay. And the Special
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Master determined that one Quinn attorney, Ryan Landes, was not sufficiently culpable to be held
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individually liable at all. As to the remaining attorneys, the Special Master capped their liability at
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1-2% of the sanctions. The Court therefore rejects Quinn Emanuelâs contention that the
10
apportionment process itself was punitive and turns to Quinn Emanuelâs argument as to the
11
punitive damages recommendation.
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â[W]hen strictly compensatory or remedial sanctions are sought, civil procedures, rather
13
than criminal-type procedures, may be applied.â Am. Unites for Kids v. Rousseau, 985 F.3d 1075,
14
1089 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Intâl Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821,
15
826-830 (1994)). But where a sanction is âimposed under a courtâs inherent authority as a penalty
16
or to punish someone,â the âprocedural guarantees applicable in criminal casesâ must be provided.
17
Id. (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 108 (2017)). â[T]he seriousness
18
of a criminal fine affects what due process protections are required.â Coleman v. Newsom, 131 19
F.4th 948, 964 (9th Cir. 2025) (emphasis omitted). â[W]hile all criminal sanctions require
20
heightened due process protections,â âthe right to trial by jury applies only to serious criminal
21
sanctions.â Id.
22
The Special Master found that his recommended $100,000 punitive sanction was not a
23
âseriousâ one within the meaning of Coleman, and Quinn Emanuel does not dispute this finding.
24
Nor could it: the Ninth Circuit takes into consideration the resources of the sanctioned party to
25
determine the seriousness of the sanction. See F.J. Hanshaw Enters. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc.,
26 244 F.3d 1128, 1139 n.10 (9th Cir. 2001) (taking into consideration that the party subject to the
27
sanction was a âwealthy individualâ). Here, the proposed sanction amounts to 0.004% of Quinnâs
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revenue for 2025 alone. Supp. Report at 19-20. (For another comparator, the proposed sanction is
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a mere 1.2% of a single equity partnerâs profits from 2025, which were reported as over
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$9,000,000 per partner. Dkt. No. 1027 at n.1; Bloomberg Law,
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https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/quinn-emanuel-partners-join-rare-club-
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with-9-million-payouts.) Since the sanction is not serious, the Ninth Circuitâs caselaw is clear that
5
Quinn Emanuel was not entitled to a jury trial. Less clear is to what extent Quinn Emanuel was
6
entitled to other traditional criminal protections. Beyond noting that âheightened protectionsâ
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apply, the Ninth Circuit does not appear to have provided guidance on how to assess which further
8
protections apply in any given case.
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The Court does not need to resolve this question, however, because Quinn Emanuel
10
obtained nearly all of the panoply of procedural guarantees applicable in criminal cases. To wit,
11
Quinn Emanuel was advised of the charges against it, had the assistance of counsel, could have
12
invoked a right against self-incrimination but chose not to do so, had the opportunity to present a
13
defense (including calling witnesses), did not exercise a right to cross-examine witnesses (only
14
because the relevant witnesses were all Quinn attorneys), and had the equivalent of a disinterested
15
prosecutor in the form of the Special Master. In this regard, Quinn Emanuel does not dispute that
16
the Special Master was disinterested but contends that Guardantâs participation in the proceedings
17
tainted the proceedings. But to adopt Quinn Emanuelâs preferred metaphor, it is common in
18
criminal proceedings for the victim to work closely with the prosecution. While it is true
19
Guardantâs counsel was allowed to ask questions, unlike a victim at a criminal trial, Quinn
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Emanuel does not contend that the Special Master ever deferred to Guardant or exercised anything
21
other than his own independent judgment in running the investigation and in reaching his findings
22
and recommendations. To the extent Quinn Emanuel was entitled to an independent âprosecutor,â
23
it received one. Guardantâs limited participation in the investigation, as permitted by the Special
24
Master, does not change that.
25
Quinn Emanuel also contends that the applicable standard to assess its conduct is a beyond
26
reasonable doubt standard, rather than clear and convincing. Such a standard may make sense
27
when the punitive sanctions at issue involve a restriction of liberty. Here, though, the punitive
28
sanction is only monetary. In the typical civil case, such punitive damages can be awarded by a
13Page 14 1
jury upon a clear and convincing finding. It is difficult to see why this standard would not apply
2
here. Even assuming that a beyond reasonable doubt standard does apply, the Court finds that the
3
Special Masterâs factual findings show beyond a reasonable doubt that Quinn Emanuel recklessly
4
or intentionally misled the Court, failed to correct an obviously meritless litigation position, and
5
proliferated court proceedings, and that the findings as to the responsible attorneys hold even
6
under a higher standard of proof. See In re Girardi, 611 F.3d 1027, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010) (â[A]
7
finding that the attorney recklessly or intentionally misled the court is sufficient to impose
8
sanctions under § 1927.â). Under either standard, the punitive sanction is warranted, and Quinn
9
does not actually dispute that it is warranted. Quinnâs procedural objection is accordingly
10
overruled.
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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C. Adoption of the Special Masterâs Report
No party has challenged the substance of the Special Masterâs factual findings, nor the
14
merits of his recommendations. Based on the Courtâs independent review of the Special Masterâs
15
Reports, the Court finds that the Special Masterâs investigation was extensive and thorough, that
16
the Special Masterâs conclusions are well-supported by the record evidence, and that his
17
apportionment reflects balanced judgment as to each attorneyâs personal degree of culpability.
18
The Court accordingly ADOPTS the Special Masterâs Report and Supplemental Report.
19
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D. Mandatory Reporting to the California Bar
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Under California Code, Business and Professions Code § 6086.7(a)(3), the Court is
22
required to notify the California State Bar of â[t]he imposition of any judicial sanctions against an
23
attorney, except sanctions for failure to make discovery or monetary sanctions of less than one
24
thousand dollars ($1,000).â Mr. Bramhall, Mr. Cannon, Ms. Wang, Ms. Shyr, and Ms. Maroulis
25
have all been apportioned individual sanctions greater than $1,000. Accordingly, the Court will
26
transmit to the State Bar a copy of this Order, with the appended Special Master Reports.
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14Page 15 CONCLUSION
The Court ADOPTS the Special Masterâs Reports and Recommendations. Quinn
3
Emanuel is directed to begin development of an eight-hour course on ethics training. The firm
4
shall submit its initial outline to the Court by July 6, 2026. The Court will enter a final sanctions
5
order upon adjudication of Guardantâs outstanding motion for further fees.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: 5/19/2026
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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______________________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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GUARDANT HEALTH, INC.,
Plaintiff,
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ORDER ADOPTING SPECIAL
MASTER REPORTS ON SANCTIONS;
GRANTING LIMITED SEALING
v.
NATERA, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
Case No. 21-cv-04062-EMC
Docket Nos. 1017, 1018
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Picture a mid-level litigation associate at a well-recognized law firm. It is the summer of
15
2023, and the firmâs client, a maker of cancer tests, has been sued by a competitor for false and
16
misleading advertising. The clientâs defense hinges on showing that the science backs up its
17
statements.
18
In early September, an expert witness retained by the firm contacts the associate with
19
intriguing news â a national clinical study of the plaintiffâs product closed early due to higher-
20
than-expected false positives. The expert calls it a âmonumental failureâ for the opposition, which
21
means it could be a litigation game-changer for the associate and her case team. At the teamâs
22
request, their expert prepares a memo about the shuttered study. The memo turns out to be more
23
than a summary: it includes data from the clinical trial before it was terminated. Their expert
24
warns that this trial data is âconfidentialâ and âembargoed,â and writes, âPLEASE DO NOT
25
DISCUSS DETAILS with anyone else.â
26
The associateâs supervising partner does not seem concerned with how their expert, who
27
was not part of the study, obtained access to embargoed, confidential clinical data. He tells the
28
associate to âconvertâ the memo into a supplemental expert report. In January, the associate
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circulates a draft expert report based on the memo to her case team. A different partner reviews it,
2
questioning the lack of citations for the clinical trial data. The associate explains that the data was
3
provided by their expert in confidence and so cannot be cited. She is hoping that this data will be
4
revealed to the public when the abstract is published at an upcoming conference. If the data is
5
confidential, the reviewing partner asks, how did the expert get it? But she is not interested in
6
pursuing this potential ethical problem further. âMaybe I donât want to know,â she says, and the
7
conversation ends there.
8
The associateâs hopes are mostly met. The abstract is published on schedule and the data
9
in it mostly aligns with the data the firmâs expert provided, though some of the data he provided
10
didnât make it into the public abstract. At the associateâs next meeting with the expert, she asks
11
him where he got his data from. He tells her: âoncologist gossip,â âwatercooler type talk,â and
12
âchatters.â Watercooler talk, for specific clinical trial data? Itâs not a real answer, but despite the
13
implausibility she accepts it at face value and lets the conversation end there. Trial is set for
14
March, and if her team is going to get this supplemental expert report in, she needs to work
15
quickly. Itâs not the time or place to second-guess.
16
Anyway, she reassures herself, the partners know that the supplemental expert report was
17
informed by embargoed data, and their only concern is that she revise the expert report to match
18
the public abstract. Thatâs easy enough to do. On the last day of January, with less than six weeks
19
to go before trial, the team serves the report on opposing counsel. Opposing counsel responds by
20
moving to strike, arguing that the expert report is untimely because it concerns a study that
21
concluded five months ago.
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The associate observes the oral argument on opposing counselâs motion to strike.
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Opposing counsel claims that the firmâs expert received the âabstract and the data at least a month
24
and a half beforeâ the abstract was published. He argues that this untimely report should not
25
vacate a trial that is less than a month away or reopen expert discovery that closed sixteen months
26
ago. A different partner from the associateâs team is handling this argument, one who did not
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work with her on the supplemental expert report. He tells the Court that their expert had no âearly
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accessâ or âinside informationâ on the clinical trial results. He implies the information is new and
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late breaking.
Is that true? Technically, the associate thinks, their expert did not have early access to the
actual abstract. Heâd just gotten its data early.
The distinction is thin and evidently not apparent to the Court or opposing counsel. Yet
5
the associate keeps quiet. She does not raise the issue with the Court or her legal team. Instead,
6
perhaps, she takes the oral argument as a lesson: this is what vigorous advocacy looks like.
7
Her team wins the motion. The Court rules that their delay in serving the expert report was
8
justified, since the study results were not available to the firm or their expert until mid-January,
9
when they were made public. Given the late-breaking evidence, the Court vacates the trial date,
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pushes trial to August, and reopens discovery.
Opposing counsel refuses to let the issue go. They subpoena the expert, seeking
12
documents and communications related to the clinical study. When the associate asks the expert if
13
he has any documents responsive to the subpoena, he says no. She asks him to run opposing
14
counselâs search terms, and he tells her that no prior correspondence with the sponsors of the study
15
came up in his email. When she asks for additional confirmation, he jokes, âasked and answered,
16
counselor.â The associate remembers the expertâs memo from back in September, with its
17
detailed, embargoed data months before the public release of the study. But she chooses to take
18
the expert at his word without any further inquiry. She reports back to her team that there are no
19
responsive documents.
20
When opposing counsel moves to compel on their request for correspondence between the
21
expert and the study sponsor, the associate is given the opportunity to handle the oral argument in
22
front of the magistrate judge. Itâs a show of trust by her team, and she is determined to do it right.
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She reassures the judge that their expertâs involvement with the clinical study was âvery limitedâ
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and that his expert report was based on âlooking at the published data.â She represents to the
25
judge that there is no correspondence to compel.
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The magistrate judge agrees with her position: there is nothing to compel, end of story.
Another win for her team.
In June, it all comes crashing down. Opposing counsel didnât stop digging â they went
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and subpoenaed a third-party sponsor of the study with access to the expertâs correspondence. The
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third-party production includes emails that show in black and white that the firmâs expert received
3
a draft of the abstract on September 13, days before he sent the associate his initial memo. The
4
associate finally circulates the memo to the team. She writes in bold and all caps that their expert
5
did not just learn about the trial data in January with everyone else. Heâd had âthe actual abstractâ
6
the whole time, which means that the data heâd sent the team had been directly taken from the
7
abstract.
The team convenes and, after discussing, decides not to correct the record. The decision is
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Document 1041
not the associateâs to make, but she agrees with it. As for the expert, she accepts his explanation
10
for why he failed to turn over that correspondence in response to the discovery request: heâd
11
deleted the emails as a matter of course and âforgottenâ that heâd had them. The team resolves to
12
rest on that assertion, as implausible as it sounds. Later, and only after the Court orders a forensic
13
examination of the expertâs computer, does the expert come clean. He lied: heâd had the emails
14
the whole time.
Opposing counsel moves for sanctions. In strategy discussions, the team agrees on the
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party line: nobody misled the Court. Saying that their expert never shared the draft abstract with
them was technically accurate; he hadnât actually shared the abstract, just the information it
contained. More thin distinctions. The associate tells herself that thin distinctions are what
lawyering is all about.
In the end, the Court finds that the associate and her firm deliberately and knowingly
misled the Court. When asked about it later, the associate doesnât believe that she did anything
wrong.
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***
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25
This is not a Professional Ethics issue spotter. These are the facts of Quinn Emanuelâs
conduct in the instant litigation, as investigated by the appointed Special Master.1 The Special
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In presenting these facts, the Court has taken some liberty in ascribing to the attorneys states of
mind throughout.
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Master reviewed internal firm communications and took testimony from the involved attorneys
2
under oath. His thorough investigation revealed not the misstatement or inadvertence of a single
3
attorney but a pattern of conduct that infected an entire litigation team, from mid-level associate to
4
managing partner. No less than four partners were involved in propagating misleading statements
5
to the Court. At virtually every juncture in this misadventure, these attorneys turned a blind eye to
6
the truth, deliberately failed to exercise diligence, violated their duties of candor to the Court, and
7
then attempted to justify it â without basis.
8
Though each attorney culpable bears individual responsibility for their actions, their
9
conduct implicates a culture of lawyering that is deeply disturbing. It is a culture that takes refuge
10
in lawyering finesse and prioritizes winning motions over acting ethically. This kind of lawyering
11
multiplies proceedings, balloons costs, and erodes trust in counsel. It is not good for anyone: not
12
for the Court, not for the client, and not for the attorneys involved, on either side. It is particularly
13
damaging to younger associates, who take their cues and learn their practice from partners who
14
fail to model ethical behavior, creating a vicious cycle. The undersigned hopes that these events
15
â and their consequences â will be educational for Quinn Emanuel, and for the legal profession
16
as a whole.
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II. BACKGROUND
The Court will not further belabor the troubling sequence of events that led to this point.
They are discussed in the Courtâs sanction orders at Dkt. Nos. 730 and 945 and at great length in
the Special Masterâs Reports, appended to this Order. In prior orders, the Court found that âQuinn
Emanuel deliberately and knowingly misled this Court,â and awarded Guardant $2,985,909.63 in
compensatory sanctions. Dkt. No. 945 at 2. These fees compensated Guardant for work incurred
as a but-for result of Quinn Emanuelâs sanctionable conduct, including for the costs of reopening
discovery and preparing for an expanded trial based on the supposedly newly discovered clinical
trial results. Id. at 3. Had Quinn Emanuel not made its deliberate misrepresentations to the Court,
the trial would have proceeded in February, fact discovery would not have been reopened, and
these substantial costs would not have been incurred. Id. at 5.
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The Court deferred the question of how these compensatory sanctions should be
2
apportioned between Natera, Quinn Emanuel, and individual Quinn Emanuel attorneys to a
3
Special Master. The Court also deferred the question of whether punitive damages should be
4
assessed. The Courtâs Appointment Order instructed the Special Master to determine the
5
apportionment of sanctions by taking into account âthe relative culpability of Natera, the firm, and
6
individual attorneys responsible.â Dkt. No. 947 at 2. The Special Master was authorized to order
7
the production of documents, rule on privilege, conduct evidentiary hearings, and call individual
8
attorneys to testify under oath. Id. at 2-3. Guardant was permitted to participate in the
9
proceedings at the Special Masterâs discretion, id. at 3, but the Special Master remained firmly in
10
control over the investigation. The Natera Parties were charged with the costs of the Special
11
Master. Id. at 4.
12
The Special Master filed his initial Report on January 9, 2026. The almost 60-page report
13
provided detailed factual findings based on the Special Masterâs investigation, which included the
14
review of Quinn Emanuelâs internal communications and the testimony of various Quinn
15
attorneys, as well as Dr. Hochster, the expert who misled the Court herein. In forming his
16
recommendation, the Special Master considered âindividual culpability, mitigating factors, and the
17
severity of the firmâs collective responsibility for the series of failures that unnecessarily
18
protracted litigation and eroded the integrity of the proceedings.â Report at 59. He looked to
19
mitigating factors including âlack of any prior discipline, lack of legal experience, personal
20
problems, remorse, cooperative attitude toward proceedings, the imposition of other penalties or
21
sanctions,â as well as aggravating factors such as âthe refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature
22
of the conduct and substantial experience practicing law.â Id. at 21.
23
The Special Master recommended the following apportionment and additional sanctions:
24
â˘
Natera: No apportionment of liability.
25
â˘
Quinn Emanuel Firm: Apportionment on a joint and several basis of 100% of the
26
sanctions, as well as a $100,000 fine of punitive sanctions. Requirement to develop
27
and administer eight hours of ethics training to the team on this litigation, with the
28
outline of the training to be submitted to the Court.
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Andrew Bramhall (Quinn Emanuel Partner): Apportionment on a joint and several
Brian Cannon (Quinn Emanuel Partner): Apportionment on a joint and several
basis up to 2% ($58,000) and eight hours of ethics training.
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5
â˘
Ryan Landes (Quinn Emanuel Partner): No apportionment of liability.
6
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Elle Wang (Quinn Emanuel Associate): Apportionment on a joint and several basis
up to 1% ($29,000) and eight hours of ethics training.
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Margaret Shyr (Quinn Emanuel Partner): No recommendation as to apportionment,
but show cause order from the Court requested.
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basis up to 2% ($58,000) and eight hours of ethics training.
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â˘
Victoria Maroulis (Quinn Emanuel Managing Partner): No recommendation as to
apportionment, but show cause order from the Court requested.
After receiving the Special Masterâs Report, the Court issued a Show Cause order as to
13
Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulis and authorized the Special Master to issue a supplemental report
14
discussing potential apportionment for each. Dkt. No. 1010. A subsequent order also directed the
15
Special Master to discuss âthe applicable standard and appropriate procedures for imposing any
16
punitive sanctions against Quinn Emanuel.â Dkt. No. 1016. The Special Master submitted his
17
Supplemental Report on February 27, 2026. The Supplemental Report recommended
18
apportionments of 1% for Ms. Shyr and 2% for Ms. Maroulis.
19
Quinn submitted consolidated Objections to the Reports on March 23, 2026. Dkt. No.
20
1023. Certain Quinn attorneys have also submitted personal letters to the Court. See Dkt. No.
21
1012 (Bramhall Letter); Dkt. No. 1013 (Cannon Letter); Dkt. No. 1014 (Landes Letter);
22
Dkt. No. 1015 (Wang Letter); Dkt. Nos. 1024 (Maroulis Letter).
23
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III.
DISCUSSION
A. Sealing of the Special Masterâs Report
The Court initially lodged the Special Master Reports under temporary seal. The parties
27
now agree that the portions of the Reports redacted by the Special Master concern privileged
28
documents for which no waiver was made, and therefore should remain under seal. Dkt. Nos.
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1025, 1028. Preservation of the attorney-client and work product privilege satisfies the good
2
cause standard for sealing. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096
3
(9th Cir. 2016) (good cause sealing standard applies for collateral, non-dispositive issues); Capitol
4
Specialty Ins. Corp. v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., No. CV 20-672-RSWL-EX, 2021 WL 7708484, at
5
*3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2021) (granting requests to seal given that â[a]ttorney-client privileged
6
materials, of course, are archetypical examples of material that has traditionally been kept secret
7
for important policy reasonsâ) (quoting Lambright v. Ryan, 698 F.3d 808, 820 (9th Cir. 2012)).
8
9
Nateraâs request to seal the redacted portions of the Report is therefore GRANTED. With
those redactions, the Reports may be made public. The Reports are attached hereto.
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B. Objections of the Quinn Emanuel Parties to the Special Master Report
As a preliminary matter, the Quinn Emanuel Parties have stated in their Objections, and
13
confirmed at oral argument, that they make no substantive objections to the Reports or the
14
recommendations herein. See Dkt. No. 1023, Consolidated Objections, (â[T]he Quinn Emanuel
15
Parties respectfully submit this response and objections to the Special Masterâs Supplemental
16
Report not to challenge or contest the specific findings and recommendations he made, but to
17
reiterate certain procedural objections regarding how those findings and recommendations were
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made.â) The Quinn Emanuel Parties do not object to the Special Masterâs recommended
apportionment of compensatory sanctions, nor do they object to the Special Masterâs
recommended award of $100,000 in punitive damages. Their only objections are procedural. The
Court is thus not required to examine de novo any findings of fact or conclusions of law made by
the Special Master. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f)(3-4).
1. Scope of Waiver
The first of the Quinn Emanuel Partiesâ objections is not actually an objection but concerns
potential future waiver disputes. During the Special Master proceedings, the Special Master
reviewed in camera numerous privileged attorney-client and work product documents under rule
502(d). 502(d) provides that a disclosure of privileged documents does not have the effect of
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waiving the privilege over those documents. Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 502(d). For a narrow segment of
2
these documents, however, the Special Master found waiver of privilege over fact work product.
3
Due to this waiver finding, these documents were also produced to Guardant.
The Quinn Emanuel Parties do not object to the Special Masterâs waiver finding over these
4
5
documents. Rather, they are concerned that in some future proceeding, Guardant or another party
6
may argue that the production of these documents effected a broad or subject matter waiver of
7
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privilege over other documents that the Special Master did not deem waived and only reviewed in
camera. This concern is premature, since no such assertion has been made. The Court reiterates
that the privilege is presumptively maintained for the class of documents for which the Special
Master found no waiver, without prejudice to any future argument that waiver was in fact effected.
2. Due Process as to Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulis
The Quinn Emanuel parties contend that Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulisâ due process rights
were violated when the Special Master ultimately recommended individual apportionment for
these attorneys, after initially interviewing them only as witnesses in the course of the initial
report.
Some background is helpful. When Guardant filed its motion for sanctions at
Dkt. No. 884-13, it sought to apportion sanctions against âat leastâ four Quinn Emanuel attorneys
it believed bore personal culpability for the sanctionable conduct: Andrew Bramhall, Elle Wang,
Ryan Landes, and Brian Cannon. Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulis were not mentioned in this motion.
Guardant named these four attorneys based on the evidence available to it at the time but deferred
to the Court to determine the extent to which individual Quinn Emanuel attorneys should be held
liable for the compensatory sanctions. Dkt. No. 884-13 at 16. The Court then deferred to the
23
Special Master the appropriate apportionment of the âindividual attorneys responsibleâ for the
24
sanctionable conduct. Dkt. No. 947 at 2. Notably, the Courtâs order did not limit this inquiry to
25
specific Quinn Emanuel attorneys; indeed, the order mentions no specific attorneys by name.
26
The Special Master initially interviewed Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulis as witnesses. In his
27
initial Report, he made factual findings as to their role in the sanctionable conduct. These factual
28
findings were based in large part on the internal emails and documents that the Special Master
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reviewed. For example, the Special Master gleaned from internal documents that Ms. Maroulis
2
directed the strategic decision to rely on facile distinctions between the draft abstract and data
3
from that abstract in briefing before the Court. Report at 53-54. The Special Masterâs review of
4
internal documents also demonstrated that when faced with the knowledge that Dr. Hochester had
5
access to non-public data, Ms. Shyrâs response was to write, âIf that data is confidential, how did
6
Hochster get it? Maybe I don't want to know.â Report at 55. In his initial Report, the Special
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Master provided these factual findings, and based on them requested that the Court enter a show
cause order specifically authorizing him to make an apportionment recommendation as to Ms.
Shyr and Ms. Maroulis. Once the Court did so, the Special Master provided both attorneys with
the opportunity to provide further testimony under oath or submit additional evidence to amend or
clarify their prior testimony. Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulis submitted a formal waiver declining to
do so. Ex. A to Supp. Report.
On this record, the Court finds Quinn Emanuelâs process objection meritless. First, the
Special Master acted well within the scope of his authority. The Courtâs initial order authorized
him to determine apportionment for any Quinn Emanuel attorney found to be culpable in the
sanctionable conduct; the order did not limit the Special Master to only the four attorneys
Guardant named in their sanctions motion. The Special Master, acting out of an abundance of
17
caution, declined to make any apportionment recommendations for Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulis
18
without formal notice from the Court authorizing him to do so. Once he received this specific
19
authorization, he then provided them with a further chance to provide testimony or evidence,
20
which they declined. The Special Master had full authority to make the recommendations he did.
21
Quinnâs reliance on In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968) is misplaced. In Ruffalo, the
22
Supreme Court held that in quasi-criminal proceedings such as disbarment, an individual must
23
know the charge before proceedings commence. Otherwise, such proceedings âbecome a trapâ
24
when âcharges are amended on the basis of the testimony of the accused,â who cannot âexpunge
25
his earlier statements, even if provided a second chance to testify. Id. at 551. In Ruffalo, the
26
attorney provided testimony when he had âno reason even to suspectâ the charges that would lead
27
to his disbarment. Id. at n.4. The Court therefore found that he may have been âlulled into a false
28
sense of securityâ in his prior testimony that could not be cured by a later opportunity to
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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Document 1041
Filed 05/19/26
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testify. Id.
Ruffalo is inapposite for multiple reasons. First, it is not clear that Ms. Shyr and Ms.
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Maroulisâ testimony â as opposed to the written documentation of their conduct (e.g. internal
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emails) â was the material factor in the Special Masterâs recommendation. As noted, Ms. Shyr
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and Ms. Maroulisâ actions, as documented in their internal communications, provide an
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independent basis for the Special Masterâs finding even without their witness testimony. Ms. Shyr
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and Ms. Maroulis do not point to any statements made by them in testimony that they were
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âentrappedâ into, nor do they argue they would have said something different to the Special Master
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had they known they might be subject to shared responsibility for the sanction.
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Second, and more importantly, unlike in Ruffalo, when Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulis
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testified as witnesses during the initial investigation, they were well aware of the relevant âchargeâ
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in this case â the misrepresentations made and the failure to correct them. They cannot argue that
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they had âno reason to suspectâ that they could be sanctioned if their testimony revealed that they
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engaged in the same pattern of conduct as their colleagues. It is no answer to say that they had no
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notice because Guardant did not name them in its sanctions motion. Guardant did not know the
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extent of Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulisâ involvement at that time; only Ms. Shyr and Ms. Maroulis
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knew what they knew, said, and did. In short, there was no trap for the unwary here. The Quinn
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Emanuel Partiesâ objection on this score is overruled.
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3. Due Process for Punitive Sanctions
Although Quinn Emanuel claims that it ârecognizes the gravity of the Courtâs and Special
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Masterâs findings, accepts responsibility, and will not challenge the $100,000 punitive sanction
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recommended in the Report,â it nonetheless challenges whether the punitive sanction complies
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with due process. Dkt. No. 1023 at 3.
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As a preliminary matter, Quinn Emanuel suggested at oral argument that its process
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objections on this score applied not only to the $100,000 punitive sanction award but to the
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individual apportionment of the compensatory sanctions. Quinnâs position is apparently that
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individual apportionment is inherently punitive. This position holds no water. The sanctions
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
Case 3:21-cv-04062-EMC
Document 1041
Filed 05/19/26
Page 12 of 15
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imposed by this Court were compensatory, not punitive. And apportionment of that compensatory
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sanction is aimed at ensuring that the actors involved bear only the costs proportionate to their
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culpability. Rather than being punitive, apportionment puts a limit on personal liability which
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would otherwise be fully joint and several. If anything, this is the opposite of a punitive process.
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Indeed, as a result of the apportionment process, Natera â Quinn Emanuelâs client â was
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absolved entirely of millions in sanctions it might otherwise have had to pay. And the Special
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Master determined that one Quinn attorney, Ryan Landes, was not sufficiently culpable to be held
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individually liable at all. As to the remaining attorneys, the Special Master capped their liability at
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1-2% of the sanctions. The Court therefore rejects Quinn Emanuelâs contention that the
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apportionment process itself was punitive and turns to Quinn Emanuelâs argument as to the
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punitive damages recommendation.
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â[W]hen strictly compensatory or remedial sanctions are sought, civil procedures, rather
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than criminal-type procedures, may be applied.â Am. Unites for Kids v. Rousseau, 985 F.3d 1075,
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1089 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Intâl Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821,
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826-830 (1994)). But where a sanction is âimposed under a courtâs inherent authority as a penalty
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or to punish someone,â the âprocedural guarantees applicable in criminal casesâ must be provided.
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Id. (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 108 (2017)). â[T]he seriousness
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of a criminal fine affects what due process protections are required.â Coleman v. Newsom, 131
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F.4th 948, 964 (9th Cir. 2025) (emphasis omitted). â[W]hile all criminal sanctions require
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heightened due process protections,â âthe right to trial by jury applies only to serious criminal
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sanctions.â Id.
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The Special Master found that his recommended $100,000 punitive sanction was not a
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âseriousâ one within the meaning of Coleman, and Quinn Emanuel does not dispute this finding.
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Nor could it: the Ninth Circuit takes into consideration the resources of the sanctioned party to
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determine the seriousness of the sanction. See F.J. Hanshaw Enters. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc.,
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244 F.3d 1128, 1139 n.10 (9th Cir. 2001) (taking into consideration that the party subject to the
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sanction was a âwealthy individualâ). Here, the proposed sanction amounts to 0.004% of Quinnâs
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revenue for 2025 alone. Supp. Report at 19-20. (For another comparator, the proposed sanction is
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a mere 1.2% of a single equity partnerâs profits from 2025, which were reported as over
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$9,000,000 per partner. Dkt. No. 1027 at n.1; Bloomberg Law,
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https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/quinn-emanuel-partners-join-rare-club-
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with-9-million-payouts.) Since the sanction is not serious, the Ninth Circuitâs caselaw is clear that
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Quinn Emanuel was not entitled to a jury trial. Less clear is to what extent Quinn Emanuel was
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entitled to other traditional criminal protections. Beyond noting that âheightened protectionsâ
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apply, the Ninth Circuit does not appear to have provided guidance on how to assess which further
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protections apply in any given case.
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
Document 1041
The Court does not need to resolve this question, however, because Quinn Emanuel
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obtained nearly all of the panoply of procedural guarantees applicable in criminal cases. To wit,
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Quinn Emanuel was advised of the charges against it, had the assistance of counsel, could have
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invoked a right against self-incrimination but chose not to do so, had the opportunity to present a
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defense (including calling witnesses), did not exercise a right to cross-examine witnesses (only
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because the relevant witnesses were all Quinn attorneys), and had the equivalent of a disinterested
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prosecutor in the form of the Special Master. In this regard, Quinn Emanuel does not dispute that
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the Special Master was disinterested but contends that Guardantâs participation in the proceedings
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tainted the proceedings. But to adopt Quinn Emanuelâs preferred metaphor, it is common in
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criminal proceedings for the victim to work closely with the prosecution. While it is true
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Guardantâs counsel was allowed to ask questions, unlike a victim at a criminal trial, Quinn
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Emanuel does not contend that the Special Master ever deferred to Guardant or exercised anything
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other than his own independent judgment in running the investigation and in reaching his findings
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and recommendations. To the extent Quinn Emanuel was entitled to an independent âprosecutor,â
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it received one. Guardantâs limited participation in the investigation, as permitted by the Special
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Master, does not change that.
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Quinn Emanuel also contends that the applicable standard to assess its conduct is a beyond
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reasonable doubt standard, rather than clear and convincing. Such a standard may make sense
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when the punitive sanctions at issue involve a restriction of liberty. Here, though, the punitive
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sanction is only monetary. In the typical civil case, such punitive damages can be awarded by a
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Case 3:21-cv-04062-EMC
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jury upon a clear and convincing finding. It is difficult to see why this standard would not apply
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here. Even assuming that a beyond reasonable doubt standard does apply, the Court finds that the
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Special Masterâs factual findings show beyond a reasonable doubt that Quinn Emanuel recklessly
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or intentionally misled the Court, failed to correct an obviously meritless litigation position, and
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proliferated court proceedings, and that the findings as to the responsible attorneys hold even
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under a higher standard of proof. See In re Girardi, 611 F.3d 1027, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010) (â[A]
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finding that the attorney recklessly or intentionally misled the court is sufficient to impose
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sanctions under § 1927.â). Under either standard, the punitive sanction is warranted, and Quinn
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does not actually dispute that it is warranted. Quinnâs procedural objection is accordingly
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overruled.
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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C. Adoption of the Special Masterâs Report
No party has challenged the substance of the Special Masterâs factual findings, nor the
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merits of his recommendations. Based on the Courtâs independent review of the Special Masterâs
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Reports, the Court finds that the Special Masterâs investigation was extensive and thorough, that
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the Special Masterâs conclusions are well-supported by the record evidence, and that his
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apportionment reflects balanced judgment as to each attorneyâs personal degree of culpability.
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The Court accordingly ADOPTS the Special Masterâs Report and Supplemental Report.
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D. Mandatory Reporting to the California Bar
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Under California Code, Business and Professions Code § 6086.7(a)(3), the Court is
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required to notify the California State Bar of â[t]he imposition of any judicial sanctions against an
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attorney, except sanctions for failure to make discovery or monetary sanctions of less than one
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thousand dollars ($1,000).â Mr. Bramhall, Mr. Cannon, Ms. Wang, Ms. Shyr, and Ms. Maroulis
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have all been apportioned individual sanctions greater than $1,000. Accordingly, the Court will
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transmit to the State Bar a copy of this Order, with the appended Special Master Reports.
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Case 3:21-cv-04062-EMC
IV.
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CONCLUSION
The Court ADOPTS the Special Masterâs Reports and Recommendations. Quinn
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Emanuel is directed to begin development of an eight-hour course on ethics training. The firm
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shall submit its initial outline to the Court by July 6, 2026. The Court will enter a final sanctions
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order upon adjudication of Guardantâs outstanding motion for further fees.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: 5/19/2026
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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______________________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge
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