COMPLAINT ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 100018262), filed by Christopher Daniel McNosky, Sven Stricker. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet and Receipt)(os) (Entered: 07/30/2013)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ;tu
occ
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS iESTEkN DSTRCT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DWISION
ti
V
Christopher Daniel MeNosky
Plaintiff
Sven Stricker
Plaintiff
A13cV0631
CASE NUMBER:
The State of Texas
Defendant
COMPLAINT
(1) Christopher Daniel McNosky Pleasant Run,
Colleyville, TX 76034
Sven Stricker Bent Tree Ct.
Bedford, TX 76021
(2) The State of Texas
11th E
St
Austin, TX 78701
(3) United States judicial precedent, citing Exparte Young 209 US. 123 (1908), clearly
indicates that when there is a question regarding whether or not a state's law is in
violation of federal law, suits may be brought before United States District Courts to
enjoin state officials from enforcing unconstitutional laws. The plaintiffs claim that the
defendant's enforcement of Article 1, Sec. 32 of the Texas Constitution, and Texas Family
Code; Title 1; Subtitle A; Chapter 2; Subchapter A; Section 2.001(b), is in violation of
The Equal Protection Clause of The Fourteenth Amendment of The United States
Constitution, due to their explicit incorporation of sex-based discrimination practices,
utilized when evaluating the validity of Texas Marriage license applications.
(4) On July 1, 2013, plaintiffs Christopher Daniel McNosky and Sven Stricker, jointly
applied for a marriage license at the Vital Records Office of Tarrant County, located in
ssPage 2 Fort Worth, Texas. The plaintiffs properly completed marriage license application was
denied immediately upon submission, without further review. The plaintiffs were
explicitly informed that their application could not be reviewed, nor approved because
they were both of the same sex.
(5) According to United States Supreme Court precedent set by Craig v. Boren; Glenn v.
Brumby; J.E.B. v. Alabama, and Mississippi Universityfor Women v. Hogan, and United
States v. Virginia, sex is considered to be a quasi-suspect classification, subject to
intermediate judicial scrutiny under The Equal Protection Clause of The Fourteenth
Amendment of The United States Constitution. According to the majority opinions of the
preceding cases, federal, state, and local governments are barred from engaging in the
discriminatory allocation and denial of liberty on the basis of sex, without valid
governmental objective.
(6) The defendant's subsequent practice of sex-based discrimination, related to the
enforcement of Article 1, Sec. 32 of the Texas Constitution, which reads, "(a) Marriage
in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman. (b) This
state or a political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal
status identical or similar to marriage," and Texas Family Code; Title 1; Subtitle A;
Chapter 2; SubchapterA; Section 2.001 (b), which reads, "A license may not be issued
for the marriage of persons of the same sex," is not rooted in any sort of valid
govenunental objective, and is thus a violation of The Equal Protection Clause of The
Fourteenth Amendment of The United States Constitution, since the aforementioned laws
restrict the otherwise legally eligible plaintiffs from participating in the state-regulated
institution of marriage, solely based upon their respective sexes. These laws further infer
that the plaintiffs could be granted a marriage license simply if one of them was
biologically female.
The plaintiffs are seeking relief in the form of a federal injunction, preventing The State
of Texas from enforcing both Article 1, Sec. 32 of the Texas Constitution, and Texas
Family Code; Title 1; Subtitle A; Chapter 2; Subchapter A; Section 2.001 (b), so that
they would then be allowed to procure a marriage license issued by The State of Texas.
Christopher Daniel MeNosky Pleasant Run
Colleyville, TX 76034-360-0687
ci:'
Sven Stricker Bent Tree Ct.
Bedford, TX 76021-681-1760
PDF Page 1
PlainSite Cover Page
PDF Page 2
Case 1:13-cv-00631-SS Document 1 Filed 07/29/13 Page 1 of 2
FILED
21113
JUL 29
PM
t1:
07
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ;tu
occ
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS iESTEkN DSTRCT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DWISION
ti
V
Christopher Daniel MeNosky
Plaintiff
Sven Stricker
Plaintiff
A13cV0631
CASE NUMBER:
The State of Texas
Defendant
COMPLAINT
(1) Christopher Daniel McNosky
5108 Pleasant Run,
Colleyville, TX 76034
Sven Stricker
3047 Bent Tree Ct.
Bedford, TX 76021
(2) The State of Texas
11th
112 E
St
Austin, TX 78701
(3) United States judicial precedent, citing Exparte Young 209 US. 123 (1908), clearly
indicates that when there is a question regarding whether or not a state's law is in
violation of federal law, suits may be brought before United States District Courts to
enjoin state officials from enforcing unconstitutional laws. The plaintiffs claim that the
defendant's enforcement of Article 1, Sec. 32 of the Texas Constitution, and Texas Family
Code; Title 1; Subtitle A; Chapter 2; Subchapter A; Section 2.001(b), is in violation of
The Equal Protection Clause of The Fourteenth Amendment of The United States
Constitution, due to their explicit incorporation of sex-based discrimination practices,
utilized when evaluating the validity of Texas Marriage license applications.
(4) On July 1, 2013, plaintiffs Christopher Daniel McNosky and Sven Stricker, jointly
applied for a marriage license at the Vital Records Office of Tarrant County, located in
ss
PDF Page 3
Case 1:13-cv-00631-SS Document 1 Filed 07/29/13 Page 2 of 2
Fort Worth, Texas. The plaintiffs properly completed marriage license application was
denied immediately upon submission, without further review. The plaintiffs were
explicitly informed that their application could not be reviewed, nor approved because
they were both of the same sex.
(5) According to United States Supreme Court precedent set by Craig v. Boren; Glenn v.
Brumby; J.E.B. v. Alabama, and Mississippi Universityfor Women v. Hogan, and United
States v. Virginia, sex is considered to be a quasi-suspect classification, subject to
intermediate judicial scrutiny under The Equal Protection Clause of The Fourteenth
Amendment of The United States Constitution. According to the majority opinions of the
preceding cases, federal, state, and local governments are barred from engaging in the
discriminatory allocation and denial of liberty on the basis of sex, without valid
governmental objective.
(6) The defendant's subsequent practice of sex-based discrimination, related to the
enforcement of Article 1, Sec. 32 of the Texas Constitution, which reads, "(a) Marriage
in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman. (b) This
state or a political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal
status identical or similar to marriage," and Texas Family Code; Title 1; Subtitle A;
Chapter 2; SubchapterA; Section 2.001 (b), which reads, "A license may not be issued
for the marriage of persons of the same sex," is not rooted in any sort of valid
govenunental objective, and is thus a violation of The Equal Protection Clause of The
Fourteenth Amendment of The United States Constitution, since the aforementioned laws
restrict the otherwise legally eligible plaintiffs from participating in the state-regulated
institution of marriage, solely based upon their respective sexes. These laws further infer
that the plaintiffs could be granted a marriage license simply if one of them was
biologically female.
The plaintiffs are seeking relief in the form of a federal injunction, preventing The State
of Texas from enforcing both Article 1, Sec. 32 of the Texas Constitution, and Texas
Family Code; Title 1; Subtitle A; Chapter 2; Subchapter A; Section 2.001 (b), so that
they would then be allowed to procure a marriage license issued by The State of Texas.
Christopher Daniel MeNosky
5108 Pleasant Run
Colleyville, TX 76034
817-360-0687
ci:'
Sven Stricker
3047 Bent Tree Ct.
Bedford, TX 76021
817-681-1760
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